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EVOLUTION AND EFFECTIVENESS





An independent board of directors in public listed companies is seen
as an integral element of a country's corporate governance norms. Board
independence has taken on such a pivotal status in corporate governance
that it has become almost indispensable.' Consequently, governance
reform in recent years has increasingly pinned hope as well as
responsibility on independent directors to enable higher standards of
governance.
Although the institution of independent directors has been the subject
of debate lately, the concept itself is hardly of recent vintage. Independent
directors were introduced voluntarily as a measure of good governance in
the United States in the 1950s before they were mandated by law.2
Thereafter, owing to sustained efforts by the Delaware courts and stock
exchanges in deferring to decisions of independent boards, independent
directors took on greater prominence. Following the Enron cohort of
. Ass't Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. Ph.D. National University
of Singapore; L.L.M. New York University; B.A., LL.B with Honors National Law School of India
University. I am grateful to Stephen Girvin, Richard C. Nolan, Sandeep Parekh, Tan Ng Chee and
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I. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 73
(2007) [hereinafter Clarke, Three Concepts] (observing that "[i]ndependent directors have long been
viewed as a solution to many corporate governance problems"). See also Laura Lin, The Effectiveness
of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 898, 899-900 (1996) (finding that reformers have identified independent outside directors as a
possible solution to highly publicized corporate governance problems).
2. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Qf
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1473 [hereinafter Gordon, The
Rise ofIndependent Directors].
3. Lin, supra note 1, at 904-10 (discussion of the reliance placed by the Delaware courts on
decisions of disinterested or independent directors). The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and
Nasdaq Stock Exchange ("NASDAQ") have emphasized the importance of independent directors on
boards of listed companies. See NYSE, Inc.. Listed Company Manual § 303A.01 (2003) [hereinafter
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scandals, independent directors were recognized by statute as well.4 A
similar, but more recent, trend is ascertainable from the United Kingdom as
well. The requirement for board independence there was triggered by the
Cadbury Committee Report ("Cadbury Report") in 1992.' With these
developments, board independence became well-entrenched in the U.S.
and the U.K.
The turn of the century witnessed a proliferation of independent
director requirements beyond the borders of the U.S. and the U.K. This is
due to the profound impact that reforms have had on corporate governance
norm-making around the world, particularly in relation to the appointment
of independent directors as an essential matter of good governance. The
Cadbury Committee Report has led the development of corporate
governance norms in various countries such as Canada, Hong Kong, South
Africa, Australia, France, Japan, Malaysia, and India, to name just a few.6
Similarly, the U.S. requirement of independent directors has also resulted
in readjustment of corporate governance norms in various countries.! Since
the 1990s, "at least 26 countries have witnessed publication of guidelines
that stipulate minimum levels for the representation of outside directors on
boards of publicly traded companies."' This demonstrates the significant
impact of Western-style corporate governance norms (particularly the
independent director) on other countries.
This Article analyzes the effect of incorporating the independent
director concept into one such country, India. In 2000, the Securities and
Exchange Board of India ("SEBI") mandated that all large public listed
companies in India are to have a minimum number of independent
NYSE Manuall, available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?
selectednode= chp 1_4&manual=%2Fcm%2Fsections%2Ficm-sections%2F; NASDAQ, Inc., Market
Place Rules (2003) [hereinafter NASDAQ Rules), available at http://nasdaq.cchwalIstreet.com/
NASDAQ/pdf/ 5605.pdf.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 301 (West 2002) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxle v].
5. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, REPORT, 1992, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf
[hereinafter Cadbury Report].
6 For accounts of the Cadbury Report's influence on Canadian, Hong Kong, South African,
Australian, and French corporate governance rules, see Brian Cheffins, Corporate Governance Reform:
Britain as the Exporter 1, in 8 HUME PAPERS ON PUBLIC POLICY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE
REFORM OF THE COMPANY LAW (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=215950 [hereinafter
Cheffins, Britain as an Exporter]. For the Cadbury Report's influence on Japan and Malaysia, see
Tong Lu, Professor, Chinese Acad. Of Soc. Sciences, Address at the Center for International Private
Enterprise Symposium: Corporate Governance Reform: East Asia and China, Development of System of
Independent Directors and the Chinese Experience (2001), available at http://www.cipe.org/regional/
asia/china/development.htm.
7. Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 3 I Del. J.
Corp. L. 125, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Clarke, Independent Directors in China] (arguing that Chinese
independent director laws are U.S. transplants). See also Chong-En Bai, et al., Corporate Governance
and Firm Valuations in China 2 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=361660.
8. Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell, Board Composition. Corporate Performance, and the
Cadbury Committee Recommendation I (2005). available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687429.
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directors.' Since then, ongoing reforms by SEBI have solidified the
requirement of board independence as a prerequisite for enhanced
corporate governance.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold: (i) to identify the rationale for
the emergence of independent directors by tracing their evolution in the
U.S. and the U.K. where they originated; and (ii) to examine the
transplantation of that concept into India with a view to evaluating the
effectiveness of independent directors in that country. This Article finds
that there are significant differences in the corporate ownership structures
and legal systems between the countries of origin of independent directors
on the one hand and India on the other. Due to the diffused shareholding
structures in the U.S. and the U.K., the independent directors were ushered
into corporate governance norms in those countries in order to operate as a
monitoring mechanism over managers in the interest of shareholders. Each
stage in the evolution of board independence bears testimony to this fact.
However, transplantating a legal concept to a country such as India
without emphasizing local corporate structures and associated factors is
likely to produce unintended results and outcomes that are less than
desirable. Due to the concentrated ownership structures in Indian
companies, it is the minority shareholders who require the protection of
corporate governance norms from actions of the controlling shareholders.
Board independence, in the form it originated, does not provide a solution
to this problem. While this Article is skeptical about the effectiveness of
board independence in India, it suggests reforms to embolden independent
directors that may empower them to play a more meaningful role in
corporate governance.
Part 1l of this Article outlines the key differences in corporate
structures and govemance between the U.S. and the U.K. (where
independent directors originated) and India (into which the concept was
transplanted) and identifies the specific agency problems that are operative
in the respective countries. Part III sets out to establish that the emergence
of the independent director in the U.S. and U.K. correlates to the theory of
the monitoring board whereby independent directors were to act as
monitors of managers in the interests of shareholders. Part IV analyzes the
legal regime relating to corporate governance and independent directors in
India. Part V evaluates the empirical evidence pertaining to the
effectiveness of independent directors in enhancing corporate governance
standards in India. Part VI sets out some normative suggestions for the
way forward, and Part VII concludes.
9. Secondary Market Department. Securities and Exchange Board of India. Circular No.
SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000 (Feb. 21, 2000). available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/
2000/CIRI02000.htmi.
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II. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
SETTING THE TONE
While the specific focus of this Article is on the role of independent
directors, that focus fits within the broader context of the different types of
regimes in the field of corporate governance. Essentially, the purpose is to
examine the implications of extracting the concept of independent directors
from one type of corporate governance system and transplanting the same
into another type. This Part seeks to determine the differing characteristics
in the ownership structures and systems of corporate governance between
the U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand and India on the other.'0
A. DIFFERENT MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Since independent directors originated primarily in the U.S. and the
U.K. and were thereafter exported to other countries, a key question is
whether the concept can be implemented across various jurisdictions. Do
fundamental differences between jurisdictions make implementation in
some more effective than in others? This naturally leads us to a study of
the differences in corporate governance systems in various countries.
I. The United States and United Kingdom
Both the U.S. and the U.K. exhibit characteristics of the outsider
model of corporate governance. There are four core features of this
system. (1) dispersed equity ownership with large institutional holdings,"
(2) the recognized primacy of shareholder interests in the company law,12
(3) a strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors in securities
law and regulation,' 3 and (4) relatively strong requirements for disclosure.' 4
The U.S. and the U.K. display dispersed share ownership with large
institutional shareholdings.' This essentially follows pattern of the Berle
and Means corporation which is represented by dispersion of ownership."
Shareholders typically have no interest in managing the company and
10. For a broader discussion of these corporate governance systems and the specific characteristics
that are applicable to India, see Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on
Indian Corporate Governance, 21 NAT. L. SCH. IND. REV. I (2009).
11 Stilpon Nestor & John K. Thompson, Corporate Governance Patterns in the OECD Eco-






16. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 47 (1940 ). The implications of Berle & Means' theory are discussed in detail infra Part
III.A.I.
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retain no relationship with the company except for their financial
investments-the separation of ownership and control is at its best." Due
to the existence of diffused shareholding and the separation of ownership
and control, the primary effort of corporate law in these jurisdictions is to
curb the "agency costs arising from self-serving managerial conduct,"'" by
acting as a check on the activities of managers and by enhancing their
accountability towards shareholders.
Other key characteristics of these countries are the emphasis they
place on the efficiency of the securities markets and on disclosure and
transparency. They follow a market-based system (with lesser reliance on
mandatory rules, and greater emphasis on default rules) that provides a
significant role to market players as opposed to regulators and the state.
Such a regime focuses heavily on capital markets and imposes high
disclosure standards that require companies to disclose information and
leaves decision-making on investment matters to the various participants in
the market. It also presupposes the existence and predominance of proper
market systems and sophisticated players (such as knowledgeable
professionals like lawyers, accountants and investments bankers, a
competent judiciary and other important fiduciaries such as a cadre of
independent directors with a strong foundation in corporate laws and
practices)." In fact, since "diffuse ownership yields managerial agency
costs as a problem, . . . it is associated with institutions like independent
and transparent accounting, which mitigate these costs." 20
The assertion that the U.S. and the U.K. are leading countries that
follow the outsider model of corporate governance receives near-
unanimous support in existing literature. First, in the U.S. and U.K.,
"unlike most of the rest of the world, most large corporations are public
and not family-controlled."' In these countries, shareholding is diffused22
17. Nestor & Thompson, supra note 1. at 5. See also Brian R. Cheffins, Putting Britain on the
Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 151 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland,
Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002) [hereinafter Cheffins, Puling Britain on the Roe
Map].
18. Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 6, at 11.
19. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1912 (1996); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
20. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction to CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE II (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, eds., 2004).
21. Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under
Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994). See also Rafael La Porta, et al., Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta, Around the World] (finding
that, contrary to the general understanding of the Berle-Means corporation, in most economies without
good shareholder protection, relatively few of the firms are widely held). But see Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomv, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006) (pointing to the fact that there could also be cultural factors that could lead
to maintenance of control in insider systems).
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and it is not common to find companies that have a dominant or controlling
shareholder.23
2. India
India follows the insider model of corporate governance, which is
characterized by cohesive groups of "insiders" who have a closer and more
long-term relationship with the company. 24 This is true even in the case of
companies that are listed on the stock exchanges. 25  The insiders (who are
essentially the controlling shareholders) are the single largest group of
shareholders, with the rest of the shareholding being diffused and held by
institutions or individuals constituting the "public." The insiders typically
have a controlling interest in the company and thereby possess the ability to
exercise dominant control over the company's affairs. In this regime, the
minority shareholders do not have much of a say as they do not hold
sufficient number of shares in the company so as to be in a position to
outvote or even veto the decisions spearheaded by the controlling
shareholders.
As to the identity of the controlling shareholders, they tend to be
mostly business family groups26 or the state.27 This tends to be particularly
true of Asian countries, which are "marked with concentrated stock
ownership and a preponderance of family-controlled businesses while
state-controlled businesses form an important segment of the corporate
sector in many of these countries." 28  This is also otherwise referred to as
the "family/state" model.29
By virtue of their control rights, these dominant shareholders are able
to exercise control over the company.30 They are virtually able to appoint
22. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evi-
dence from International Data, 50 J. FIN. 1421, 1449 (1995).
23. Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map, supra note 17, at 151. But see Clifford G.
Holdemess, The Myth oflDi{Jise Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1377 (2009).
24. Nestor & Thompson, supra note II, at 9. See also Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, Law and Finance] (describing insider systems as
"characterized by the significance of the state, families, non-financial corporations, employees, and
banks as a source of funding and/or control").
25. Erik Berglof & Ernst Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm:
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries 17 (1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=183708 [hereinafter Berglof& Thadden, Changing Paradigm].
26. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in
Developing Countries: Evidence from India, 1:3 INT'L REV. OF FIN. 161, 168 (2000).
27. Rampant state ownership in several countries is unsurprising on account of the fact that
privatization is yet to be completed in those countries. See La Porta, et al., Around the World, supra
note 21, at 496.
28. Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India-Evolution and Challenges 11 (2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=649857.
29. See Nestor & Thompson, supra note I1, at 12.
30. See Berglof & Thadden, supra note 25, at 12.
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and replace the entire board and, through this, influence the management
strategy and operational affairs of the company. For this reason, the
management will likely owe its allegiance to the controlling shareholders.
The controlling shareholders nominate senior members of management,
and even more, they often appoint themselves on the boards or as
managers. It is not uncommon to find companies that are controlled by
family groups to have senior managerial positions occupied by family
members. Similarly, where companies are controlled by the state, board
and senior managerial positions are occupied by bureaucrats.
Further, such a system does not possess either robust capital markets
or sophisticated market players; if at all, these are in an early stage of
evolution in some countries that have experienced significant capital
markets explosion in the last decade." For this reason, the state continues
to perform a greater role in the regulation of corporate activity by imposing
mandatory standards and bright-line rules. There is a perceived reluctance
on the part of the state in relying on market participants or a market-based
regulation, perhaps owing to their lack of sophistication as compared to the
outsider systems.
Indian companies display ownership concentration in the hands of a
few persons, and hence India is considered as part of the insider model of
corporate govemance.3 Business families predominantly own and control
companies (even those that are listed on stock exchanges)." This is largely
due to historical reasons whereby firms were mostly owned by family
businesses.34 In addition, it is quite common to find state-owned firms as
well." Other categories in which ownership structures can be found are: (i)
control by multinational companies; and (ii) diffused ownership. However,
diffused ownership (in the sense of the Berle-Means corporation) can be
found only in a handful of Indian listed companies, where such structures
exist more as a matter of exception rather than the rule. Academic studies
31. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, China and India) are apt examples of economies
historically bereft of developed capital markets that have more recently attempted rapid adoption of
systems and practices from more developed capital market economies.
32. There is one strand of thought that describes India as a "hybrid of the outside-dominated
market-based systems of the U.K. and the U.S., and the insider-dominated bank-based systems of
Germany and Japan." Sarkar & Sarkar, supra note 26, at 163. However, this observation does not find
broader acceptance in the literature pertaining to ownership structures in India.
33. Chakrabarti, supra note 28, at 7.
34. Prior to 1991, Indian businesses were subject to tight control and regulation by the
government. For this reason, all businesses were concentrated in the hands of rich and influential
business families and entities who had the wherewithal to obtain licenses from the government, which
were required for various aspects of running the business, including establishment, operation, expansion
and closure. See Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes-Oxley': Can One Model Fit All?, 12 NEW ENG. INT'L &
COMP. L. ANN. 231, 235 (2006).
35. There are indeed several listed companies that are government-owned, where either the central
government or a state government owns the (often substantial) majority interest in the company. Such
companies are also referred to as Public Sector Undertakings ("PSU").
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too have demonstrated the high concentration of ownership in Indian listed
companies."
Like many other emerging economies, the legal and regulatory
framework in India is arguably not altogether conducive to corporate
activity and investor protection, although significant improvements have
been effected to the system after the liberalization process began in 1991.
For instance, the Indian Companies Act, which was enacted in 1956 and
has subsequently undergone several amendments, is unduly complex and
still contains vestiges of strong government control of companies." There
are a number of procedures to be complied with for incorporating
companies, and moreover, winding up of companies involves a
cumbersome, costly and time consuming procedure." However, there is
optimism at least on two counts. First, there has been tremendous progress
in the area of investor protection since 1991. SEBI, India's securities
market regulator, was established in 1992 to regulate the Indian capital
markets, and SEBI has since enacted a plethora of subsidiary legislation
governing the stock markets (both primary and secondary). 9 Second, there
exists an increasingly robust body of law to deal with minority shareholder
grievances."(
However, while law on the statute books is one thing, its enforcement
another. Even where laws do exist, they are sometime ambiguous and
ridden with uncertainties, thereby placing obstacles in enforcement.
Further, there are serious deficiencies in enforcement of laws and
regulations due to the ineffectiveness of the enforcement machinery such as
the courts and other specialized tribunals. These courts and tribunals are
36. Chakrabarti, supra note 28, at 11 (indicating that "[e]ven in 2002, the average shareholding of
promoters in all Indian companies was as high as 48.1 percent"). See also Shaun J. Mathew, Hostile
Takeovers in India: New Prospects. Challenges, and Regulatory Opportunities, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
800 (2007) (finding an average promoter stake of over 48 percent in companies listed on the Bombay
Stock Exchange). George S. Geis, Can Independent Blockholding Play Much of a Role in Indian
Corporate Governance?, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 283 (2007); Varottil, supra note 10, at 18-20.
37. India's corporate insolvency regime is also notoriously weak. See John Armour & Priya Lele,
Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India 15 (2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
11166808.
38. The 2009 World Bank Doing Business Report ranked India 132 out of 181 countries surveyed
in relation to the ease of doing business. It ranked 166 for starting a business and 142 for closing a
business. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS REPORT (2009), available at http://doingbusiness.org/
ExploreEconomies/?economyid=89 [hereinafter World Bank Report].
39. The more prominent among such legislation relate to the establishment of a detailed disclosure
regime for companies, a share depository for electronic trading of shares and a sophisticated trading and
settlement system in the secondary markets. See Armour & Lele, supra note 37, at 20.
40. Indian Companies Act, §§ 397-98, provides remedies to minority shareholders when affairs of
the company are conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company, the shareholders or
public interest, or if it is oppressive to the shareholders. The Indian Companies Act, No. I of 1956;
India Code (1993). This is known as the remedy of "oppression and mismanagement." Apart from a
rich body of precedents having been established in this area of law, there is also a special tribunal in the
form of the Company Law Board to deal with cases on this count. Armour & Lele, supra note 37 at 3 1.
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overburdened resulting in significant delay in dispute resolution and justice
delivery. This is true even in the area of corporate governance and investor
protection.4
Further, unlike in the more developed economies, it is hard to find a
sufficient number of competent professionals such as auditors, independent
directors and rating agencies who can potentially act as gatekeepers of
corporate governance. For this reason, the affected parties and the legal
system are compelled to rely on courts, tribunals and other regulatory
bodies to seek remedies, and those may not be effective in law enforcement
altogether.4 2 Here again, these are issues faced by most developing
countries in common, which are also part of the insider model of corporate
governance.
B. REVIEWING THE MODELS IN CONTEXT OF THE AGENCY PARADIGM
At this stage, it is appropriate to review the insider and outsider
models against the "agency problems" paradigm. As Reiner Kraakman
explains, corporate law attempts to "control conflicts of interest among
corporate constituencies."4 3 These conflicts are referred to in economic
literature as "agency problems."44
Corporate law and corporate governance literature define three generic
agency problems.45 The first agency problem relates to the conflict
between the company's managers and its owners (being the shareholders).4 6
This "manager-shareholder agency problem" exists largely in jurisdictions
with predominantly diffuse ownership. This is due to collective action
problems and the resultant inability of shareholders to properly monitor the
actions of managers. The second problem relates to the conflict between
the majority or controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.4 Such
''majority-minority agency" conflicts are largely prevalent in jurisdictions
41. More generally, it has been observed empirically that "in securities law, we find that several
aspects of public enforcement, such as having an independent and/or focused regulator or criminal
sanctions, do not matter. . . ." Rafael La Porta, et. al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1,
27-8 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta, What Works].
42. The World Bank's 2009 Doing Business Report ranked India second to last for contract
enforcement (after Timor-Leste). World Bank Report, supra note 38. See also Jayanth K. Krishnan,
Globetrotting Law Firms 14-15, 23 GEO. J.L. ETHICS (2009) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1371098.
43. REINIER R. KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21 (2004).
44. For a detailed analysis of agency theory in economic literature, see Michael Jensen & William
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305 (1976).
45. KRAAKMAN, supra note 43, at 21. See also Paul L. Davies, The Board of Directors: Comp-
osition. Structure, Duties and Powers 2, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. (2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/30/1857291.pdf.
46. KRAAKMAN,supra note 43 at 22.
47. Id.
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that display concentrated shareholding; the interests of minority
shareholders being significantly diluted.48
Advancing this discussion in the context of various corporate
governance systems, we find that the outsider systems of the U.S. and the
U.K. are largely concerned with the manager-shareholder agency problem.
Corporate law, as well as measures to enhance corporate governance, is
designed to resolve this agency problem. It was this very conflict that the
concept of an independent board initially emerged to address in the U.S.
and subsequently in the U.K.
However, we find that the insider systems such as India's are less
concerned with the manager-shareholder agency problem-that problem is
much less important in those systems. There is no separation of ownership
and control as the majority or controlling shareholders are well-endowed
with the power to hire and fire managers and therefore oversee managerial
aspects of a company. Instead, the concentration of corporate ownership in
insider systems afflicts them with the majority-minority agency problem.
Hence, India predominantly suffers from the majority-minority
conflict and not the manager-shareholder agency problem. Mechanisms
designed to suit one type of system of ownership and corporate governance
(e.g., outsider) may not be suitable in another system (e.g., insider). More
specifically, the mechanism of altering board structure and composition
introduced to deal with the manager-shareholder conflict prevalent in the
U.S. and the U.K. will not produce the same results in dealing with the
majority-minority agency problems dominant in India.
Ill. ORIGIN OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
The objective of this Part is to briefly explore the origins of the
concept of the independent director which, as discussed earlier, can be
related to the U.S. and the U.K. The seeds of the independent director
concept were sown in the theory of the monitoring board. Whenever
independent directors have been looked upon as a monitoring mechanism
in companies-whether by the legislature, judiciary or self-regulatory
organizations-it has always been with a view to addressing the manager-
shareholder agency problem. An understanding of the theories and practice
in this Part will widely illuminate the analysis of whether the independent
director concept will find its place in dealing with the majority-minority
agency problem and, if so, to what extent.
48 A third agency problem relates to the conflict between a firm's owners/controllers and other
stakeholders such as creditors, employees, customers, or the non-shareholding public. Id. However,
this third agency conflict is beyond the interests of this article.
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A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ORIGIN OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
The concept of the independent director originated in both legal and
economic theories. These theories help explain why the concept was
conceived as a mechanism to deal with the manager-shareholder agency
problem. This was essentially due to the fact that the manager-shareholder
agency problem was predominant in the U.S. and the U.K.
I. The Berle and Means Study
An appropriate place to begin this survey is to consider the analysis of
Berle and Means in their study of U.S. corporate ownership patterns
between 1880 and 1930.49 Berle and Means concluded that there is a
''separation of ownership and control" in which the individual interest of
shareholders is made subservient to that of managers who are in control of
a company."' Due to the diffusion in ownership, the shareholders are unable
to maintain vigil over the managers," as widely dispersed shareholders lack
sufficient financial incentives to intervene directly in the affairs of the
company. Managers, being unchecked, may abuse their position by acting
in their own interests rather than the interests of the shareholders which
they have a duty to promote.52 The Berle and Means study proved
influential. Much of the effort in corporate law and governance reform
over the years has sought to address the agency problem identified by Berle
and Means. The board of directors and independent directors, in particular,
are cardinal institutions in redressing that conflict."
2. Economic Analysis of the Agency Problem
As the separation of ownership and control leads to the manager-
shareholder agency problem, it became the subject of study by economists,
49. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16. See also Brian Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law)
Scholarship 25 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=429624 [hereinafter Cheffins, Trajectory of
Scholarship].
50. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 244. See also Victor Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 598, 603 (1982) (citing the concern
of academic economists with the board's role in monitoring management's efforts to maximise
shareholder wealth in such circumstances); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1034 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
AL/] (stating that because no single shareholder owns enough stock to affect corporate decisionmaking,
the firm is effectively controlled by its managers, and that unchecked, management may abuse its
control by benefiting itself at the expense of the shareholder-owners).
51. Cheffins. Trajectory of Scholarship, supra note 49, at 24.
52. See Bainbridge, ALl, supra note 50, at 1034.
53. Melvin A. Eisenberg. Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers. Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 407-09 (1975).
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particularly in the context of the role of the board of directors in addressing
that agency problem. This wave of scholarship created the form "nexus of
contracts" theory where the firm was viewed through the lens of contract
analysis." Applying principles of agency to the modem corporation,"
Jensen and Meckling argued that whenever a principal engages an agent to
do something which involves some decision-making authority given to the
agent, the latter may not always act in the interests of the principal." This
imposes significant agency costs as the principal is required to establish
appropriate incentives for the agent and monitor the agent's action."
In such a structure, one obvious question is who will monitor the
monitors?" Alchian and Demsetz explored this issue through team
organization theory." They argued that in any economic organization,
incentive to productive effort can be maintained if input productivity and
rewards are metered properly."o In order to avoid ending up with a series of
monitors who meter productivity, Alchian and Demsetz suggest that the
party entitled to the final residual income would be the appropriate
monitoring authority because that party stands to reap the highest reward if
the monitoring is at its best, thereby incentivizing such authority to monitor
the firm's activities properly.
Viewing the agency theory in the context of the Berle & Means
corporation, it becomes clear that shareholders (who are the principals)
suffer from agency costs on account of the actions of managers (the agents
and persons in control of the corporation). The end result of this approach
is the need for proper monitoring of the managers so as to protect the
interest of the shareholders. In Alchian and Demsetz's paradigm,
shareholders will be the best monitors as they receive the residual income
of the firm. However, the collective action problem facing shareholders
makes effective monitoring by diffuse owners particularly difficult." This
54. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 44, at 310. See also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1988) [hereinafter Fama, Agency Problems]. This
wave of research is dominated by economists who addressed individual rights in terms of allocating the
costs and rewards among various participants in a business organization. See also Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
55. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 44, at 309.
56. Id. at 308.
57. Id. Jensen and Meckling argue that it may be possible to reduce agency costs, but that it can
never be brought down to zero.
58. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP.
L. 657, 672 (1996) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Participatory Management].
59. Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
60. Id. at 778.
61. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, stipra note 58, at 672.
Because of the separation of ownership and control, it simply does not describe the modem
publicly held corporation. As the corporation's residual claimants, the shareholders should act
as the firm's ultimate monitors. But while the law provides shareholders with some enforcement
and electoral rights, these are reserved for fairly extraordinary situations. In general,
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difficulty has ultimately led to the monitoring role being foisted on the
board of directors of a company.
There is still the residual question of the composition of the board. If
the board of directors comprises insiders, will the board act as an effective
monitor of the managers' activities? The answer is surely to be in the
negative. A board comprised of managers cannot be expected to monitor
the managers' own actions. Hence, the composition of the board acquires
importance. Directors who are independent of the management are likely
to serve the monitoring role more effectively than inside directors. The
monitoring role is therefore the raison d'etre of independent directors.62
Such a role confers authority on a monitoring board of directors to monitor
the managers in the interests of the shareholders. It is clear that the
theoretical foundation of independent directors is the monitoring function
of the board; the board's role is to protect the interest of the shareholders
against manager abuse."
It is therefore evident that the theoretical underpinnings of the
monitoring board and the independent director concept emanate from the
agency cost theory that relates primarily to the manager-shareholder agency
problem. Acknowledgement of the majority-minority agency problem in
the literature is sparse because academics were not confronted with the
issue at all as they were primarily dealing with outsider systems of
corporate governance.
shareholders of pubIic corporations have neither the legal right, nor the practical ability, nor the
desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation's
agents.
62. Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 1. Note, however that in the U.K., directors are required
to provide entrepreneurial leadership of companies in addition to their monitoring role. Such a dual role
has been the subject matter of academic critique. See Richard C. Nolan, The Legal Control of
Directors' Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs
Report, 6 THEORETICAL INQ. L.413 (2005).
63. N. Arthur, Board Composition as the Outcome of an Internal Bargaining Process: Empirical
Evidence, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 310 (2001) (stating that "[m]uch of the existing literature examines
board composition from an agency cost perspective and argues that representation by outside directors
will increase with the conflicts of interests between management and outside shareholders"). See also
Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law: The ALI 's
Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 557, 564 (1984) (stating that it would
"appear intuitively that board independence should play a major role in the resolution of agency
problems associated with large, dispersed-owner corporations"); Douglas M. Branson, The Verv
Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321,
360 (2001) (identifying the independent director concept as a solution to the Berle-Means manager-
shareholder agency problem); Dan R. Dalton, et al., Meta-AnalYtic Reviews of Board Composition.
Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 270 (1998) (noting
that a "preference for outsider-dominated boards is largely grounded in agency theory ... built on the
managerialist notion that separation of ownership and control . . . potentially leads to self-interested
actions by those in control"); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding the Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 489, 491 (1999) (commenting that "a high proportion of outsiders will enhance some
aspects of board functioning. such as board effort norms, as agency theory would suggest . .. ").
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B. EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN U.S. CORPORATE
PRACTICE
In practice, the independent director emerged as a response to the
same manager-shareholder problem that sparked its development in legal
and economic theory. American boardroom practice is replete with
instances favoring independent directors as a solution to the manager-
shareholder agency problem. As we shall see, the concept emerged as a
voluntary mechanism based on the belief that a board with some level of
independence will introduce objectivity in decisionmaking, add to the
diversity and advisory capabilities of the board and hence improve the
company's performance (ultimately reflected in the company's stock
price). Various arms of the government rapidly bought into this idea: the
judiciary, the legislature, and finally self-regulatory bodies such as the
stock exchanges and law review bodies such as the American Law Institute
("ALl"). What commenced as a voluntary movement in the 1950s took on
a mandatory form following the various corporate governance scandals
(such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco) that occurred at the turn of the
century and resulted in the enactment of stringent legislation in the form of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act' in 2002. The NYSE and NASDAQ also
amended their listing rules. Similar changes occurred in the U.K., with the
Cadbury Report and its successors. However, these developments are more
recent than those in the U.S. Critically, all these initiatives are aimed
towards addressing the manager-shareholder agency problem. It is to this
aspect that I shall now turn in greater detail.
1. Changing Board Composition: The Voluntary Phase
Most academic studies review board composition from the 1950s.
Prior to 1950, boards largely consisted of "insiders" who were executives
of the companies, and the essential role of the board was to manage the
company, or to advise the management of the company. 6 At most, boards
included certain "outside" directors, who were not executives or employees
of the company, but were otherwise affiliated with the company.
However, since the 1950s, boards gradually began inducting more outside
directors,6 although in the initial years the numbers of outside directors
were relatively few and the inside directors continued to constitute a
64. Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 4.
65. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 2.
66 Id. at 1468.
67. Id. Such directors are usually referred to as "affiliated" or "gray" directors.
68. Id. at 1472-73.
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significant majority on the board.69
2. Emergence of a 'Monitoring Board'
It was only during the 1970s that the concept of the independent
director "entered the corporate governance lexicon . . . as the kind of
director capable of fulfilling the monitoring role.""' This introduced a
significant change in the terminology, because "outside" directors, which
until then were considered as a class comprising of persons other than
insiders, were further divided into "independent directors" and "affiliated,"
or "gray," directors." Together with the concept of independent directors,
the need for a "monitoring board" was clearly identified."
At a conceptual level, the shift in the thinking towards a monitoring
board can be attributed to the work of Professor Eisenberg.72 It was found
that, in practice, the board's principal function was advisory, providing
counsel to the company's chief executive rather than oversight in the
shareholders' interests. 73  Furthermore, even outside directors largely
carried out the same role thereby creating some consternation among the
policymakers.7 ' The goal was a "monitoring model," boards that constantly
monitored the results achieved by managers (led by the chief executive)
and determined whether the incumbents should stay or be replaced.7 ' A
corollary to the monitoring function was that it should be comprised of a
substantial number of independent directors so that the monitoring may be
carried out in a fair, objective and dispassionate manner. Professor
Eisenberg therefore recommended the creation of mandatory rules for
board composition rather than leaving it to the judgment of companies and
their managers:
Specifically, these rules must, to the extent possible: (1) make the board
independent of the executives whose performance is being monitored;
and (2) assure a flow of, or at least a capability for acquiring, adequate
and objective information on the executives' performance.
69 Id. at 1475 (noting that existing studies tend to overstate the presence of independent directors
serving on pre-1970 boards).
70. Id. at 1477.
71. The recognition of the failure of monitoring on boards was precipitated by the collapse of
Penn-Central and Watergate-related scandals. Id. at 1514-15. See also Joel Seligman, A Sheep in
Wolfs Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 325, 328-40 (1987).
72. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976).
73. Id. at 155.
74. Id. at 154. Although neither law policy clearly defined the role of the outside directors,
Professor Eisenberg noted that the "outside director [was] not fulfilling the policy-making role
contemplated by corporate law." Id.
75. Id. at 164-65.
76. Id.at 170.
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While the monitoring board represents a paradigm shift in board functions,
it is clear that such a board was conceived in the context of the manager-
shareholder agency problem created by diffuse ownership. The monitoring
board has been created to monitor only one constituency, the managers.
The majority-minority shareholder conflict is nowhere in the reckoning of
this analysis.
Apart from the development in the 1970s of the monitoring board and
a more nuanced form of the independent director, that decade also saw
regulatory attention paid to independent directors for the first time. Both
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the NYSE
recommended the creation of audit committees of the board comprising
independent directors.
At the same time, business and professional organizations began
subscribing to the view that independent directors would enhance the
monitoring functions of the board. In 1976, a subcommittee of the
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Committee of the American Bar
Association issued the Corporate Director's Guidebook that called for
boards to be comprised of non-management directors.7 ' The Business
Roundtable recommended that "outsiders should have a substantial impact
on the board's decision-making process."7
The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance reflected the growing
consensus favoring independent boards." The ALL was confounded with
the problems raised by Berle and Means, undertaking an ambitious effort to
address those problems."' Tentative Draft No. I of the ALl Principles
required the boards of large publicly held companies to be comprised of a
majority of independent directors.82 The draft also required companies to
have audit and nomination committees." Subsequent versions were
diluted, however, containing only recommendations for the independent
director.8 4 Nevertheless, the ALI's process makes it clear that the
independent director was a response to the specific agency problems
created by diffuse ownership.
77. See Roberta Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 534, 545 (1984).
78. Id. at 546-47.
79. Id. at 548.
80. See Bainbridge, ALI, supra note 50, at 1034.
81. Id. at 1034-35.
82. Id. at 1037.
83. Id. at 1038.
84 Bainbridge, ALI, supra note 50. at 1034-40. For a thorough discussion of the controversy
surrounding drafts of the Princples. see James D. Cox. The AL/ Institutionalization and Disclosure: The
Quest for the Outside Directors Spine, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1233 (1993). See also Karnel, supra
note 77.
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3. Judicial Reliance on Board Independence
While efforts were underway to reform board structure by instilling
greater independence, judicial interpretation of state law began to place
significant weight on decisions of independent boards while reviewing
corporate actions. This was particularly the case in the state of Delaware."
The deference by Delaware courts to independent boards can be examined
under three distinct categories: (i) self-dealing transactions; (ii) derivative
suits; and (iii) hostile takeover situations.
a. Self-dealing transactions
Under Delaware law, the focus is on "whether a director, officer, or
controlling shareholder of a corporation has a financial interest in a
transaction that is not shared by the other shareholders in a corporation.""
Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DCGL") provides
for a safe-harbor that legitimizes self-dealing transactions in certain
circumstances. One such circumstance is where (i) the material facts
pertaining to the conflict of interest and terms of the transaction are
disclosed to the board of directors (or the appropriate committee thereof),
and (ii) the transaction has been approved by a majority of disinterested
directors, even if such directors constitute less than a quorum. This
provision induces companies to appoint outside directors on their boards so
that they are able to pass decisions on conflicted transactions." This is
particularly necessary because certain kinds of conflicted transactions are
inevitable in modem businesses, with executive compensation being the
prime example, and approval of such transactions by a set of outside
directors who are disinterested in such decisions will help companies
appoint and reward their managers suitably." On this issue, we find that
courts are again confronted with the manager-shareholder agency problem,
whereby courts defer to the decisions of disinterested directors who are
expected to act in the interest of shareholders by supervising conflict-of-
interest transactions that may benefit managers to the detriment of
85. See Usha Rodrigues, Ferishization ofIndependence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 464 (2008). Delaware
courts have been progressive in dealing with corporate law cases and placing reliance on actions of
corporate fiduciaries where necessary. The importance of board independence has been accentuated
because of the activist nature of the Delaware courts in dealing with corporate law matters.
86. Id. at 467.
87. Delaware General Corporation Law, § 144(a)( I). Note that the provision deals with
"disinterestedness" of the directors rather than "independence."
88. Lin, supra note 1, at 905-06.
89. Courts have generally deferred to decisions of fully informed, disinterested directors on
matters involving compensation of executives. See Charles M. Elson, Erecutive Overcompensation-A
Board-Based Solution. 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 973 (1993); Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Ojficer's
Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, I7 J. CORP. L. 785, 805,
809(1992).
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shareholders.
Beyond the contours of Section 144 of DGCL and the conflict of
interest involving officers and directors lies another type of self-dealing
transaction. That pertains to conflict of interest transactions involving
controlling shareholders." Such transactions manifest themselves mostly
in freezeout mergers.9' In this context, the Delaware Supreme court placed
reliance on the independent director institution as a solution to the
controlling shareholder agency problem. In the seminal case of
Weinberger v. UOP Inc.,92 the court made a suggestion that one method to
solve the controlling shareholder conflict would be to employ independent
directors who can consider the transaction at arm's length.93  This
suggestion was picked up by Delaware courts in subsequent cases94 holding
that "the use of a well functioning committee of independent directors
shifts the burden of proof in the context of mergers with a controlling
shareholder."" This string of cases displays two characteristics: (i) for the
first time, independence was determined with reference to the controlling
shareholder rather than merely with reference to managers;" and (ii)
independence was not considered a position to be determined ex ante
through prescribed qualifying factors, but was to be determined by courts
ex post based on the actual behavior of such directors in decisionmaking on
the conflicted transaction; it is not sufficient for directors to satisfy
prescribed criteria for independence, but rather to clearly demonstrate that
they have in fact acted independent of the controlling shareholders.97
The freezeout illustration shows the keenness of Delaware courts in
90. Note that in the analysis of various developments pertaining to independent directors in the
U.S. in this Part, we encounter the controlling shareholder's role for the first time only at this juncture.
91. A freezeout is defined as "a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the
minority shareholders in a publicly traded corporation, for cash or the controller's stock." Guhan
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2005).
92. 457 A. 2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
93. In the Weinberger case, the Delaware Supreme Court lamented the absence of an independent
process for negotiating the deal and laid the foundation for the role of independent directors in such
situations: "Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have been entirely
different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal
with Signal at arm's length." Id. at 709.
94. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694
A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 (Del. 1985).
95. Rodrigues, supra note 85 at 477.
96. Hence, a director ought to have no financial relationships either with the managers or with the
controlling shareholders in order to qualify as independent for this purpose. Id. at 478.
97. Rodrigues notes:
[Tihe independence of directors is evaluated not just in terms of their lack of ties with
the acquirer, but also in terms of their behavior. Delaware courts conduct a fact-
intensive ex post inquiry into the special committee's actions. The key point is that
courts assessing the situational interestedness of directors do not focus solely on
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regulating controlling shareholder transactions too, apart from transactions
involving officers and directors. To that extent, it extends the role of the
independent directors beyond the manager-shareholder agency problem to
cover even the majority-minority shareholder problem. This is indeed a
unique instance considering that the U.S. courts are often left to deal with
the manager-shareholder agency problem. What are the lessons to be leamt
from this episode, and how have they been considered in other
jurisdictions? First, independence is to be reckoned not only with reference
to managers but also with reference to controlling shareholders. This
aspect of independence has indeed been transplanted to other jurisdictions,
including India," where there are controlling shareholders in most
companies. Second, independence ought not to be considered as a
predetermined qualification for appointment of directors ex ante, but the
actual performance of the directors is also an important factor in
determining independence. This aspect does not seem to have found its
way past the borders of Delaware. Neither the federal laws in the U.S. nor
the stock exchange regulations in that country prescribe independence
requirements in that fashion. Independence is considered on the basis of
preset rules, and it is a status conferred on the person at the time of
appointment and not based on the actions of such person after appointment
and with reference to any specific conflicted transaction. Similarly, such ex
post determination has not found its way into other jurisdictions such as
India or even the U.K. for that matter. Hence, while Delaware law on
controlling shareholder transactions provides some useful lessons to deal
with that problem (which is widespread in emerging insider economies),
the prescribed solutions have not been considered in their entirety in
India."
b. Derivative suits
Under Delaware law, before a shareholder can initiate a derivative
action on behalf of a company against its directors or officers, such
shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors requesting it to
98. For a discussion of this issue, see Part IV.B infra.
99. Academics such as Rodrigues have argued that independence is situational and should be
defined to deal with the specific conflicts at hand. Rather than having a preset definition of
independence as a qualification, they suggest that independence should be considered on a case-by-case
basis. See Rodrigues, supra note 85. However, it must be noted that implementation of such
suggestions are bound to be met with practical difficulties. Ex post determination of independence
requires courts to swiftly determine cases and lay down principles of law that provide certainty as to the
concept of independence. While that may be practicable in jurisdictions such as Delaware that
possesses a fairly advanced system of corporate law adjudication, such approach would be fraught with
difficulties in jurisdictions that lack such judicial infrastructure, and an emerging economy such as India
would surely point in that direction. As Lin notes: "Even if courts were capable of making such
evaluations intelligently, the uncertainty of the resulting standard could both raise litigation costs and
hamper business planning." Lin, supra note 1. at 964.
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initiate action on behalf of the company. Since the board may not be
inclined to sue its own members or officers, it is quite possible that the
board may reject such a demand. In order to prevent such a situation, such
a demand on the board may be excused when the demand is considered to
be futile, whereby the shareholder may bring a suit without making a
demand."" Delaware law lays down the standard for determining demand
futility as follows: "whether taking the well-pleaded facts as true, the
allegations raise a reasonable doubt as to (i) director disinterest or
independence or (ii) whether the directors exercised proper business
judgment in approving the challenged transaction."' 0 '
These requirements too encourage companies to have outside directors
on their boards and committees.102 However, in this case, the concept of
independence is not as clear as in the case of conflicted transactions
discussed earlier.'o3 The test of independence is the lack of "domination or
control," which is "very fact specific, and the courts have differed as to
what factors to take into consideration.""' It appears, therefore, that the
role of outsider or independent directors in rejecting demands for derivative
actions essentially again deals with the manager-shareholder agency
problem, but to a lesser extent the majority-minority agency problem.""
100. Although the demand requirement applies mostly in suits against the insiders, it is a matter of
curiosity that the requirement originated in suits against third parties. See Paul N. Edwards, Compelled
Termination and Corporate Governance: The Big Picture, I0 J. Corp. L. 373, 398 (1985).
101. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 at 814 (Del.
1984) [hereinafter Aronsonl).
102. See Lin, supra note 1, at 907.
103. See Part lil.B.3.assupra.
104. Lin, supra note 1, at 908. There is no clear indication as to the person who may exercise
"dominance or control" in order to disqualify the independence of a director. Dominance or control may
be exercised by the officers or directors (thereby creating the manager-shareholder agency problem) or
by the controlling shareholder (thereby creating the majority-minority agency problem). See id. at 907-
08.
105. In fact, courts have generally placed scant reliance on the beholdenness of a director to a
controlling shareholder. As Rodrigues observes with reference to Aronson:
Understanding how the independence inquiry arises in the derivative context, we can
examine what it means for directors to be independent. Early articulations by Delaware
courts stressed the idea of "domination and control": plaintiffs had to allege particularized
facts demonstrating "that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden to
the controlling person." Obviously, one could argue that a director is beholden to the person
who put her on the board. Nevertheless, the beholdenness that leads to a finding of
domination and control requires more than a simple indebtedness for office. In Aronson, the
court also made clear that allegations of stock ownership alone, at least when less than a
majority, are not enough to prove non-independence--even when coupled with the allegation
that a proposed controller not only owned 47% of the outstanding stock of the corporation,
but also had nominated the director at issue. As the court dryly observed: "That is the usual
way a person becomes a corporate director."
Rodrigues, supra note 85, at 472 (internal citations omitted).
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c. Defensive measures against hostile takeovers
The "deal decade" of the 1980s gave rise to defensive measures
adopted by companies in response to hostile takeovers. The most notable
among the defensive measures was the "poison pill." While the pill and
other defensive measures aided incumbent directors and managers from
entrenching their positions in the company, it was often susceptible to
challenge as being contrary to the interests of shareholders.o' Due to the
inherent conflict of interest, "directors [were required to] show that they
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed"". because of a hostile acquisition. The court again
placed reliance on an independent board's decision on this count. It held
that the proof of showing good faith and reasonable investigation "is
materially enhanced . .. by the approval of a board comprising of a
majority of outside independent directors . . . .""" Although the court did
not attempt a definition of "independence" in Unocal, that option was
exercised subsequently in Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp."9 This
inference of director independence by courts in situations involving
defensive measures encouraged companies to appoint independent outside
directors on their boards.
However, hostile takeovers of the kind witnessed during the "deal
decade" involved the interests of hostile acquirers and the incumbent
boards and managers. Hostile takeovers often occurred in companies
where there were no controlling shareholders.'" Hence, the mechanism of
outside independent directors relied upon by the Delaware courts for
hostile takeovers was again meant to protect the interests of shareholders
against actions of managers, and was essentially catered to resolve the
manager-shareholder agency problem.
106. In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware made a pertinent
observation that takeover defenses raise "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
107. Id. at 955.
108. Id.
109. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Quoting Aronson, see supra note 101, the court held that
"independence 'means that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before
the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences."' Unocal, supra note 106, at 1375. In
such circumstances, the measures used to determine independence would also depend on the nature of
the proposed sale, whether the company is in distress, and similar factors.
I 10. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr.. Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and UK. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. I 727 (2007)
(describing that hostile takeovers are thought to play a key role in making managers accountable to
shareholders in a dispersed shareholding system). See also Mathew. supra note 36 (indicating that
hostile takeovers will have a lesser impact in systems that display concentrated shareholding).
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4. Regulatory Prescriptions on Board Independence
The corporate governance scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and
other companies triggered a wave of reforms in the U.S. It is worth
pausing for a moment to briefly reflect on what caused that corporate
governance crisis. At the outset, boards did have a role (or failure thereof)
to play in precipitating the corporate governance crisis. The 1990s
witnessed a shift in executive compensation from cash payments to stock-
based compensation (including stock options). This created perverse
incentives to company managers as it enabled them to boost the short-term
stock performance of the company and then encash the options at a high
price."' As Professor Gordon notes: "Boards had simply failed to
appreciate and protect against some of the moral hazards that stock-based
compensation created, in particular, the special temptations to misreport
financial results."' 12
This was the manager-shareholder agency problem manifested at its
best. Stock options to managers promoted short-termism that prompted
them to inflate financial figures and that went unchecked by directors.
While the managers benefited, shareholders suffered, and the board seemed
to be waiting on the sidelines
The wave of corporate governance reforms was led by the enactment
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and revisions to the listing rules of NYSE and
NASDAQ that introduced mandatory board composition requirements for
the first time. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not mandate a general
requirement regarding independence of the board. However, it does
require that each member of a public company's audit committee shall be
an independent director.'' 3  It is the revised rules of the NYSE and
NASDAQ that require that all listed companies contain boards that have a
Ill . John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers Stupid, 57 Bus. LAW.
1403, 1413-14 (2002). See also COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD:
DESIGNING CORPORATE BOARDS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 48 (discussing the danger of serious
financial manipulation and distortion of boardmember priorities thanks to stock options). Charles Elson
details the failure of independent directors to police management in the Enron case:
But how does this emphasis on director independence and equity relate to the board failure at
Enron? The answer is straightforward: the Enron directors lacked independence from
management. They may have held company equity, but without the appropriate
independence from Enron management, they lacked the objectivity needed to perceive the
numerous and significant warning signs that should have alerted them to the alleged
management malfeasance that led to the company's ultimate meltdown and failure.
Charles M. Elson, Enron and Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 496,
499 (2004).
112. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 2, at 1536.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 4. This section also provides that "a member of an audit
committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee,
the board of directors, or any other board committee-(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof."
See also Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 1, at 86.
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majority of independent directors." 4 Each of the exchanges defines an
independent director.'"
Although the definitions of the two exchanges are largely similar,
there are some differences in the approach and in certain details. Both
provide for a broad definition of independence whereby a director does not
qualify as independent unless the board affirmatively determines that the
director has no material relationship with the listed company."6 In addition
to the general test, a director would not be considered independent if she
falls within one of the specific tests laid down."
Both exchanges also require regular executive sessions among the
non-management directors without management being present.'" They
also require the establishment of nomination committees for nomination
and selection of directors." 9 It is the expectation that placing nomination
or selection decisions in the hands of independent directors would enhance
the independence and quality of the nominees that are being considered for
directorship. This curbs the power of the inside directors or managers to
influence the board composition, particularly when it comes to the
appointment of independent directors.
Interestingly, both exchanges exempt controlled companies from
provisions mandating independent directors.'20 A controlled company is
one where more than 50 percent of the voting power is held by an
individual, a group or another company.' 2 ' This appears to be in
recognition of the fact that independence of directors need not, or even
cannot be expected to, act as a check on management as the controlling
shareholders would be in a position to assume that role.'22 The rationale for
114. NYSE Manual, supra note 3; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605(b)(1).
I 15. See NYSE Manual, supra.note 3, § 303A.02; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605(a)(2).
116. Such relationship may be either direct or as partner, shareholder or officer of an organisation
that has a relationship with the company. NYSE Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.02(a). The NASDAQ
rules require a determination by the board of directors as to whether the relationship of the director with
the listed company would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the
responsibilities of a director. NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605(a)(2).
117. These include: (i) employment by the individual or family member with the listed company as
an executive officer within the last three years; (ii) receipt by the individual or a family member of
compensation from the company of certain specified amounts; (iii) association with a firm that is the
company's internal or external auditor; (iv) employment as an executive officer of another company
where any of the listed company's present executive officers serve on that company's compensation
committee; and (v) employment as executive officer of a company that has payment transactions with
the listed company for property or services in an amount which is beyond a specified amount. NYSE
Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.02(b); NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605(a)(2).
118. NYSE Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.03; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605-2. This is to
empower non-management directors to serve as a more effective check on management by promoting
free and frank discussions among them.
119. NYSE Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.04; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5605(e).
120. NYSE Manual. supra note 3, § 303A.00; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 3, § 5615(c).
12 1. Id.
122. This also fits well into the theory that, in the U.S., independent directors are considered as
monitoring the managers and for addressing the agency problem between the shareholders and
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the exception appears to be that where there is a controlling shareholder,
the other shareholders may not be afforded sufficient protection by
independent directors. This recognizes the fact that:
[NYSE and NASDAQ] see independent directors as a protection for
shareholders specifically against management, not against other
shareholders. A shareholder who controls a company does not need an
external rulemaker to protect him from a management team that he has
the power to appoint. Minority shareholders may need protection from
controlling shareholders, but the exchanges are apparently willing to
leave this task to other bodies of law, such as federal securities law
requiring disclosures, and state corporate law mandating certain
fiduciary duties.123
Moreover, this exception has been found necessary to protect the interests
of controlling shareholders. If controlled companies have majority
independent boards, those boards may work against the interests of the
controlling shareholders resulting in unintended consequences. 24 This risk
is most prevalent in family businesses and VC-capitalized firms.' 25 This
exception has also invited some criticism as errant companies found this
avenue an attractive means to evade board independence requirements
prescribed by NYSE and NASDAQ.1 26
This background clarifies two key factors: (i) the mandatory
independent director requirement was introduced in the Sarbanes-Oxley era
reforms as a reaction to corporate governance scandals that involved the
manager-shareholder agency problem; and (ii) it is the express intention of
the policymakers not to consider the independent director as a solution to
the majority-minority agency problem and hence exceptions were carved
out for "controlled companies."
It is possible to conclude with a great deal of conviction that the rise
of the independent director in the U.S. is entrenched in the search for an
optimal board composition that can resolve the agency problem between
managers and shareholders. The current U.S. policy prescribes a board
with a majority of independent directors as capable of undertaking that
task. Since the U.S. corporate structure was never confronted with the
majority-minority shareholder problem, its corporate governance norms
have not been guided by any concern towards addressing that problem. At
the least, independent directors have not been envisaged as a means of
managers.
123. Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 1, at 94 (emphasis in original). This is also consistent with
Professor Davies' observation that board structure and composition do not have as much a role to play
in addressing the majority-minority agency problem as do other mechanisms under company law.
Davies, supra note 45.
124. Joseph P. Farano, How Much Is Too Much? Director Equity Ownership and Its Role in the
Independence Assessment, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 753, 768 (2008).
125. Id.
126. See Deborah Solomon, Loophole Limits Independence-Dozens of Firms Use Exemption That
Allows Them to Avoid Rules Mandating Board Structure, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2004. at Cl .
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resolving that problem.'27
C. EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN U.K. CORPORATE
PRACTICE
The history of the independent director institution is comparatively
short in the U.K., with its lifespan being less than 20 years. Apart from
that, the literature on the role of independent directors in U.K. companies is
limited compared to that in U.S. companies. Nevertheless, there is a great
amount of similarity in corporate governance practices between the U.S.
and the U.K. Of course, there exist some areas of divergence, but the
similarities far outweigh the differences, at least on matters of principle (as
opposed to matters of detail).128  Even where there are differences, they
have a bearing largely in terms of "degree rather than kind." 29 Hence, my
effort in this section is to briefly discuss the emergence of the independent
director concept in the U.K., with greater emphasis on those areas where
U.K. has followed a different trajectory from that of the U.S.
The genesis of the independent director in the U.K. can be ascribed to
the 1992 Cadbury Report. 3" That report introduced the concepts of non-
executive director and independent director. Non-executive directors have
been foisted with the role of bringing "an independent judgment to bear on
issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments and
standards of conduct."'"' More specifically, the Cadbury Report assigns
two principal responsibilities to non-executive directors, viz.: (i) to review
the performance of the board and the executives; and (ii) to take the lead in
decision-making whenever there is a conflict of interest. 32 Note that the
role aptly fits that of the independent director in the Anglo-American
context, which is to monitor the managers in the interest of the
shareholders. In other words, the non-executive director is expected to act
127. The only exception that one can point to relates to the role of independent directors in
approving transactions involving conflicts of interests of controlling shareholders, such as the case of
freezeout mergers. This is a principle judicially recognized under Delaware law. For details, see supra
notes 86 to 97 and accompanying text.
128. See Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map, supra note 23, at 148 (noting that "with respect
to corporate governance, the USA has more in common with Britain than it does with other major
industrial nations"). See also Geoffrey Miller. Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some
Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 51
(observing: "While it is relatively easy to identify salient differences between the English and U.S.
systems and the rest of the developed world, it is more difficult to identify major contrasts within the
Anglo-American world itself.").
129. Miller, supra note 128, at 51.
130. Cadbury Report. supra note 5. This report is considered to be one of the most influential
studies on corporate governance. See R.P. AUSTIN, H.A.J. FORD & I.R. RAMSAY, COMPANY
DIRECTORS: PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14 (2005).
13 1. Cadbury Report, supra note 5, 4. 1.
132. Id. % 4.4-4.6.
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as a catalyst in the resolution of the manager-shareholder agency problem.
Independent directors are a sub-set of non-executive directors. As
regards independent directors, "apart from their directors' fees and
shareholdings, they should be independent of and free from any business or
other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of
independent judgment."' 3 The board of the company is conferred sufficient
discretion to determine whether the definition has been satisfied with
reference to each individual director. Note again that independence is
clearly linked to the lack of any relationship with the company or the
managers. There is no reference whatsoever to a controlling shareholder's
role. Clearly, independence is connected with the manager-shareholder
agency problem.
In terms of board composition, every company is required to have at
least three non-executive directors, of which at least two are independent.3 4
In addition, boards are required to constitute nomination committees for
nomination of board members' and audit committees for ensuring
integrity of financial reporting.' The Cadbury Report formed the basis for
the development of corporate govemance norms in the U.K.
Subsequently, there were two committees that submitted reports on
areas involving corporate governance. The Greenbury Committee
recommended the establishment of remuneration committees of boards to
determine the remuneration of company executives.' The Hampel
Committee reaffirmed the role of the non-executive directors." The end-
result of these committee reports was the issuance of the 1999 Combined
Code on Corporate Governance 39 which forms part of the United Kingdom
Listing Rules that imposed several of these governance requirements on a
"comply or explain" basis. 40
133. Id. 114.12.
134. Id.
135. Id. 4.30. The nomination committee is to comprise of a majority of non-executive directors.
136. Id. 4.35. The audit committee is to consist of only non-executive directors, with a majority of
them being independent.
137. Richard Greenbury, et al., Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir
Richard Greenburv, Conf. of British Indus. (July 17, 1995) available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/greenbury.pdf.
138. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINAL REPORT,
1998, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel-index.htm.
139. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 1999.
The original Code on Corporate Governance issued in 1999 has since been revised periodically. See
Nolan. supra note 62, at 438. For the current code, see Combined Code 2008, infra note 146.
140. Id. at 418. This approach requires listed companies either to comply with the provisions of the
Combined Code, or alternatively, to explain the noncompliance. But there are some empirical issues
that emerge from such an approach, considering that there is evidence of "serial non-compliers"
identified in studies. See Ian MacNeil & Xiao Li, Comply or Erplain: Market Discipline and Non-
Compliance with the Combined Code, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=726664; Sridhar Arcot,
Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the UK: Is Comply or Explain
Approach Working?, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 532290.
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In a subsequent series of reforms focused principally on the role of
non-executive directors, the Higgs Report' 4 1 recommended that "at least
half of the members of the board should be independent."' 42 Furthermore,
the concept of independence was defined in the Higgs Report in an
extensive form."' The Higgs Report recommended a specific role to non-
executive directors that included contribution towards business strategy as
well as scrutiny of the performance of management.'" In that sense, the
role includes both advisory as well as monitoring functions. The
Combined Code was amended to include the principal recommendations of
the Higgs Report, including as to board composition.'45 The current version
of the 2008 Combined Code continues this trend,'46 and board
independence has therefore become an integral part of corporate
governance in the U.K.147
As far as U.K. is concerned, the agency problem it faces is similar to
that in the U.S., where there is a separation of ownership and control.
Shareholding is diffused, with institutional shareholders making up for a
large portion of share ownership. Although the collective action problem is
less severe due to greater institutional shareholding, it does not disappear.
There continues to be a need for a monitoring board of directors enhanced
with the appointment of independent directors. The monitoring board in
the U.K. serves to tackle the manager-shareholder agency problem, as
Professor Cheffins notes:
Since investors in a country with an 'outsider/arms-length' system of
ownership and control have good reason to be fearful of 'agency costs'
arising from self-serving managerial conduct, a key corporate
141. DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION, AND SKILLS, DEREK HIGGS, REVIEW OF THE ROLE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, 2003, available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/
files/file23012.pdf [hereinafter Higgs Report].
I42. Id. 19.5.
143. Id. See also Suggested Code Provision A.3.4, id. at 81. Under Provision A.3.4, independence
is compromised if the director was an employee of the company, had a material business relationship
with the company, had close family ties with relevant personnel, represented a significant shareholder
or served on the board for more than 10 years.
144. Id. See also Suggested Code Provision A. 1.4, id. at 80.
145. AUSTIN, FORD & RAMSAY, supra note 130, at 21.
146. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL. THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Jun.
2008, 1 A.3.2, available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined Code_
June_2008/Combined%2OCode%2OWeb%200ptimized%2OJune%202008%282%29.pdf [hereinafter
Combined Code 2008]. The provision states:
Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. A smaller
company should have at least two independent non-executive directors.
147. The Combined Code is under review and is expected to undergo changes. See FINANCIAL
REPORTING COUNCIL, 2009 REVIEW OF THE COMBINED CODE, FINAL REPORT, 2009, available at
http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/2009%2OReview%20of/ 2Othe%20Combined%20
Code%20Final%20Reportl.pdf. See also DEP'T. OF TREAS., DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORP-
ORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES, 2009, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walkerreview_261109.pdf.
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governance objective should be to improve the accountability of
corporate executives. Consistent with such reasoning, Britain's
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees have . . . sought to
influence managerial behavior by enhancing the role of non-executive
directors and by improving links between pay and performance.148
This trend has not only been followed by the legislature and policymakers,
but by the judiciary as well. For instance, in Equitable Life v. Bowley,149
Langley J. held:
It is well known that the role of the non-executive directors in corporate
governance has been the subject of some debate in recent years. . .. It is
plainly arguable, I think, that a company may reasonably at least look to
non-executive directors for independence of judgment and supervision of
the executive management.
The court's concern, quite evidently, is to protect the interest of
shareholders from the actions of management and that is precisely the role
envisaged for non-executive and independent directors.
We therefore find that not only is the U.K. an outsider system with
diffused shareholding and collective action problems, but since there are no
controlling shareholders in most companies, the primary role foisted on
non-executive and independent directors is to tackle the manager-
shareholder agency problem. The majority-minority agency problem does
not persist in the U.K. due to which we see no preference from
policymakers or the judiciary for using the independent director institution
towards that issue at all.
IV. ADOPTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS BY EMERGING
ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM INDIA
Although concepts in corporate governance originated in the outsider
systems of the U.S. and the U.K., they have been transplanted to several
other countries in the last decade. The transplantation has occurred even in
148. Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 6, at I1. Professor Cheffins continues to make an
interesting contrast with the position in insider systems:
While agency costs seem unlikely to pose a serious problem in countries with an
insider/control-oriented system of ownership and control, a different danger exists. This is
that core investors will collude with management to cheat others who own equity. For
instance, a controlling shareholder might engineer "sweetheart" deals with related firms in
order to siphon off a disproportionate share of a public company's earnings. Minority
shareholders can also be prejudiced if a company is dominated by an entrepreneur who,
motivated by vanity, sentiment or loyalty, continues to run the business after he is no longer
suited to do so or transfers control to family members who are ill-suited for the job. It
follows that in insider/control-oriented jurisdictions, providing suitable protection for
minority shareholders should be a higher priority than reducing agency costs and fostering
managerial accountability. Correspondingly, the corporate governance issues that will matter
most in such countries are likely to be of a different character than they are in Britain.
Id. at I -12.
149. [2003] EWHC 2263 (Comm) 41 (U.K.).
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insider systems that possess shareholding structures and other corporate
governance norms and practices that are entirely different from those in the
outsider systems. This phenomenon can be ascribed to a number of
reasons. First, several developments in the outsider systems of corporate
governance have had a profound impact around the world. These include
legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. and
recommendations such as those of the Cadbury Committee in the U.K.
Second, several emerging economies had opened their markets to foreign
investment during the last decade of the 20th century. The process required
development of their own corporate governance norms simultaneously with
the explosion of corporate governance reforms in the outsider systems
discussed above. Third, concurrent with the opening up of emerging
economies to foreign investment, particularly from the leading investing
countries of the U.S. and the U.K., there was a need to develop corporate
governance systems that were familiar to investors from those countries.
Transplantation was a convenient response to this need. Among all the
transplanted concepts, the independent director presents some of the
greatest challenges both from a theoretical and practical standpoint.
A. EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NORMSso
A major wave of economic reforms was initiated in India in the year
1991. A thrust towards economic liberalization"' led to a new era in
Indian corporate governance. The year 1992 witnessed the establishment
of SEBI as the Indian securities markets regulator. 5 2 SEBI rapidly began
ushering in securities market reforms that gradually led to corporate
governance reforms as well. Curiously, the first corporate governance
initiative was sponsored by industry. In 1998, a national task force
constituted by the Confederation of Indian Industry ("CI") recommended a
code for "Desirable Corporate Governance," which was voluntarily
150. For a more detailed analysis on the historical developments in Indian corporate governance,
see Chakrabarti, supra note 28, at 14-20; N. Balasubramanian, Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya
Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Case Study of India 5-6 (2008),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=992529; Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence:
Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 335 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna,
Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present and Future?, I JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 171 (2009).
151. Radical reforms were occasioned in 1991 due to exceptionally severe balance of payments
crisis and dismal growth. See generally Montek S. Ahluwalia, Economic Reforms in India Since 1991:
Has Gradualism Worked?, in INDIA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION: THE POLITICS OF REFORMS 87 (Rahul
Mukherji ed., 2007); Anne 0. Krueger & Sajjid Chinoy, The Indian Economy in Global Context, in
ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS AND THE INDIAN ECONOMY 21 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 2003).
152. SEBI was established under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. The
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 1993, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/. See also The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002,
No. 59, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (amending §§ 2, 4, and I1), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/.
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adopted by a few companies."s3 Thereafter, a committee chaired by Mr.
Kumar Mangalam Birla ("Birla Committee") submitted a report to SEBI
"to promote and raise the standard of Corporate Governance in respect of
listed companies."' 54 Based on the recommendations of Birla Committee, in
2000 SEBI inserted Clause 49 into the Equity Listing Agreement;
prescribing corporate governance norms that were applicable to all listed
companies of a certain size.' 5 India's corporate governance norms
therefore came to be governed through a clause in the listing agreement
popularly referred to as "Clause 49." 116 Although both the CII Code as well
as the Birla Committee's report expressly cautioned against mechanically
importing forms of corporate governance from the developed world,'57
several concepts introduced by them were indeed those that emerged in
countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. These include the concepts such as
an independent board and audit committee.
Thereafter, following Enron, WorldCom, and other governance
scandals, SEBI decided to strengthen Indian corporate governance norms.
In the wake of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., SEBI
appointed the Narayana Murthy Committee ("Murthy Committee") to
153. Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code, (1998),
available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CilCode_1998.pdf [hereinafter CII Code]. The CII
Code, which was directed at large companies, contained some of the measures that continue to date,
such as the appointment of a minimum number of non-executive independent directors, an independent
audit committee, the unimpeded flow of key information to the board of directors and norms for
corporate disclosures to shareholders.
154. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE KUMAR MANGALAM
BIRLA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 2000, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/
commreport/corpgov.html [hereinafter Birla Report]. This report built upon the pattern established by
the CII Code and recommended that "under Indian conditions a statutory rather than voluntary code
would be far more purposive and meaningful, at least in respect of essential features of corporate
governance." Id. 11.7. For a detailed discussion regarding the transition from the CII Code to the Birla
Report, see, Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms
Increase Firms' Market Values? Evidence from India, 4 Journal of Empirical Studies (2007), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=914440.
155. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR No. SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-
10/2000 (Feb. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/CIRIO2000.html. Clause
49 contained a schedule of implementation whereby it was applicable at the outset to large companies
and newly listed companies, and thereafter to smaller companies over a defined timeframe.
156. Some discussion about the Equity Listing Agreement ("Listing Agreement") is in order. It is a
contractual document executed between a company desirous of listing its securities and the stock
exchanges where the securities are to be listed. The execution of the Listing Agreement is a pre-
condition of listing securities on a stock exchange. Since the format of the Listing Agreement is
prescribed by SEBI, all stock exchanges are required to follow the standard Listing Agreement, and
hence its terms do not vary from one stock exchange to another. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
BOARD OF INDIA, LISTING AGREEMENT, available at http://www.nseindia.com/contentlequities/
eqjlistagree.zip. See also The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, No. 42, Acts of Parliament,
1956 § 21. [hereinafter SCRA] (providing that a company that applies for listing of securities on a stock
exchange shall comply with the provisions of the Listing Agreement).
157. C1I Code, supra note 153, at I; Birla Report, supra note 154, 12.6, Endnote.
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examine Clause 49 and recommend changes to the existing regime.'
Following the recommendations of the Murthy Committee, on October 29,
2004, SEBI issued a revised version of Clause 49 that was to come into
effect on April 1, 2005.159 However, since a large number of companies
were not yet in a state of preparedness to be fully compliant with such
stringent requirements, SEBI extended the date of compliance to December
31, 2005."60 Hence, detailed corporate governance norms were introduced
into Indian corporate regulations only from January 1, 2006.161 Clause 49 in
its present form provides for the following key features of corporate
governance:162
(i) boards of directors of listed companies must have a minimum number
of independent directors, with independence being defined in a detailed
manner; 6 3
(ii) listed companies must have audit committees of the board with a
minimum of three directors, two-thirds of whom must be independent; 64
the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee are specified in
detail; 6 1
(iii) listed companies must periodically make various disclosures
regarding financial and other matters to ensure transparency;' 6 6
(iv) the CEO and CFO of listed companies must (a) certify that the
financial statements are fair and (b) accept responsibility for internal
158. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
REPORT, 2003, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf [hereinafter Murthv
Report]. The need for a review of Clause 49 was triggered in part by events that occurred in the U.S.,
such as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. Id. T 1.6.1. Considerable emphasis was placed in this
report on financial disclosures, financial literacy of audit committee members as well as CEO and CFO
certification, all of which are matters similar to those dealt with by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
159. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/
1/2004/12/10 (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcirOI04.pdf
[hereinafter SEBI Circ. Oct. 29]
160. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/l/
2005/29/3 (Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2005/dil0I05.html.
161. These norms have been subjected to some periodic amendments and clarifications thereafter.
See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR NO. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/l/2008/08/04
(Apr. 8, 2008); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR NO. SEBI/CFD/DIL/
CG/2/2008/23/10 (Oct. 23, 2008); SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR No.
SEBI/CFD/DIL/LA/2009/3/2 (Feb. 3, 2009).
162. Clause 49 applies to all listed companies (or those that are seeking listing), except for very
small companies (being those that have a paid-up capital of less than Rs. 30 million and net worth of
less than Rs. 250 million throughout their history). While several requirements of Clause 49 are
mandatory in nature, there are certain requirements (such as remuneration committee, training of board
members and whistle blower policy) that are merely recommendatory in nature. See SEBI Circular Oct.
29, supra note 159.
163. Where the Chairman is an executive or a promoter or related to a promoter or a senior official,
then at least one-half the board should comprise independent directors; in other cases, independent
directors should constitute at least one-third of the board size. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, at cl.
49(l)(A).
164. Id., cl. 49(II)(A).
165. Id.,cl.49(II)(D).
166. Id, cl. 49(IV).
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controls;167 and
(v) annual reports of listed companies must carry status reports about
compliance with corporate governance nonns. 6 8
However, there are some existing proposals to reform some of these
corporate governance provisions, specifically those relating to independent
directors, under the Companies Bill, 2009, which is pending in
Parliament.169 Moreover, following the Satyam scandal, and based on
recommendations provided by various industry and professional bodies, the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs has proposed a voluntary code of conduct to
be adopted by companies."
B. CLAUSE 49 AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
It is necessary at this stage to examine the specific provisions in
Clause 49 relating to independent directors.
1. Basic Requirements
Boards of listed companies are required to have an optimum
combination of executive and non-executive directors, with at least half of
the board comprising of non-executive directors."' As regards the
minimum number of independent directors, that varies depending on the
identity of the chairman of the board. Where the chairman holds an
executive position in the company, at least one half of the board should
consist of independent directors, and where the chairman is in a non-
executive capacity, at least one third of the board should consist of
independent directors.'72 Another condition was imposed in 2008 to
determine the number of independent directors.'7 1 Where the non-executive
chairman is a promoter or a person "related to any promoter" of the
company, at least one half of the board should consist of independent
directors.'74 The insertion of this condition was necessitated due to the then
167. Id., cl. 49(V).
168. Id., cl. 49(VI).
169. The concept of "independent director" is proposed under the Bill to be introduced in the
Indian Companies Act for the first time. Companies that have a prescribed minimum share capital are
required to have at least one-third of their board consist of independent directors. This will be a uniform
requirement and the distinction between companies with executive chairman and non-executive
chairman will be removed. See The Companies Bill (Proposed), 2009, No. 59, Lok Sabha, cl. 132(3),
available at http://www.icai.org/resource-file/I 7166companies-bill_2009.pdf.
170. This recent set of changes to India's corporate governance norms are detailed in Part V C
infra.
171. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49(l)(A)(i).
172. Id., cl. 49(l)(A)(ii).
173. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR NO. SEBI/CFD/DIL/
CG/l/2008/08/04 (Apr. 8, 2008). This was subject to a further clarification in SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, CIRCULAR No. SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/2/2008/23/1 0 (Oct. 23, 2008).
174. Clause 49(l)(A)(ii) of the Listing Agreement explains "related to any promoter" as follows:
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prevailing practice. Chairmen of companies retained themselves in a non-
executive capacity, but were often relatives of the promoters (in case of
individuals) or controllers of parent/holding companies (where promoters
were other companies). For example, in family-owned companies, the
patriarch or matriarch of the family would be the non-executive chairman,
while the day-to-day management (in executive capacity) would be carried
out by persons from the subsequent generations such as children and grand-
children. Promoter-related chairmen were thus able to exert significant
influence. With this amendment to Clause 49,' chairmen are required to
be truly independent to justify the composition of the board with one-third
being independent rather than one half.
2. Independence
An independent director is defined as a non-executive director who:
apart from receiving director's remuneration, does not have any material
pecuniary relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters,
its directors, its senior management or its holding company, its
subsidiaries and associates which may affect independence of the
director. 76
Apart from the general statement above, there are certain specific
factors that help determine whether or not a director is independent. 77 Note
a. If the promoter is a listed entity, its directors other than the independent directors, its
employees or its nominees shall be deemed to be related to it;
b. If the promoter is an unlisted entity, its directors, its employees or its nominees shall be
deemed to be related to it".
Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49(l)(A)(ii). In this context, it must be noted that the concept of
"promoter" has specific legal significance in the Indian context. The expressions "promoter" and
"promoter group" are defined to include (i) the person or persons who are in control of the company,
(ii) the person or persons who are instrumental in the formulation of a plan or program pursuant to
which securities are offered to the public, and (iii) the person or persons named in a securities offering
document as promoters. See Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements, 2009, Securities and
Exchange Board of India Regulations, 2009, Reg. 2(l)(za). Controlling shareholders holding a
substantial number of shares in the company would be treated as "promoters" or as part of the
"promoter group." In that sense, the expressions "controlling shareholders" and "promoters" are used
interchangeably in this Article, because the former expression is familiar to readers of corporate
governance literature in Anglo-American jurisdictions, while the expression "promoters" is familiar in
the Indian context.
175. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49(l)(A)(ii).
176. Id., cl. 49(1)(A)(iii)(a).
177. These are that the director:
b. is not related to promoters or persons occupying management positions at the board
level or at one level below the board;
c. has not been an executive of the company in the immediately preceding three
financial years;
d. is not a partner or an executive or was not a partner or an executive during the
preceding three years, of any of the following:
i. the statutory audit firm or the internal audit firm that is associated with the company,
and
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that all these factors dictate as to who cannot become independent
directors. There is a complete absence of positive factors that would
qualify a person for being an independent director (except perhaps for the
age of the person). For example, there is no mention of the types of
qualification or experience the person should possess prior to appointment
to the position so as to be able to discharge board responsibilities
effectively. This is a serious deficiency in the definition of independence.
It encourages companies to appoint persons who satisfy the formal
requirements of independence, but who may otherwise not be suited for the
job.178
Directors are, however, required to ensure some minimum
commitment towards boards on which they sit. Companies are required to
have at least four board meetings a year.179 Apart from that, there may be
meetings of various committees of the board that directors are required to
attend if they are members of such committees. Towards that end, there are
maximum limits as to the number of boards and committees on which
independent directors can sit. An independent director cannot be a member
of more than 10 committees or act as chairman of more than 5 committees
across all companies. so This is to ensure that the director is not so busy as
to be unable to devote sufficient time and attention towards responsibilities
in each company. The Listing Agreement, does not, however specify any
positive commitment that each director has to make towards a company,
for instance in terms of the minimum number hours or days to be spent
each year on a company.
3. Nomination and Appointment
Clause 49 does not contain any specific procedure for nomination and
appointment of independent directors. That process occurs in the same
manner as it does for any other director. It therefore requires us to explore
ii. the legal firm(s) and consulting firm(s) that have a material association with the
company.
e. is not a material supplier, service provider or customer or a lessor or lessee of the
company, which may affect independence of the director;
f, is not a substantial shareholder of the company, i.e. owning two percent or more of
the block of voting shares;
g. is not less than 21 years of age.
Id., cl. 49(I)(A)(iii).
178. It is not the case that all companies in India adopt that path. Of course, there are reputable
companies that appoint eminently suited individuals to be position despite the absence of any positive
qualifications. But, one cannot rule out the possibility of certain mid-cap and small-cap companies (who
may usually stay below the radar screen of public scrutiny) that may adopt the undemanding approach
of appointing persons that are independent, but without the requisite competence to effectively
undertake the task of board membership and monitoring management.
179. Id., cl. 49(l)(C)(i).
180. Id., cl. 49(l)(C)(ii).
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the provisions of the Indian Companies Act to examine how directors are
appointed and the various factors that play out in that regard.
In India, the appointment of each director is to be voted on
individually at a shareholders' meeting by way of a separate resolution.
Each director's appointment is to be approved by a majority of
shareholders present and voting on such resolution.'"' Hence, controlling
shareholders, by virtue of being able to muster a majority of shareholders
present and voting on such resolution can control the appointment of every
single director and thereby determine the constitution of the entire board.
Similarly, controlling shareholders can influence the renewal (or otherwise)
of the term of directorship.'82 More importantly, shareholders possess
significant powers to effect the removal of a director: all that is required is
a simple majority of shareholders present and voting at a shareholders'
meeting.'"' The only protection available to directors subject to removal is
that they are entitled to the benefit of the principles of natural justice, with
the ability to make a representation and explain their own case to the
shareholders before the meeting decides the fate of such directors. The
removal can be for any reason, and there is no requirement to establish
"cause," thereby making it a potential weapon in the hands of controlling
shareholders to wield against directors (particularly those directors that the
controlling shareholders see as errant to their own perceptions regarding
the business and management of the company).
The absence of a specific procedure for nomination and appointment
of independent directors makes it vulnerable to capture by the controlling
shareholders.'84 Assuming that one of the purposes of the independent
directors is to protect the interest of the minority shareholders from the
actions of the controlling shareholders, such a purpose can hardly be
achieved given the current matrix of director appointment, renewal and
removal. The absolute dominance of controlling shareholders in this
process creates a level of allegiance that independent directors owe towards
controlling shareholders. If controlling shareholders cease to be pleased
181. Section 263 of the Companies Act provides as follows:
At a general meeting of a public company or of a private company which is a subsidiary
of a public company, a motion shall not be made for the appointment of two or more
persons as directors of the company by a single resolution, unless a resolution that it
shall be so made has first been agreed to by the meeting without any vote being given
against it.
Companies Act, supra note 40, § 263.
182. The mechanism that applies for appointment of directors applies equally to renewal of the
term once the director's office comes up for retirement.
183. The Companies Act, supra note 40, § 284 provides: "(1) A company may, by ordinary
resolution, remove a director ... before the expiry of his period of office . . . ."
184. One observer notes: "one of the major weaknesses in Indian corporate governance has been
provisions allowing the appointment of purportedly independent directors who are old friends or
associates of management or of controlling shareholders." Shyamal Majumdar, Opinion, "Nodders" in
the Boardroom, BUSINESS STANDARD(India), Dec. 25, 2008.
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with the efforts of an independent director, such a director can be certain
that his or her term will not be renewed, even if such director is spared the
more disastrous consequence of being removed from the board.
The position of the controlling shareholders further gets reinforced
due to the dispersed nature of the remaining shareholding in the
company.' In most Indian companies, institutional shareholders do not
individually hold a significant percentage shareholding, even though the
aggregate shareholding of all institutional shareholders may be fairly
substantial.'" This factor adds to the vast powers already available to
controlling shareholders in determining the board composition of an Indian
company.
There are possible alternative approaches that can considerably dilute
the influence of the controlling shareholders in the appointment of
independent directors. The first approach is to have an independent
nomination committee of directors that will determine the persons who will
be placed on the board as independent directors.' As we shall see shortly,
this is not a mandatory requirement under Clause 49.
Another alternative method of director election that provides some
powers to minority shareholders is cumulative voting or proportionate
voting rights. In such a system, the appointment of directors can be
determined through proportional representation, such that minority
shareholders are able to elect such directors on the board correlative to the
percentage of their shareholding in the company.' 8 The Indian Companies
Act does provide for cumulative voting in Section 265:
the articles of a company may provide for the appointment of not less
than two-thirds of the total number of the directors of a public company
or of a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company,
according to the principle of proportional representation, whether by the
single transferable vote or by a system of cumulative voting or
otherwise, the appointments being made once in every three years and
interim casual vacancies being filled in accordance with the provisions,
185. For a discussion of the shareholding pattern generally in Indian companies, see discussion
supra Part II.A.2.
186. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
187. See infra Part V.A.3.
188. The proportional representation may be by a single transferable vote or by a system of
cumulative voting. As described by Professor Gordon:
Cumulative voting operates in two distinct settings. First, a single shareholder (or cohesive
group) owning a significant minority block can automatically elect a director to the board.
But second, cumulative voting lowers the cost of mobilizing diffuse shareholders because
electoral success-in the sense of placing a nominee on the board-requires much less than
50% of the votes. For example, for a ten-person board elected annually, a dissident need to
rally only a 10% shareholder vote to put a director on the board. So cumulative voting offers
significant potential for shareholder selection of at least some directors who would be
independent in this genealogical sense.
Gordon, Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 2, at 1498.
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mutatis mutandis, of section 262."9
The key factor is that this provision is not mandatory and is only optional
permitting companies to incorporate the system of proportional
representation in their articles of association. It is hardly surprising then
that very few companies, if any at all, have adopted the system of
proportional representation to elect their directors because controlling
shareholders do not have any incentive to incorporate these provisions by
amending the articles association as their own influence in the voting
process will be diluted.
4. Allegiance of the Independent Directors
Under Clause 49, there is no indication at all as to the constituencies
that independent directors are to serve. It is not clear whether independent
directors are to serve the interests of the shareholder body as a whole or
whether they are required to pay greater attention to the interests of the
minority shareholders. Considering that Indian companies predominantly
display concentrated share ownership, it seems logical that independent
directors should bear the interests of minority shareholders in mind, but
there is no direct evidence of that intention in the express wording of
Clause 49.'9 In the absence of any express signals, this leaves Indian
independent directors in the unenviable position of having to determine for
themselves the constituency they are to serve. Similarly, there is no
indication as to whether independent directors are to bear in mind the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and if so, in what situation.
The inability of Clause 49 to pinpoint the interests independent directors
are to serve arguably renders their position futile and this makes the
institution somewhat ambiguous. In outsider economies, the absence of
such clarity causes less ambiguity as board members generally, and
independent directors more specifically, serve to preserve shareholder
value, but in insider economies where divergent interests are involved in
the shareholder body, the lack of clarity in the role is inexplicable.
5. Role of Independent Directors
Much as Clause 49 does not specify to whom the independent
directors owe their allegiance, it also does not contemplate any specific role
for them. There is no separate task or function assigned to independent
189. The Companies Act, supra note 40, § 265.
190. This is in stark contrast to the position in another emerging economy, China, where the law
expressly requires independent directors to consider the interests of minority shareholders. See Minority
Director. CHINESE SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, Zheng jian fa (2001) No. 102,
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002030/4079260.html [hereinafter China Independent
Director Opinion].
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directors. The most prominent among such functions in the context of the
majority-minority agency problem could have been for independent
directors to consider and approve related party transactions that involve
self-dealing by controlling shareholders. But, there is nothing of the kind
envisaged. Independent directors are treated like any other director for
purposes of role and decision-making and there is neither a specific
privilege conferred nor a specific duty or function imposed on independent
directors, in either case specifically by law, on the board.
However, as regards board committees, there are some specific
requirements pertaining to independent directors. All companies that
satisfy a minimum size are mandated by the Indian Companies Act to
constitute an audit committee.19 ' The audit committee must be comprised
of at least two thirds non-executive directors, but no reference is made to
independence. In case of listed companies, however, Clause 49 provides
that an audit committee shall be constituted consisting of three directors,
with at least two-thirds of them (including the chairman) being independent
directors.' 92  In the case of audit committee members (unlike for
independent directors on the board), there is a need for positive
qualifications regarding competence:' all members shall be "financially
literate"'94 and at least one of them must have "accounting or related
financial management expertise."9
Unlike the case of independent directors on the entire board, the audit
committee's mandate is fairly clear and elaborate.' These include
oversight of the company's financial reporting process, recommendations
regarding appointment of auditors and review of their performance, review
191. Section 292A of the Companies Act provides:
Every public company having paid-up capital of not less than [fifty million] rupees shall
constitute a committee of the Board knows as "Audit Committee" which shall consist of not
less than three directors and such number of other directors as the Board may determine of
which two thirds of the total number of members shall be directors, other than managing or
whole-time directors.
The Companies Act, supra note 40, §292A.
192. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49(II)(A)(i).
193. Id., cl. 49(II)(A)(ii).
194. The term "financially literate" is defined to mean "the ability to read and understand basic
financial statements, i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account, and statement of cash flows." Id., cl.
49(ll)(A)(ii), Explanation I.
195. This requirement is defined as follows:
A member will be considered to have accounting or related financial management expertise
if he or she possesses experience in finance or accounting, or requisite professional
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results
in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive
officer, chief financial officer or other senior office with financial oversight responsibilities.
Id., cl. 49(Il)(A)(ii), Explanation II.
196. Clause 49 prescribes a list of 13 functions that the audit committee is required to discharge in
addition to reviewing various types of information. Id., cl. 49(ll)(D)-(E).
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of financial statements before submission to management and the like."
As far as related party transactions are concerned, the audit committee is
required to verify the disclosures made in that behalf in the financial
statements. Curiously enough, the audit committee only has a disclosure
obligation regarding related party transactions. It has no approval rights. 9 9
Hence, independent directors have not been conferred any roles or
responsibilities to monitor transactions that may cause erosion of value to
the company and its shareholders while enriching one or more groups of
insiders such as managers or controlling shareholders.
Apart from the audit committee, only one other board committee, viz.,
the "Shareholders/Investors Grievances Committee," is required to be
constituted as a mandatory matter.'99 This committee is not required to
comprise any independent directors, although in practice they do carry a
number of independents on them. The role of this committee is
insubstantial in the overall scheme of things as it is required to "look into
the redressal of shareholder and other investor complaints like transfer of
shares, non-receipt of balance sheet, non-receipt of declared dividends,
etc."2 Oo Many of these matters have now become insignificant with the
advent of dematerialized trading in shares and the use of modem
technology to track investor communication.
As far as the remuneration committee is concerned, that is only a non-
mandatory requirement.20 ' It is for the companies themselves to decide
whether to include such committees or not, although in the case of large
listed companies, it is almost always the case that such companies have a
remuneration committee where independent directors play a significant
role.
Finally, as we have seen earlier, the nomination committee generally
plays an important role in corporate governance. But India does not
impose a mandatory requirement to constitute nomination committees to
nominate independent directors. For this reason, the controlling
shareholders are able to significantly influence the process of nomination
and appointment of independent directors. The absence of a nomination
committee presents a significant obstacle to the protection of minority
shareholder interest as controlling shareholders are able to determine the
identity of individuals who occupy the position of independent directors
and they are likely to ensure the appointment of such individuals who will
be sympathetic to the perspectives of the controlling shareholders with
197. Id.,cl.49(ll)(D).
198. This is in contrast with the position in the U.S. where Delaware General Corporation Law, §
144 expressly provides powers to an independent committee to approve self-dealing transactions or
China's conferral of a specific role on independent directors to acknowledge and express their opinion
on related party transactions. China Independent Director Opinion, supra note 190.
199. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49(IV)(G)(iii).
200. Id, cl. 49(IV)(G)(iii).
201. Id, cl. 49, Annexure IC12.
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complete allegiance in fact towards them.
Moreover, at a broad level, the absence of any specific role for
directors creates difficulties at a practical level. Neither independent
directors themselves nor the corporate community in general are able to
comprehend what is expected of independent directors. For instance, at
least a majority of the independent directors in India that I interviewed for
the purposes of this Article20 2 believed their role to be one of advising
management from a business or strategic standpoint rather than to act as
monitors of management or the controlling shareholders. In the absence of
any such clarity in regulatory intentions in the Indian context, one cannot
expect any meaningful level of monitoring from independent directors.
6. Effectiveness of Clause 49
In an overall sense, Clause 49 makes a considerable effort to codify
the independent director concept in India. Moreover, when it comes to
enforcement of the requirements under Clause 49, India fares well in terms
of the law on the statute books. Previously, there were no specific
sanctions for violation of the Listing Agreement, which contains the
corporate governance norms.2 03 At most, stock exchanges could threaten to
delist companies from the stock exchanges. That would not be a viable
solution because it would be the shareholders that suffer from the
consequences of delisting as it would deprive them of liquidity in the
markets and even a resultant fall in the value of their shareholding.
Conscious of this shortcoming, certain statutory amendments were
introduced in 2004. Section 23E was inserted into the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956 ("SCRA") that provided a penalty of up to Rs. 250
million (approx. US$5.4 million) for violation of the listing conditions.204
This imposes significant deterrence against non-compliance (including the
corporate governance norms embodied in Clause 49). However, as we
shall see later, there could still be drawbacks in the implementation of these
202. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
203. The difficulties that emanate from such an inchoate position regarding enforcement are
evident from the parallel situation in Hong Kong. See Chee Keong Low, Silence is Golden: The Case
of CITIC Pacific in Hong Kong (2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1381990. Low highlights
"a lacuna in the regulatory framework in Hong Kong with some anomalous outcomes likely[;] . . . while
the company and its directors will be censured for their breach of the Listing Rules they are unlikely to
be correspondingly sanctioned under the Securities and Futures Ordinance." Low argues that "the
rectification of such anomalies requires the introduction of statutory backing to the Listing Rules which
was first discussed by the government in 2003." Id. at 2.
204. Section 23(E) reads:
If a company ... fails to comply with the listing conditions or delisting conditions or
grounds or commits a breach thereof, it or he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding
twenty-five crore rupees.
SCRA, supra note 156, § 23(E)
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enforcement provisions in the Indian context.205
The discussion in this Part reveals the nexus between developments
pertaining to the independent director concept in the developed outsider
economies of the U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand and the emerging
insider economy of India. Since the late 1990s, the developments in Indian
corporate governance have closely followed those of the outsider
economies. This is a result of the possible convergence of corporate
governance norms towards the U.S. and the U.K. models.
However, a closer examination of the specific norms pertaining to
independent directors in India indicates that they were adopted in that
country without suitable changes to reflect the agency problems prevalent
there. Although the independent director concept was evolved as a solution
to the manager-shareholder agency problem in the U.S. and the U.K., they
have been incorporated in India without substantial modifications. For
instance, the independent director concept does very little to address the
majority-minority agency problem which is prevalent in India. There has
been no deliberation on whether the concept deals with the majority-
minority agency problem at all, nor have there been any suitable
adjustments in its applicability to deal with that agency problem. This
results in a mismatch in the application of the independent director concept
that is clear from a close scrutiny of Clause 49 in India. The aforesaid
survey of the development of corporate governance norms in India coupled
with an analysis of the legal provisions indicates several failures in the
transplant.
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN INDIA
After having analyzed the evolution (i.e., transplantation) of the
independent director concept in India, it is necessary to determine the
success of independent directors in that country. This is achieved through
an analysis of empirical studies as well as anecdotal evidence by means of
case studies. In this Part, it becomes evident from the empirical and
anecdotal analysis that the concept has not been entirely effective in
practice, at least not to the extent anticipated by regulators at the time of its
inception.
Here, I survey existing empirical literature and case studies relating to
the effectiveness of independent directors in India. The availability of
studies (empirical or anecdotal) on independent directors in India is fairly
limited. At an empirical level, there are some recent studies that examine
the role of corporate governance in general and its impact on corporate
performance. This literature employs the event study method. These
studies are relevant to the extent that independent directors form one of the
205. See Part V.B.I. infra.
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instruments or institutions employed to enhance corporate governance in
India. Recent empirical surveys have been conducted by professional
bodies and consultants who focus more specifically on independent
directors. These have received limited attention from a legal academic
standpoint, and it is hoped that the survey in this Part will contribute to a
more concerted move in that direction. In order to supplement this survey,
in 2008 1 also interviewed fifteen individuals, being independent directors,
chairpersons of boards, CEOs, CFOs, controlling shareholders or promoters
of various Indian companies, partners of law firms and academics, and the
responses from such interviews are discussed as appropriate.206
A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN INDIA: EMPIRICAL SURVEY
There are some recent empirical studies pertaining to India that
examine the effectiveness of independent directors. These studies pertain
to corporate governance in general, of which independent directors are only
one component. For instance, the event studies in the Indian context deal
with the impact of Clause 49 reforms as a whole without specifically
focusing on independent directors. On the other hand, there are other
empirical studies primarily carried out by professional bodies that examine
board practices that focus more specifically on the institution of
independent directors. This section analyzes the findings of these studies
and draws conclusions regarding the role of independent directors in India.
1. Effect on Corporate Performance
There is an emerging body of empirical literature on Indian corporate
governance,2 07 but for the present purposes it would suffice to review two
recent empirical studies. In the first,208 an event study, Professors Black
and Khanna study the impact of corporate governance reforms reflected by
the formation of the Birla Committee209 and find that over a two-day event
window around May 7, 1999,210 the share prices of large firms, to which the
corporate governance reforms were then intended to apply, rose by roughly
4 percent relative to other small firms, thereby signaling the investors'
expectations that corporate governance reforms will increase market value
206. Most of the individuals were interviewed based on the understanding of anonymity, and hence
their names are not specified in this Article.
207. For a review of this empirical literature, see Rajesh Chakrabarti, William L. Megginson &
Pradeep K. Yadav, Corporate Governance in India, 20 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 59, 70-71 (2008).
208. Black & Khanna, supra note 154.
209. Id.
210. The authors selected May 7, 1999, as the core event date for the study as that is the date on
which the Government announced the formation of the Birla Committee to suggest corporate
governance reforms. The authors also rely on the fact that that "investors had reason to expect the
[Birla Committee] proposals to be similar to the CII Code." See Black & Khanna, supra note 154, at 6.
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of firms.2 ' The second study by Dharmapala and Khanna acknowledges
the importance of enforcement in corporate governance reform.212 The
authors study the impact of the introduction of Section 23E to the
Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 in 2004 that imposed large
penalties of Rs. 25 crores (Rs. 250 million) for noncompliance with the
Listing Agreement (that also includes Clause 49 containing the corporate
governance norms).2 13 Using a sample of over 4,000 firms during the
1998-2006 period, the study reveals a "large and statistically significant
positive effect (amounting to over 10 percent of firm value) of the Clause
49 reforms in combination with the 2004 sanctions."214
While these event studies are optimistic about the impact of recent
corporate governance measures in India, it would imprudent to conclude
that independent directors have been effective in India. These studies
examine the impact of Clause 49 in its entirety, of which the independent
director is only one part. There are other measures such as the audit
committee, financial disclosures, CEO/CFO certification, whistle blower
policy, a corporate governance code and the like that are part of the
package.
Since event studies by themselves do not provide much evidence
regarding the effectiveness of independent directors, it is necessary to
examine studies on corporate governance practices, particularly those
relating to board practice. Recent events in India such as the Satyam
corporate governance scandal have spurred a number of surveys. While
there is one academic survey215 that explores corporate governance
practices in Indian companies, there are three recent surveys by
professional bodies that cover similar ground.2 16 The remainder of this
211. Id.
212. Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and
Firm Value: Evidence from India (2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1105732.
213. Id. at 9.
214. Id. at 3.
215. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150. This study was based on responses to a
2006 survey of 370 Indian public listed companies.
216. The AT Kearney, AZB & Partners and Hunt Partners ("AAH") 2007 survey studied board
composition across various public companies are listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the
National Stock Exchange. AT Kearney, AZB & Partners, and Hunt Partners India Board Report-
2007: Findings, Action Plans and Innovative Strategies (2007) (copy on file with the author)
[hereinafter AAH Report]. The FICCI & Grant Thornton ("FICCI-GT") survey analyzed corporate
governance at "mid-market" listed companies in India by reviewing the nature and extent of corporate
governance practices in approximately 500 companies across various sectors that were targeted to
participate in the survey, FICCI & Grant Thornton, CG Review 2009: India 101-500 (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.wcgt.in/assets/FICCl-GTCGR-2009.pdf [hereinafter FICCI-GT Report]. The
KPMG Audit Committee Institute's survey presented findings on a poll conducted between November
2008 and January 2009, involving over "90 respondents comprising CEOs, CFOs, independent directors
and similar leaders, who were asked about the journey, experience and the outlook for corporate
governance in India," KPMG Audit Commitee Inst., The State of Corporate Governance in India: A
Poll (2009) available at http://www.in.kpmg.com/TLFiles/Pictures/CG%20Survey%20Report.pdf
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section discusses the relevance of these surveys and the conclusions that
emanate from them.
2. Number of Independent Directors
As we have seen earlier,2 17 boards are required to have at least one
third of their size comprised of independent directors, and if the chairman
is an executive director or related to the promoters, then at least one half.
This requirement has been mandatory for all large companies since
January 1, 2006. However, Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna find that
7 percent of the firms surveyed do not have the minimum one-third
independent directors and further a number of other companies that have a
common chairman and CEO do not have the minimum one-half
independent directors. 2 18 They find that only 87 percent comply with board
independence rules. 219 The fact that 13 percent companies are yet to even
comply with the minimum formal requirement of independent directors is
startling. First, the definition of independence does not require any positive
factors but only the absence of relationships with the company or its
controlling shareholders. Hence, the pool of candidates for companies to
choose from is fairly large, especially in a country whose total population
exceeds one billion. Further, it has generally not been difficult for
companies to find independent directors.22 () In this context, noncompliance
of even the formal requirements by a large number of companies indicates
the lack of all-round corporate will to follow more stringent governance
norms in India. Even where companies do meet the minimum number of
independent directors, a large number of them are appointed principally to
satisfy compliance requirements.22'
Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna also find that in 59 percent of the
surveyed companies, there was a separate CEO and chairman.222 At first
blush, these statistics appear to be impressive. However, interview
evidence suggests that several companies maintained separate CEO and
chair positions so as to be able to comply with Clause 49 by appointing
one-third of their board as independent directors rather than one-half,
because if the positions of CEO and chairman were held by the same
person the more onerous requirement of appointing one half of the board as
[hereinafter KPMG Report].
217. Supra note 172 and accompanying text.
218. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150, at 14.
219. Id.
220. This finding is supported by the practitioner interviews that I conducted as well as
Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150 at 14.
221. The KPMG Report shows that 64 percent of its respondents believe independent directors
merely contribute towards satisfying a regulatory requirement, although empowering them would
enhance their performance significantly. KPMG Report, supra note 216, at 6.
222. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150, at 14.
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independent directors would apply instead of the one-third requirement.223
This way, management and controlling shareholders can keep the influence
of independent directors on boards at a minimum. 224
3. Nomination and Appointment
While the analysis of Clause 49 in Part IV.B.3 of this Article identifies
controlling shareholder influence as a key shortcoming, the empirical
survey of board practices reflects the perpetuation of the problem in
practice. Controlling shareholders in fact do exercise significant control
over appointment of independent directors as they have in the case of other
directors too. 225 The FICCI GT Report observes as follows:
The survey shows that majority of the respondents (56%) do not have a
nomination committee to lead the process of identifying and appointing
directors. Possibly, the general practice has been for the promoters to
identify people known to them or with whom they have comfort levels or
otherwise people who are known personalities and can thus enhance the
visible creditability of the board. This naturally restricts the choice to a
relatively small segment and explains why the second most populated
country in the world has been voicing a problem with numbers when it
comes to finding independent directors.226
In a similar vein, the AT Kearney, AZB & Partners, and Hunt Partners
Report ("AAH Report") finds that a "good 90 percent of the non-executive
independent directors were appointed using CEO/chairperson's personal
network/referrals, and the remaining 10 percent through executive search
finns." 227 These findings are also overwhelmingly supported by interviews
with practitioners. Most practitioners were of the view that the
involvement of promoters in director nomination and appointment is
223. Interview with a corporate lawyer, who is also an independent director on companies, in New
Delhi, India (July 3, 2008).
224. It must be noted, however, that when Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna conducted their
survey in 2006, the one-third requirement could be satisfied by merely separating the positions of the
CEO and chairman. At that stage, it was quite common for companies to appoint promoters (who were
not in any executive capacity) as the chairman of the company. This effectively ensured that the
chairmanship as well as the key managerial responsibilities remained with the family. It is for this
reason that an additional requirement was introduced in April 2008 requiring companies to avail of the
one-third independent director requirement, i.e., that the chairman should also not be related to the
promoter. See also supra notes 174 and accompanying text. This will ensure that boards are structured
such that either the chairman is truly independent or that at least one half of the board consists of
independent directors. It is possible that any survey over a period following April 2008 may yield
different results.
225. Issues are compounded because it is not mandatory under Clause 49 to have independent
nomination committees that would handle the process of selection, nomination and appointment of
independent directors.
226. FICCI-GT Report, supra note 216 at II.
227. AAH Report, supra note 216. at 33. This study also finds that only "39.1% followed a formal
process for the selection of board of directors in 2005-2006." Id.
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"huge."2 28 Interestingly, some practitioners opined that such involvement is
not necessarily objectionable, primarily because promoters themselves gain
when high quality individuals are enlisted onto corporate boards as
independent directors as their contribution would be immensely useful to
the companies. Apart from that, bringing in independent directors who can
work with promoters and the management will enable collegiality on the
board.22 9 While the practitioner view will enable seamless board activity, it
is not clear if that would result in proper monitoring so as to ensure that the
interests of all constituencies involved are appropriately protected.
However, most practitioners were of the view that nomination committees
ought to be made mandatory as that will introduce objectivity in the
independent director selection process.230
4. Competence
Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna report their findings on
backgrounds of independent directors. They find that 39 percent of the
firms surveyed had a scholar on their board.2 3 ' The other prominent
categories of individuals for independent directorship are lawyers (in 38
percent of companies) and former governmental officials or politicians (30
percent).232 The study by Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna does not
track executives from other companies as independent directors. However,
it appears from a sample survey of large reputed Indian companies and also
interviews with practitioners that the category of business executives is
becoming increasingly prominent. Practitioner interviews also suggests the
emergence of a cadre of professional directors, although they are few and
far between compared to the other categories.2 33
As regards the dominant categories of academics, professionals (such
as lawyers), retired governmental officials and politicians, it is not clear if
they do possess requisite qualities to perform monitoring activities in the
required manner.
228. Interview with a former senior corporate executive, chairman and independent director on
several Indian companies, in Mumbai, India (June 13, 2008).
229. One practitioner even observed that boards should not become "debating societies" and that
constructive decisionmaking is essential. Interview with a corporate lawyer, independent director on
Indian companies, in New Delhi, India (July 3, 2008).
230. Some of the surveys also call for reform by way of mandating a nomination committee. See
FICCI-GT Report, supra note 216, at 11; KPMG Report, supra note 216, at 6.
231. Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna, supra note 150, at 16. They find that scholars are an
attractive choice for companies as they are formally independent.
232. Id., at 16.
233. This is similar to the category recommended by Professors Gilson and Kraakman whereby the
primary occupation of such individuals is independent directorships on the boards of a few companies.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (199 1).
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5. Incentives and Disincentives
Remuneration of independent directors in India is fairly low compared
to international standards. Independent directors are paid a sitting fee or a
commission (as a share of profits)234 or are awarded stock options in the
company.' Further, committee members are paid additional compensation
for their enhanced efforts in performing specific functions. The quantum
of remuneration has been on the upswing in recent years. The AAH Report
found that the "average annual compensation increased from Rs. 397,000
in 2004-05 to Rs. 606,000 in 2005-06, an increase of 52.5%"236 and the
"average annual sitting fee increased by 39%, from Rs. 112,000 in 2004-05
to Rs. 155,000 in 2005-06."237 Although the numbers are increasing, they
may not be sufficient to attract high quality talent.
From an empirical standpoint, the key question relates to whether
increase in compensation would compromise independence, especially if
the independent director's principal source of income were to come from
such directorship. During interviews, most respondents seem to believe
that increased compensation by itself will not impinge upon independence,
particularly if individuals are independent directors on multiple boards.
There are several disincentives to individuals for acting as
independent directors. The principal among them relates to potential
liability and loss of reputation, primarily in case of breach of law by the
company or any other types of malfeasance. Furthermore, companies are
not in a position to indemnify independent directors except in certain
circumstances.2 38 As regards D&O insurance policies in favor of
independent directors, they are not as popular as they are in developed
economies, although the Indian market for such policies is on the rise.239
Following the corporate governance scandal at Satyam, SEBI is actively
considering the imposition of a mandatory requirement that all public listed
companies obtain D&O insurance policies for their directors. 24 0 However,
234. As regards sitting fees and commissions, there are limits on the amounts payable. While the
sitting fee is a small amount, the commission is determined on the basis of profitability of the company.
235. The trend of awarding stock options to independent directors is of recent vintage and is yet not
entirely common. AAH Report, supra note 216, at 50.
236. Id. at 49.
237. Id. at 49.
238. Section 201 of the Companies Act provides that any such indemnification provision in favour
of a director (including an independent director) that holds such person harmless "against any
negligence, default, misfeasance, breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be guilty in relation
to the company, shall be void." Moreover, any expenses incurred in defending proceedings can be
reimbursed by the company only when the independent directors have been acquitted or discharged or
when relief is granted to them. The Companies Act, supra note 40, § 201.
239. D&O insurance policies market picking up, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE (India), Nov. 10,
2005.
240. Aman Dhall. SEBI may make D&O liabilitv insurance must for listed cos, ECONOMIC TIMES
(India), Apr. 19, 2009.
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there are certain practical difficulties in the wide acceptance of D&O
insurance policies. While the large and more reputed companies,
particularly those that are cross-listed on international stock exchanges, do
obtain large amounts of D&O insurance policies, most of the other
companies find it prohibitively expensive to obtain meaningful policies. 241
Indian insurance companies have only recently begun offering these types
of insurance policies and there are bound to be difficulties in successfully
invoking such policies.
There appears to be no empirical survey that tracks the manner in
which such disincentives operate in the minds of independent directors in
India. However, there are some cases which provide an indication in this
regard, which will be examined in the next section.
6. Role of Independent Directors
As we have seen in the previous Part, Clause 49 is altogether silent
when it comes to the roles and responsibilities of independent directors. It
is not clear if they are to be involved in strategic advisory functions or
monitoring functions. It is also not clear if they are to owe their allegiance
to the shareholder body as a whole, to the minority shareholders
specifically, or to other stakeholders. It is somewhat surprising, therefore,
to find that survey results report a great level of confidence among
independent directors about knowledge of their own roles. The AAH
Report states that 62.5 percent of the respondents "believe that the roles
and responsibilities of the non-executive directors are clearly defined and
documented." 242 In the FICCI GT Report, a slightly larger proportion of 69
percent expressed satisfaction with the outline of the current role and
responsibility of the board members in general. If participants in the
corporate sector seem quite conscious of their own role, what exactly is that
role-strategic advisory or monitoring? This is an important question
which the surveys do not readily answer. The only guidance available is
that 59 percent of respondents to one survey believe that independent
director involvement in annual planning and strategy development of the
company of the company is moderate, while 22 percent believe it to be
substantial and 13 percent minimal. 244 But, the monitoring function, which
has been the focus of the independent director's evolution in the U.S. and
the U.K., appears not yet to be a key part of an independent director's role
in India. While the surveys themselves do not track the monitoring
241. Interview with a corporate lawyer, independent director on Indian companies, In Mumbai
(June 12, 2008).
242. AAH Report, supra note 216, at 25.
243. FICCI-GT Report, supra note 216, at 15. Note that this report, unlike the AAH Report,
surveys the role of the board as a whole as opposed to the specific roles of independent directors.
244. FICCI GT Report, supra note 216, at 17.
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function, interviews with practitioners suggest a greater involvement of
independent directors in business strategy formulation than in
monitoring.24
In the context of the majority-minority agency problem's persistence,
there is no general tendency on the part of independent directors to bear in
mind the interests of minority shareholders. One survey finds that "[o]ver
20 percent of firms have a director who explicitly represents minority
shareholders or institutional investors." 246  However, the survey does not
identify the types of minority investors. Based on practitioner interviews
and a broad overview of minority investors in Indian companies, it appears
that these independent directors are usually appointed by institutional
investors who take significant shareholdings in public listed companies.247
The investors enter into contractual arrangements (though subscription and
shareholders' agreements) with the company and the controlling
shareholders to identify the inter se rights among the parties. The so-called
independent directors, who are otherwise nominees of the investors, are
appointed to oversee the interests of the investors appointing them and do
not have any explicit mandate to cater to the interests of minority
shareholders as a whole. Such an independent director selectively takes
into account the interests of one minority shareholder, and cannot be said to
aid in the resolution of the majority-minority shareholder problem in
general.248
Finally, independent directors can play an impactful role only when
board systems and practices enable such role. One of the key obstacles to
the proper functioning of independent directors relates to availability of
information. Although the amount of information being shared with
independent directors has been increasing over the years, surveys find that
there is a need for drastic improvement both in terms of the timeliness and
245. Many practitioners believed that their role is not meant to be one of "policing" individuals
within the company, and that with their minimal involvement in the company's affairs it was impossible
for them unearth all goings-on in the company.
246. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150, at 16.
247. These institutional investors are private equity funds, venture capital funds and similar
institutional investors who take up a stake in public listed companies through PIPE (private investment
in public equity) transactions or are investors who came into the company prior to its listing, but have
remained even thereafter. These types of investors rely extensively on additional rights provided under
contractual documentation, including the right to nominate directors on the boards of the companies.
Practice reveals that several companies treat such nominees as independent directors. This is because
such directors tend to satisfy the formal definition of independence in Clause 49 and there is no further
clarity regarding the status of such nominee directors. Other companies, however, adopt a more
conservative approach and refuse to treat such nominees as independent directors. The practice is
dichotomous.
248. The KPMG Report generally notes that "75 percent of the respondents believe that significant
efforts need to be made to address the concerns of minority shareholders" and that "12 percent of the
respondents say that minority shareholders' concerns are sometimes addressed but not in the best
interests of the company." KPMG Report, supra note 216, at 7.
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quality of information provided. 24 9 Furthermore, independent directors can
be effective only if they are provided adequate training and their
performance is properly evaluated. As far as training is concerned,
although there is no mandatory training requirement in Clause 49,250 one
survey suggests that 57 percent of the respondents are taking steps to
provide training to their directors.25' Independent directors will have an
incentive to carry out their roles diligently if their performance is
periodically evaluated.252 However, performance evaluation of independent
directors has not evolved sufficiently in India as a common practice. One
survey indicates that only a quarter of responding firms have an evaluation
system for non-executive directors,253 while another survey indicates that
about 39 percent companies surveyed had a formal board evaluation
process254 (which perhaps covers the entire board rather than just the
independent non-executive directors). This suggests that independent
directors are often brought on boards merely to comply with the legal
requirement rather than with a view of obtaining any significant
contribution (either in terms of strategic value-add or monitoring).255
In conclusion, the empirical surveys reemphasize the shortcomings not
only of the concept of the independent director itself but its current form as
contained in Clause 49. Although respondents are generally optimistic
about greater effectiveness of the independent directors once appropriate
conditions are created, the current situation is far from the desired. 256 To a
249. AAH Report, supra note 216, at 30-31; FICCI GT Report, supra note 216, at 13; KPMG
Report, supra note 216, at 10.
250. This is unlike China where independent director training is mandatory. China Independent
Director Opinion, supra note 190.
251. FICCI GT Report, supra note 216, at 24. This is also consistent with practitioner interviews
indicating that companies do provide opportunities to directors for training programmes. However,
these are provided only on a voluntary basis and directors do avail of them depending on their need for
the training and the availability of time.
252. Under Clause 49, evaluation of the performance of non-executive directors is only a non-
mandatory requirement. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 49 Annexure IC, 1 6.
253. Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, supra note 150, at 18.
254. AAH Report, supra note 216, at 33.
255. In a practitioner interview, one respondent remarked that often individuals are often brought in
as independent directors just to "keep the seat warm." Interview with a CEO of a listed company, in
Bangalore, India (June 23, 2008). This is also consistent with the inadequacies pointed out in the
nomination and appointments process. If there is a serious evaluation process, controlling shareholders
and managers would be compelled to nominate competent and strong-willed individuals as independent
directors with the ability to sustain serious scrutiny, and who may not necessarily adhere to the policies
and aspirations of their nominators.
256. One survey summarizes the deficiencies in the current position:
According to directors, the greatest impediments in changing board structure include limited
pool of independent directors, and lack of willingness on part of existing board members to
change. Absence of a structured process to select capable independent directors was also
perceived to be an impediment to a certain extent.
AAH Report, supra note 216, at 23. The survey also noted that -[r]elatively few directors believe that
adding more independent directors could add further value to the board." Id. at 23.
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large extent, the claims made in this Article about the inadequacies of the
independent director regime in India 25 7 stand supported by empirical
evidence.
Before concluding on the empirical front, it is necessary to highlight
one heartening trend. During practitioner interviews, the study revealed
that in a handful of leading Indian companies (the so called "blue-chip"
companies), the corporate governance norms and practices identified were
far superior to what is prescribed by Clause 49 and were also comparable
to, and perhaps more stringently followed than, practices around the world,
particularly in developing countries.258 In these companies, only competent
individuals who are truly independent are appointed following a rigorous
appointment process. Further, the companies (management and controlling
shareholders) themselves are highly demanding of the time and attention of
the independent directors. They seek independent advice of such directors
(on strategy, compliance, monitoring and other issues), rely substantially
on their inputs and even impose an onerous evaluation system. However,
these are only honorable exceptions that seem to flow against the tide.
B. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN INDIA: CASE STUDIES
In addition to empirical evidence, there is also a fair amount of
anecdotal evidence represented by case studies (with the prominent ones
being most recent) that help analyze the effectiveness of independent
directors in Indian corporate governance. The case studies are divided into
three categories and discussed below.
1. Compliance with Clause 49
Even assuming that independent directors are not believed to be
effective, it would be right to presume that companies would nevertheless
appoint independent directors in order to comply with the minimum
requirements of Clause 49, at least as a means of "checking the box."
However, as we have seen, 259 nearly 13 percent companies were yet to
appoint the minimum number of independent directors as of 2006.
Surprisingly, the principal offenders are not the medium- and small-scale
companies or lesser known businesses, but the government itself in the case
of public sector undertakings.
In a string of cases, SEBI initiated action in 2007260 against several
257. See supra Part IV.B.
258. Interview with an executive director and the company secretary of a technology services
company, in Bangalore, India (June 23, 2008).
259. Supra Part V.A.2 and accompanying notes.
260. SEBI Cracks the Whip-Violation of Corporate Code Under Lens, THE TELEGRAPH (India),
Sept. 12, 2007): SEBI Proceeds Against 20 Cos For Not Complying With Clause 49 Norms, THE HINDU
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government companies for non-compliance of Clause 49.261 These actions
were initiated on the specific count that these government companies had
failed to appoint the requisite number of independent directors as required
by Clause 49. However, the actions were subsequently dropped by
SEBI." The principal ground for dropping the action is that, in the case of
the government companies involved, the articles of association provide for
the appointment of directors by the President of India (as the controlling
shareholder), acting through the relevant administrative Ministry. SEBI
found that despite continuous follow up by the government companies, the
appointments did not take effect due to the need to follow the requisite
process and hence the failure by those companies to comply with Clause 49
was not deliberate or intentional.
This episode may likely have deleterious consequences on corporate
governance reforms in India. Compliance or otherwise of corporate
governance norms by government companies has an important signaling
effect. Strict adherence to these norms by government companies may
persuade others to follow as well. But, when government companies
violate the norms with impunity, it is bound to trigger negative
consequences in the marketplace thereby making implementation of
corporate governance norms a more arduous task. Furthermore, such
implementation failures raise important questions as to the acceptability of
transplanted concepts of corporate governance in the Indian context.
2. Effectiveness of Independent Directors: The Satyam Episode
Even where there is a stellar independent board of directors, it may not
be possible for them to perform their role effectively if the conditions that
facilitate proper performance do not exist. The Satyam episode
demonstrates some of the reasons why the effectiveness of independent
directors in India may continue to be in doubt.
a. Satyam: the company and its board
Satyam Computer Services Limited (recently renamed Mahindra
Satyam) is a leading information technology services company
incorporated in India.263 Satyam's promoters, represented by Mr.
BUSINESS LINE (India), Sept. 12, 2007.
261. SEBI repeatedly made public statements through its Chairman indicating its intention to
ensure that government companies too strictly comply with Clause 49. See PSUs Must Meet Clause 49
Norms, REDIFF MONEY (India), Jan. 3, 2008).
262. During October and November 2008, SEBI passed a series of orders involving several
government companies, viz. NTPC Ltd. (October 8, 2008), GAIL (India) Ltd. (October 27, 2008),
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (October 31, 2008) and Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (November 3,
2008). available at http://www.sebi.gov.in.
263. It is paradoxical that the expression "Satyam" stands for "truth" in Sanskrit.
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Ramalinga Raju and his family, held about 8 percent shares in the company
at the end of 2008,26 while the remaining shareholding in the company was
diffused.265 Its securities are listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the
National Stock Exchange. 266 Furthermore, the company's securities are
cross-listed on the NYSE.26  This required Satyam to comply not only with
Clause 49 but also the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as
the NYSE Manual. Satyam took immense pride in its corporate
268governance practices.
At the relevant time (end 2008), Satyam had a majority independent
board, thus over-complying with the requirements of Clause 49. Its board
consisted of the following:269
Executive Directors
B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman;
B. Rama Raju, Managing Director and Chief Executive
Officer;
Ram Mynampati, Whole Time Director;
Non-Executive, Non-Independent Directors
Prof. Krishna G. Palepu, Ross Graham Walker Professor of
Business Administration at the Harvard Business School;27 0
264. It has been reported that the promoters' percentage shareholding in Satyam declined over a
period of time:
Though the precise numbers quoted vary, according to observers the stake of the promoters
fell sharply after 2001 when they held 25.60 per cent of equity in the company. This fell to
22.26 per cent by the end of March, 2002, 20.74 per cent in 2003, 17.35 per cent in 2004,
15.67 per cent in 2005, 14.02 per cent in 2006, 8.79 in 2007, 8.65 at the end of September
2008. and 5.13 percent in January 2009 . The most recent decline is attributed to the decision
of lenders from whom the family had borrowed to sell the shares that were pledged with
them. But the earlier declines must have been the result either of sale of shares by promoters
or of sale of new shares to investors.
C.P. Chandrasekhar, The Satyam Scam: Separating Truth from Lies, THE HINDU (India), Jan. 14, 2009
(internal citations omitted). It would be cumbersome to obtain the exact amount of voting shares held
by the promoters as large parts of those shares were pledged to lenders and those pledges were enforced
by the lenders, thereby bringing the promoter holdings down to negligible levels.
265. In Satyam's case, institutional shareholders held a total of 60 percent of shares as of December
31, 2008; the highest individual shareholding of an institutional shareholder, however, was only 3.76
percent. Satyam Computer Services, Ltd., Shareholding Pattern (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.bseindia.com/ shareholding/shareholdingPattem.asp?scripcd=500376&qtrid=60.
266. SATYAM COMPUTER SERVICES LTD,, 21ST ANNUAL REPORT 2007-2008 43 (2008) [hereinafter
Sarvam Annual Report].
267. Id. at 43. The securities listed on the NYSE in the form of American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) are derivative securities issued to holders by a global depository that holds underlying equity
shares of Satyam.
268 It is also ironic that the company was awarded the Golden Peacock Award for Corporate
Governance by the World Council for Corporate Govemance as late as September 2008. Saiyam
receives Golden Peacock Global Award for Excellence in Corporate Governance, FINANCIAL EXPRESS
(India), Sept. 23, 2008.
269. Satyam Annual Report, supra note 266; Satyam Computer Services Ltd., Annual Report
(Form 20-F) (Aug. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Satyam Form 20-F].
270. Although Professor Palepu was initially appointed as an independent director, he ceased to be
so formally, in view of the special remuneration of $200,000 that he received from the company
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Independent
Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, management consultant and a
visiting professor at several U.S. universities;
Vinod K. Dham, Vice President and General Manager, Carrier
Access Business Unit, of Broadcom Corporation;
Prof. M. Rammohan Rao, Dean, Indian School of Business;
T. R. Prasad, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of India;
and
V. S. Raju, Chairman, Naval Research Board and former
Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras.
The board consisted of three executive directors, five independent directors
and one grey (or affiliated) director. Amongst the non-executives, four
were academics, one was from government service and the last was a
business executive. At a broad level, it can be said that very few Indian
boards can lay claim to such an impressive array of independent directors.
b. The Maytas transaction
On December 16, 2008, a meeting of Satyam's board was convened to
consider a proposal for acquisition of two companies, Maytas Infra Limited
and Maytas Properties Limited. 272 Two sets of facts gain immense
relevance to the transaction. One is that the Maytas pair of companies273
was predominantly owned in excess of 30 percent each by the Raju
family,274 thereby making the proposed acquisition deal a related party
transaction. The other is that the Maytas companies were in the businesses
of real estate and infrastructure development, both unrelated to the core
business of Satyam. The transactions were also significant as the total
purchase consideration for the acquisition was Rs. 7,914.10 crores (US$1.6
billion)." It is important to note that, if effected, the transaction would
have resulted in a significant amount of cash flowing from Satyam, a
publicly listed company, to its individual promoters, the Raju family.
The board meeting on December 16, 2008, was attended by all
directors, except for Palepu and Dham who participated by audio
conference.' On account of the related party situation and unrelated
towards professional consulting services rendered. Satyam Annual Report, supra note 266, at 64.
271. Vinod Dham is a seasoned technocrat who is also referred to as the "father of the Pentium
chip." Scandal at Satyam: Truth, Lies and Corporate Governance, INDIA KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4344.
272. Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of Satyam Computer Services Ltd., 2 (Dec.
16, 2008, at Hyderabad, India), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/
satyam0 I 15.pdf [hereinafter Satyam Board Minutes].
273. Maytas is a palindrome for Satyam. See R. Narayanaswamy, L affaire Satyam, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (India), Dec. 28, 2008.
274. K.V. Ramana, Satyam Buys Maytas cos for 5 1.6b, DNA-MONEY (India), Dec. 16, 2008,
available at http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-satyam-buys- maytas-cos- for- I -6b_ 1214566.
275. Satyam Board Minutes, supra note 272, at 4.
276. Under the Companies Act, participation by audio conference is not recognized and hence there
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business diversification, it is natural to expect a significant amount of
resistance from the independent directors to the Maytas transactions.277
After the company's officers made a presentation to the board regarding the
transactions, the independent directors did raise some concerns. For
example, "Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, Director enquired if there are any
particular reasons either external or internal for this initiative and timing of
the proposal" and "suggested to involve the Board members right from the
beginning of the process to avoid the impression that the Board is used as a
rubber stamp to affirm the consequent or decisions already reached." 278
Other independent directors such as a Rao and Dham were concerned about
the risks in a diversifying strategy as the company was venturing into a
completely unrelated business.27 9 Yet others opined that "since the
transactions are among related parties, it is important to demonstrate as to
how the acquisition would benefit the shareholders of the company and
enhance their value"280 and that there should be "complete justification"
regarding the valuation methodology adopted, which "should be
communicated to all the concerned stakeholders."2 8'
The independent directors cannot be criticized for failing to identify
the issues or to raising their concerns at the board meeting, for that is
precisely what they did. Surprisingly, however, the final outcome of the
meeting was a "unanimous" resolution of the board to proceed with the
Maytas transaction, without any dissent whatsoever.282 As required by the
listing agreement, Satyam notified the stock exchanges about the board
approval immediately following the board meeting.283 This information was
not at all accepted kindly by the investors. The stock price of Satyam's
American Depository Receipts collapsed during a single trading session by
over 50 percent due to massive selling, and the company was compelled to
withdraw the Maytas proposal within eight hours of its announcement. 284
This episode gives rise to a number of questions regarding the role of
is doubt as to whether such participation is considered as a matter of official record for the purpose of
quorum or voting.
277. As a technical matter, however, this board meeting was chaired by Rao (an independent
director) rather than the Chairman, Raju, as the latter was interested in the Maytas transactions. Satyam
Board Minutes, supra note 272, at 1.
278. Id. at 4. Her suggestions were for "the management to take Board's guidance at appropriate
stages for all acquisitions."
279. Id.
280. Id. at 5.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Id. at 8-10.
283. Id. at 8. The announcements to the stock markets were made after the close of trading hours in
India, but before the commencement of trading on the NYSE (resulting in some disparity in information
between the markets due to the time difference between India and the U.S.).
284. Somasekhar Sundaresan. Year of All-Pervasive Poor Governance, BUSINESS STANDARD
(India), Dec. 29, 2008; S. Nagesh Kumar, Independent Directors Put Tough Questions. But Gave Blank
Cheque, THE HINDU (India), Jan. 14, 2009 (noting that the drastic collapse of Satyam's stock price
following the board meeting signalled "the start of Satyam's downhill joumey").
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the independent directors. If the transactions were riddled with issues, why
were they approved "unanimously" by the independent directors even
though they voiced their concerns quite forcefully? Why were the interests
of the minority public (institutional and individual) shareholders not borne
in mind by the independent directors when the transaction involved a
blatant transfer of funds from the company (which was owned more than
90 percent by public shareholders) to the individual promoters that is
tantamount to siphoning of funds of a company by its controlling
shareholders to the detriment of all other stakeholders? Why were the
independent directors unable to judge the drastic loss in value to the
shareholders by virtue of the transactions and stop them or even defer the
decision to a further date by seeking more information on the transactions?
How was it the case that the investors directly blocked the transaction when
the independent directors were themselves unable to do so? These
questions do not bear easy answers, but it is clear from this episode that
shareholder activism (exhibited through the "Wall Street walk") performed
a more significant role in decrying a poor management decision than
independent directors. If independent directors are to be the guardians of
minority shareholders' interests, Satyam's directors arguably failed in their
endeavors.
In the ensuing furor that this episode generated, four of the non-
executive directors resigned from Satyam's board.285 However, most
independent directors defended themselves stating that they had raised their
objections to the Maytas transactions as independent directors should.286
While the markets were still recovering from the purported corporate
governance failures at Satyam, evidence of a bigger scandal emerged
during the first week of 2009 raising further questions about the role of
independent directors.
c. Fraud in financial statements
On January 7, 2009, the Chairman of the company, Mr. Ramalinga
Raju, confessed to having falsified the financial statements of the company,
including by showing fictitious cash assets of over US$1 billion on its
books.287 The confession also revealed that the proposed Maytas buy-outs
285. The directors who resigned are Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, Prof. Krishna Palepu, Mr. Vinod
Dham and Prof. Rammohan Rao. Corporate Lawyers. CAs Hit Out at Satyam 's Independent Directors
for Quitting, THE MINT (India), Dec. 30, 2008; Sundaresan, supra note 284.
286. Satvam *s Independent Directors Had Raised Concerns Over the Deal, BUSINESS LINE (India),
Dec. 19, 2008.
287. Letter from B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman, Satyam Computer Services Ltd., to the Board of
Directors, Satyam Computer Services Ltd. (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.hindu.com/nic/
satyam-chairman -statement.pdf [hereinafter Chairman s Confession]. In his confession addressed to
Satyam's board, Raju wrote:
It is with deep regret, and tremendous burden that I am carrying on my conscience, that]
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were just illusory transactions intended to manipulate the balance sheet of
Satyam and to wipe out inconsistencies therein.288 The stock price of the
company reacted adversely to this information and fell more than 70
percent289 thereby wiping out the wealth of its shareholders, some of whom
are employees with stock options.290 Minority shareholders were
significantly affected as they were unaware of the veracity (or otherwise) of
the financial statements of Satyam, and hence this exacerbated the
majority-minority agency problem.29'
This episode invoked fervent reaction from the Indian government.
Several regulatory authorities such as the Ministry of Company Affairs,
Government of India2 92 and SEBl 293 initiated investigations into the matter.
would like to bring the following factors to your notice:
1. The Balance Sheet carries as of September 30, 2008
A. Inflated (non-existent) cash and bank balances of Rs. 50.40 billion (as against
Rs. 53.61 billion reflected in the books)
B. An accrued interest of Rs. 3.76 billion which is non-existent
C. An understated liability of Rs. 12.30 billion on account of funds arranged by
me
D. An over stated debtors position of Rs. 4.90 billion (as against Rs. 26.51 billion
reflected in the books
2. For the September quarter (Q2) we reported a revenue of Rs. 27 billion and an
operating margin of Rs. 6.49 billion (24% of revenues) as against the actual
revenues of Rs. 21.12 billion and an actual operating margin of Rs. 610 million
(3% of revenues). This has resulted in artificial cash and bank balances going up
by Rs. 5.88 billion in Q2 alone.
The gap in the Balance Sheet has arisen purely on account of inflated profits over a
period of last several years . .. What started as a marginal gap between actual
operating profit and the one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow
over the years. It has attained unmanageable proportions as the size of the company
operations grew significantly .. .
Id.
288. Id. Raju's letter further goes on to stale:
The aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the last attempt to fill the fictitious assets with
real ones. Maytas' investors were convinced that this is a good investment opportunity
and a strategic fit. Once Satyam's problem was solved, it was hoped that Maytas'
payments can be delayed. But that was not to be. What followed in the last several days
is common knowledge"
Id.
289. Satvam ChiefAdmits Huge Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009.
290. Santanu Mishra & Ranjit Shinde, Satvam Esop-Holders in Deep Sea as Valuation Takes a Hit,
ECONOMIc TIMES (India), Jan. 8, 2009.
291. The magnitude of the financial loss caused to unwitting minority shareholders is
unimaginable. As one column notes:
Shareholders have lost Rs. 136 billion in Satyam shares in less than a month. The
market capitalisation fell to Rs. 16.07 billion on January 9, 2008, from Rs. 152.62
billion at the end of trade on December 16, 2008, the day when Satyam had announced
the Rs. 80 billion acquisition deal of two firms promoted by the kin of the IT firm's
former chairman Ramalinga Raju.
Ashish K. Bhattacharyya, Satvam: How Guiltv are the Independent Directors?. BUSINESS STANDARD
(India), Jan. 12, 2009.
292. Souvik Sanyal, Government Refers Satvan Case to Serious Frauds Investigation Oflice,
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While several independent directors of the company had resigned,294 the
remaining directors were substituted with persons nominated by the
Government.295 Certain key officers of Satyam, being the chairman, the
managing director and the chief financial officer were arrested by the
police within a few days following the confession,9 " while two partners of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Satyam's auditor, were arrested thereafter.29 7 The
investigations by the various authorities, which are likely to be time-
consuming, are ongoing and it is expected that their outcome will be
available only in due course. The only significant investigation that has
been completed is that of the Ministry of Company Affairs conducted
through the Serious Frauds (Investigation) Office.29 8 At a broader level, the
Satyam episode has triggered renewed calls for corporate governance
reforms in India,2 9 and some of the reforms are already underway. t )
As for the company itself, it witnessed a remarkable turnaround of
fortunes under the leadership of its new government-nominated board of
directors.30 1 The new board and their advisors took charge of the affairs of
ECONOMic TIMES(India), Jan. 13, 2009.
293. Oomen A. Ninan, Satyam Episode: SEBI Enquiries Will Focus on Three Areas, HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (India), Jan. 16, 2009.
294. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
295. Mukesh Jagota & Romit Guha, India Names New Sarvam Board, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Jan. 12,
2009.
296. Satyam s Rcou Brothers Arrested by AP Police, ECONOMIC TIMES (India), Jan. 9, 2009;
Satvam Fraud: Raju Sent to Central Prison; CFO Vadlamani Arrested, ECONOMic TIMES (India), Jan.
10, 2009).
297. Jackie Range, Pricewaterhouse Partners Arrested in Satyam Probe, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Jan.
25, 2009.
298. Satvam: SF10 Report Being Examined, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (India), Apr. 26, 2009.
299. Some of the immediate developments towards:
(i) Within days of the Satyam episode coming to light, the CII set up a special task force on
corporate governance to examine issues arising out of the Satyam episode and to make
suitable recommendations. CII Sets Up Task Force on Corporate Governance, BUSINESS
STANDARD(India), Jan. 12, 2009.
(ii) The National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM), the
premier trade body representing the Indian IT-BPO industry announced that it will be
forming a Corporate Governance and Ethics Committee to be chaired by Mr. N. R. Narayana
Murthy, Chairman and Chief Mentor, Infosys Technologies Ltd. This signifies NASSCOM's
efforts to strengthen corporate governance practices in the Indian IT-BPO industry.
NASSCOM Announces Formation of Corporate Governance and Ethics Committee,
BUSINESS STANDARD(India), Feb. 11, 2009.
(iii) The Minister for Corporate Affairs, Government of India announced that the Ministry
will consider changes to the Companies Bill, 2008 (that is pending in Parliament) in the light
of events surrounding Satyam. Satyam Scam: Provisions of New Companies Bill to be
Reviewed, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (India), Jan. 8, 2009.
300. These reforms are discussed in Part V.C below.
301. A six-member board was appointed pursuant to orders passed by the Company Law Board.
The board (as of May 18, 2009) consisted of industrialists, representative of business associations,
professional bodies and a former government officer. They were: Deepak Parekh, Kiran Karnik, C.
Achutan, Tarun Das, T.N. Manoharan and S.B. Mainak. Satyam.com, http://www.satyam.com/about/
boardmembers.asp.
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the company, appointed a new chief executive, and undertook tireless
efforts to retain clients and employees. Finally, the company itself was
sold through a global bidding process to Tech Mahindra, another Indian IT
player in a transaction that received uniform adulation for the alacrity with
which the various players (particularly the new board of Satyam) acted to
resuscitate the company and protect the interests of its stakeholders." 2
d. Lessons from Satyam
It is necessary to examine to how misstatements in Satyam's
financials were made possible in the first place despite the applicability not
only of Clause 49 (as Satyam was listed on Indian stock exchanges), but
also of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (as the company was also listed on the
NYSE). Satyam had seemingly complied with all the onerous requirements
imposed by Clause 49 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as the
appointment of an impressive array of independent directors, an audit
committee, and the audit of its financial statements by a "Big Four" audit
firm, but these corporate governance failures nevertheless occurred."" This
episode raises serious questions about implementation of corporate
governance norms in India, and points towards the lack of success of
transplanted concepts.
More specifically, several key questions arise with reference to the
role of independent directors in such situations. Satyam's independent
directors were unable to prevent the falsification of financial statements.
302. Posting of Umakanth V. to Indian Corporate Law, http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2009/
04/reactions-to-satyam-sale.html, (Apr. 15, 2009).
303. See Pratip Kar, Enron? Parmalat? Lehman? No, no, it's Satvam, BUSINESS STANDARD
(India), Jan. 9, 2009; Salil Tripathi, India Faces an 'Enron Moment', WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009. An
additional question that has baffled observers pertains to how Satyam was able to circumvent the
onerous provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that were applicable to it by virtue of its cross-listing on
NYSE.
For an explanation regarding specific characteristics that arise out of cross-listings, see Amir N. Licht,
Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 142 (2003).
He refers to the cross-listing feature of companies as the "bonding thesis" and notes that "cross-listing
on a foreign stock market can serve as a bonding mechanism for corporate insiders to commit credibly
to a better governance regime." However, there are some challenges to the bonding thesis as its role
has been greatly overstated. He adds:
A large body of evidence, using various research methodologies, indicates that the bonding
theory is unfounded. Indeed, the evidence supports an alternative theory, which may be
called "the avoiding hypothesis." To the extent that corporate governance issues play a role
in the cross-listing decision, it is a negative role. The dominant factors in the choice of cross-
listing destination markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing issuer visibility.
Corporate governance is a second-order consideration whose effect is either to deter issuers
from accessing better-regulated markets or to induce securities regulators to allow foreign
issuers to avoid some of the more exacting domestic regulations. Overall, the global picture
of cross-listing patterns is best described as a model of informational distance, which
comprises elements of geographical and cultural distance."
Id.
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Various reasons can be attributed to this failure. No doubt, the Satyam
board was largely independent and also comprised distinguished and
reputable individuals. But, independent directors cannot generally be
expected to uncover frauds in companies as the decisions they make are
generally based on information provided to them by management." Even
in Satyam's own case, the Chairman's Confession itself concedes that
"[n]one of the board members, past or present, had any knowledge of the
situation in which the company is placed."30 s Since independent directors
do not get involved in the day-to-day management of the company, it is
virtually impossible for them to unearth such frauds.30' Hence, even when
monitoring functions are imposed on independent boards, it is impractical
to expect independent directors to exercise watchdog functions as their role
is necessarily limited. In addition, independent directors are busy
individuals who spend little time each year tending to matters pertaining to
each company on whose boards they serve. This also limits their ability to
delve deeper into financial, business and other matters involving the
companies.
At a structural level, as discussed earlier, independent directors are
subject to nomination, appointment and removal, all at the hands of the
controlling shareholders,07 and hence may be subject to influence by the
controlling shareholders.30 s Although Satyam was subject to the listing
requirements of NYSE," 9 it did not have an independent nomination
committee310 that could have potentially brought the appointment of
directors outside the purview of the controlling shareholders. In the present
304. The management or controlling shareholders control the "amount, quality and structure" of
information that is provided to the board, and this "kind of power over information flow is virtually
equivalent to power over decision." EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 144, 172. Added to that is the
complexity of the information based on which directors are required to decide. Often, directors' roles
are "predicated on a detailed knowledge of a company and its business." JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH
MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 57 (1989).
305. Chairman's Confession, supra note 287.
306. It has been noted that "by their nature, the directors on the board largely rely on information
from the management and auditors, with their capacity to independently verify financial information
being quite limited...." D. Murali, Truly Independent Director A Rarity, HINDU BUSINESS LINE
(India), Jan. 22, 2009.
307. See supra Part IV.B.3 and supra Part V.A.3.
308. To be sure, this is not to suggest any malfeasance on the part of Satyam's independent
directors. The independent directors may act well-intentioned and bona fide, but due to the operation of
several constraints on time, information, as well as on business, financial and legal expertise, they may
not be in a position to challenge management or controlling shareholders when required. An
observation made several years ago by a leading commentator on board behavior continues to be apt
today: "'Professional courtesy' and 'corporate manners' were phrases used to explain the lack of
challenging questions." MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 54 (1971).
309. Satyam's ADRs are listed on the NYSE, symbol: SAY. New York Stock Exchange,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/say.htmi.
310. Satyam did not constitute a nomination committee even though one is mandated by the
corporate governance requirements of the NYSE. Satyam Form 20-F, supra note 269, at 70. See also
NYSE Manual, supra note 3, § 303A.04 (2003).
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case, it is evident that the independent directors were not willing to fiercely
oppose the proposals of the management and promoters, as they may have
implicitly owed allegiance to the promoters of the company who were in a
position to influence their appointment and continuance on the board. "
Independent directors are said to be in a position to exchange their
views more frankly if they meet separately from the management (or the
controlling shareholders). This would ensure that they are not inhibited by
the presence of the management or their possible reaction to the views of
the independent directors. This would help independent directors take a
more unbiased position. However, Indian corporate governance norms do
not require such executive sessions without the presence of management,
and hence independent directors' views tend to be equivocal even when
they are not convinced of the merits of any proposals that are before them
for consideration. The Satyam episode presents evidence of this difficulty.
Furthermore, Indian corporate governance norms do not specify the
roles of independent directors. Such lack of clarity in their roles could
result in less desirable outcomes from independent director action as we
have witnessed in Satyam's case. More importantly, there is no special
role for independent directors in related party transactions with the
controlling shareholders. For instance, if there is a requirement that all
such related party transactions are to be approved by a vote of independent
directors only, then such office bearers are likely to take on greater
responsibility for their decisions. 312 Again, there is no such specific role
envisaged for independent directors in the Indian corporate governance
norms.
Lastly, the Satyam episode is also symptomatic of a signaling problem
with the role of independent directors. That is, the corporate governance
norms bestow too much (and somewhat misplaced) importance on the role
of independent directors than is justified. In epitomizing independent
directors as a guardian of various corporate interests, including possibly
minority shareholders, the corporate governance norms create a false sense
of security among corporate stakeholders.3 " However, as the Satyam
episode has demonstrated, the independent directors are constrained in the
311. As one observer quite directly notes:
If the board is in awe of the family executive, it makes it difficult for the board sometimes to
ask tough questions or at other times the right questions at the right time in order to serve the
interests of the shareholders better. As a result truly independent directors are rarely found in
India companies.
D. Murali, supra note 306. In the Satyam case, although the independent directors did ask pointed
questions, they seemed willing to accept answers which may not have been altogether convincing
(because the investors voted thumbs down as they did not seem convinced with the proposals).
312. For such provisions in the laws of Delaware, see supra Part III.B.3.a and accompanying text.
313. It has been observed that an "independent director is a myth in India." Virendra Varma &
Rachna Monga, Cry Freedom! Investor Activism More Than Independent Directors Can Keep
Managements in Check, BUSINESS TODAY (India), Jan. 25, 2009.
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extent to which they can be effective in unearthing frauds, even when they
exercise a fair amount of diligence in their action.
There also exists the larger issue of promoter control in Indian
companies that affects the functioning of independent directors. Promoters
(who are controlling shareholders) exercise significant influence on matters
involving their companies, even though such companies are listed on stock
exchanges and hence have public shareholders. Indian law confers some
distinct roles for promoters.314 This largely holds good even for companies
that have controlling shareholders with small percentage holdings in
companies. For instance, the Raju family who were the promoters of
Satyam held only about 5 percent shares around the time when the
Chairman's confession was made on January 7, 2009."' A company with a
5 percent promoter shareholding will usually be considered as belonging to
the outsider model in terms of diffused shareholding, and hence requiring
the correction of agency problems between shareholders and managers.
However, the gradual decrease in controlling shareholders' percentage
holdings coupled with the concept of "promoter" under Indian regulations
makes the distinction between an insider-type company and outsider-type
company somewhat hazy in the Indian context. The Raju family, as
promoters, continued to wield significant powers in the management of the
company despite a drastic drop in their shareholdings over the last few
years. This was aided by the diffused nature of the remaining shareholding
within the company."' The Satyam episode illustrates that a company with
314. The importance of the position originates in the context of public offerings of securities, where
the role of key persons involved in control of the company is material information that is to be disclosed
to investors to enable them to take an informed investment decision. Apart from that, promoters are
required to hold minimum number of shares in the company at the time of listing (also known as
minimum promoter contribution) and they are subject to lock-in on their shares. It has been argued that
"[a]ny requirement that statutorily forces a promoter to bring in specific investment amounts or
maintain specific shareholding would necessarily perpetrate the unfortunate reality of keeping our listed
companies in the hands of the promoters." Somasekhar Sundaresan, SEBI Should Phase Out
'Promoter' Concept, BUSINEss STANDARD (India), Oct. 8, 2007. This would arguably inhibit any
transition from controlling shareholding in companies (i.e., the insider system) to diffused shareholding
(i.e., the outsider system) so as to engender board-driven professionally managed companies. Id.
315. Chandrasekhar, supra note 264.
316. Although institutional shareholders (particularly foreign institutional investors) are beginning
to hold significant numbers of shares in Indian listed companies, they have refrained from exercising
significant influence over corporate decisionmaking. Collective action problems continue to operate
and, over a period of time, "the culture of institutional shareholders always blindly voting with the
promoter was established." Ajay Shah, Getting the Right Architecture for Corporate Governance,
FINANCIAL EXPRESS (India), Jan. 13, 2009.
In the U.S., hedge funds and other institutional shareholders effectively monitor and sometimes
agitate against inefficient boards and management and also help shape general corporate governance
norms. Geis, supra note 36. They are ably aided by proxy consultants such as RiskMetrics to build
coalitions of institutional investors to adopt an "activist" role in companies. Id. The absence of these
checks and balances in the Indian context confers unhindered powers to controlling shareholders or
promoters (including those with limited shareholding percentages) to wield significant influence over
corporate decisionmaking. Id. The "transplantation" of investor activism from developed markets such
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minimal promoter shareholding could still be subject to considerable
influence by the promoters, thereby requiring a resolution of the agency
problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders even
at those shareholding levels."' The transition of companies from the insider
model to the outsider model through constant dilution of shareholding by
controlling shareholders can be difficult, as Satyam demonstrates.
Corporate governance regimes in emerging markets such as India which
are likely to witness such transition from insider to outsider regimes
through dilution of controlling shareholding need to provide mechanisms to
tackle undue control by promoters with limited shareholding."'
The Satyam case clearly demonstrates the inability of the existing
corporate governance norms in India to deal with corporate governance
failures in family-controlled companies, even where the level of promoter
shareholding is relatively low. Reforms to the independent director regime
that spring from this case ought to take into account the vulnerability of
minority shareholders in such companies that lie at the cusp of insider and
outsider systems.
3. Legal Liability
If the Satyam episode exhibits the lack of appropriate institutions and
incentives that enable independent directors to act effectively, certain other
recent cases demonstrate the operation of several disincentives that impede
otherwise competent individuals from taking up independent director
position. The case of Nagarjuna Finance is symptomatic of potential
criminal liability that could be foisted upon independent directors.
Nagarjuna Finance, located in Hyderabad, State of Andhra Pradesh, is
a non-banking financial company that had raised deposits worth Rs. 938
as the U.S. and yet to find an entrenched position in the Indian corporate milieu, although signs of
activist investors in India are slowing beginning to emerge. Id. This tepid involvement of investors in
corporate governance of Indian companies has also been a subject matter of empirical studies. Id.
317. Observers believe that companies with controlling shareholders holding limited stakes can be
particularly vulnerable to corporate governance failures. As Ajay Shah, a noted Indian economist
states: "The incentive for theft [in such cases] is the greatest: there is a great temptation for a CEO who
owns 8% of a company to make a grab for 100% of the cashflow." Shah, supra note 316. Further,
promoters who are in the twilight zone of control, i.e., where they hold shares less than that required to
comfortably exercise control over the company, have perverse incentives to keep the corporate
performance and stock price of the company at high levels so as to thwart any attempted takeover of the
company. The following statement by Ramalinga Raju is emblematic of how this incentive operates:
"As the promoters held a small percentage of equity, the concern was that poor performance would
result in a take-over, thereby exposing the gap. It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off
without being eaten." Chairman's Confession, supra note 287.
318. There is an argument that if there is to be a smooth transition towards an outsider regime and
"[i]f SEBI truly desires the Indian market to have board-driven professionally-managed companies, it
should begin by considering a roadmap to do away with the 'promoter' concept over time."
Sundaresan, supra note 314. See also Brian Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going
from London to Milan to Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 7 (2000).
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million from the public (about 85,000 depositors) during the years 1997
and 1998."9 During the period when the deposits were raised, the
company's board included prominent individuals such as Nimesh Kampani,
one of India's leading investment bankers, Minoo Shroff, a former
industrialist, A.P. Kurien, a prominent finance professional and L.V.V.
lyer, a corporate lawyer. As they were independent directors, they were
not involved in the day-to-day management of the company. Reports
indicate that at the time the deposits were obtained, the company had an
unblemished track record of repaying its deposits.320 This continued until
2000.321 In the meanwhile, the independent directors ceased to hold office
in the company.3 22 Subsequently, from the year 2000, the company began
defaulting on its deposits, and a large number of depositors suffered severe
financial loss on that count.
In terms of Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors
of Financial Establishments Act, 1999, which is a state legislation and not a
central or federal legislation, it is a criminal offence if the company is
unable to repay its depositors, due to which "every person responsible for
the management of the affairs of the financial establishment including the
promoter, manager or member of the financial establishment shall be
punished with up to 10 years' imprisonment and with up to Rs. 100,000
fine."323 Based on this provision, the Andhra Pradesh state police issued
arrest warrants against a number of persons involved with Nagarjuna
Finance, including those who were independent directors of the company
when it raised deposits.324 It did not matter that these persons ceased to be
independent directors by the time the deposits became matured for
repayment, i.e., when the default in fact occurred. Fearing persecution by
the police, at least two independent directors, Kampani and Shroff
remained in Dubai and London respectively for several months.32 5
The recent events involving Satyam and Nagarjuna have resulted in a
mass exodus of independent directors from Indian corporate boards. In
Satyam's case, there has been no liability (either civil or criminal) yet
imposed on the independent directors. However, Satyam's directors
suffered a grave loss of reputation as all of them were individuals of great
standing. In Nagarjuna's case, it is more than just reputation, i.e., the
actual fear of arrest. Due to the alarming effect of these instances, more
3 19. The Common-Sense View; The Supreme Court s Decision Not to Grant Anticipatory Bail,
BUSINESS STANDARD(India), May 11, 2009.




324. Professionals Turn Fall Guys of Boards, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (India), Jan. 5, 2009.
325. Sucheta Dalal, Scared Speechless, MONEY LIFE (India), Apr. 9, 2009. In October 2009,
Kampani received relief from the Andhra Pradesh High Court which stayed charges against him. C.R.
Sukumar, Kampani Gets Relieffrom Andhra Court, THE MINT (India), Oct. 15, 2009.
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than 500 independent directors resigned from companies listed on the
Bombay Stock Exchanges during the first three months of 2009 itself.32 6
This adds to the issues pertaining to the availability of competent
individuals to act as independent directors on Indian companies.
Finally, even where indemnification provisions and D&O insurance
policies are available to directors to protect themselves against liability,
there is no past track-record in India as to how such claims have been
handled. In the recent instance involving Satyam, although the company is
said to have taken a D&O policy cover in the range of US$75 million to
US$100 million,327 the insurance company has disputed the claims of the
independent directors in connection with expenses incurred by them in
defending various actions, including class actions filed in the U.S. courts.328
Although it is somewhat premature to conclude on the outcome of the
claim, existing evidence does not point to the effectiveness of protective
provisions such as indemnity and D&O policies in favour of independent
directors in India yet.
C. EVALUATING RECENT REFORMS
Before concluding this Part, it is appropriate to consider the round of
regulatory reforms to corporate governance norms that have been propelled
by the recent events. Although there was great anticipation of radical
reforms immediately following the Satyam and Nagarjuna episodes, the
Government chose to adopt a more careful approach by avoiding any knee-
jerk reactions. There was some level of consternation when no firm
announcements were forthcoming on regulatory policy in the months that
followed these events. Moreover, the Companies Bill, 2009 was presented
in Parliament on August 3, 2009, in the same form as contained in its
previous version presented in 2008 before the occurrence of these
episodes.3 29 However, during late 2009, a series of policy reforms were
announced, which I shall now consider briefly.
In November 2009, the Task Force constituted by CII330 made
recommendations to modify corporate governance norms in India.3 3 1
326. Abha Bakaya, Independent Directors on Quitting Spree, ECONOMIC TIMES (India), Apr. 20,
2009; Ranju Sarkar, Why Independent Directors are Quitting in Droves, BUSINESS STANDARD (India),
May 14, 2009; Candice Mak, Corporate Structures are Frightening Independent Directors, ASIA LAW,
Apr. 9, 2009.
327. Mayur Shetty, Satvam Scam Triggers Biggest D&O Claim, ECONOMIC TIMES (India), Jan. 8,
2009); Kevin LaCroix, What About Satyam s D&O Insurance?, D&O DIARY, Jan. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/01 /articles/d-o-insurance/what-about-satyams-do-insurance/.
328. Tata AIG Disputes Satvam 's D&O Claim, ECONOMIC TIMES (India), June 10, 2009.
329. Press Release, Ministry of Corp. Affairs, Companies Bill Introduced in Lok Sabha (Aug. 3,
2009), http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=51386.
330. See supra note 299.
331. MINISTRY OF COMPANY AFFAIRS, Naresh Chandra, Task Force on Corporate Governance,
Report (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/Draft-Report
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Pending formal legal changes, the Task Force also called upon companies
in India to voluntarily adopt the revised regime. Shortly thereafter, the
Institute of Company Secretaries of India ("ICSI") too provided its own set
of recommendations for altering corporate governance regulations. 332 Based
on these and other proposals received, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
Government of India has published the Corporate Governance Voluntary
Guidelines, 2009313 which provide a set of best practices for public
companies to follow. Rather than impose mandatory requirements, such as
by adding to Clause 49, the Government has chosen to adopt the "comply-
334or-explain" regime on this occasion.
From a substantive standpoint, the Voluntary Guidelines do address
some of the concerns that recently emerged. First, the appointment of
independent directors is provided a greater element of formality. The
company is required to execute a letter of appointment with the
independent director that captures various details such as the term of
appointment, duties of the director, remuneration, D&O insurance and list
of prohibitions against directors.3 Second, there is recognition of
discrepancies in the nomination and appointment of independent directors
due to the influence of controlling shareholders. Companies are to have a
nomination committee comprising a majority of independent directors.
Some guidance is also provided regarding the process of nomination.3 3 1
Third, specific positive attributes have been prescribed for independent
directors.33 ' These include "integrity, experience and expertise, foresight,
managerial qualities and ability to read and understand financial
statements."33 ' Fourth, a maximum tenure of six years is fixed for an
independent director.339 Fifth, in order to ensure time and attention of the
independent directors, a cap has been imposed on the number of
NareshChandra_ CII.pdf.
332. Institute of Company Secretaries of India, ICSI Recommendations to Strengthen Corporate
Governance Framework (December 2009), http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/ICSI
RecommendationsBook_8dec2009.pdf.
333. MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestnews/CG
VoluntaryGuidelines_2009_24dec2009.pdf [hereinafter Voluntary Guidelines].
334. This is contrary to the approach adopted in 2000, following the Birla Report, where it was felt
that corporate governance norms should be made mandatory. See supra note 154.
335. Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 333, 1 I.A. Such a formal letter of appointment is also
required to be included as part of disclosures to shareholders. Id.
336. Id., I I.A.3 (providing that nomination should be "based on an objective and transparent set of
guidelines which should be disclosed").
337. Id., | I.B.I. Independent directors are also required to provide a certificate of independence.
All of this signifies progress from the position under Clause 49 wherein "independence" is defined with
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directorships, which is restricted to seven.340 Sixth, the Voluntary
Guidelines also lay down some basic principles for remunerating
independent directors. They are required to be paid sitting fees depending
upon the "twin criteria of net worth and turnover of companies." 34' Finally,
several suggestions have been made to enhance the quality of decision-
making on boards, particularly by independent directors. These include
training of directors,3 42 provision of information in a timely manner,3 43
access to company management for information, " and a formal and
rigorous evaluation of directors.3 45
However, such an approach arguably fails to evoke a great sense of
optimism. As we have seen earlier, a large number of companies have
failed to comply with even the formal requirements of corporate
governance3 46 that are prescribed under the Listing Agreement with fairly
significant consequences in law. It is not clear, therefore, whether
compliance with such voluntary guidelines is bound to be met with much
success.3 47 Moreover, as they signify government actions in the aftermath
of a corporate governance crisis, the Voluntary Guidelines amount to mere
rhetoric in certain areas. To take one example, requirements such as
training of directors and board evaluations were already non-mandatory
recommendations in Clause 49 of the listing agreement. By including them
again in another exercise that only exhorts companies to voluntarily adopt
these practices, no real purpose appears to be served. In all, while the
current reforms do highlight the importance of these measures to address
existing inadequacies, there exists considerable agnosticism about their
ability to bring about significant changes in practice. That can be
empirically verified only in due course after implementation of the
Voluntary Guidelines.
Previous parts of this Article laid down the hypothesis that the
functioning of independent directors in India would be different from that
in the outsider economies of the U.S. and the U.K. from where they were
transplanted. Further, the preceding part identified shortcomings in the
legal provisions that dictate the roles and other aspects pertaining to
independent directors. In this Part, these shortcomings were verified
340. Id., L.A.4. For reckoning the number of directorships, two types of companies are included:
(i) public limited companies; and (ii) private companies that are either holding or subsidiary companies
of public companies.
341. Id., I.C.I.4.
342. Id., 1 LIA.
343. Id., .IB.
344. Id., 1 I.B.3
345. Id., 1 ID.
346. See supra Part V.B. I.
347. That is not to suggest that there would be large-scale non-compliance. Several reputable blue-
chip companies would follow these voluntary guidelines, and some of them may have already set up the
required mechanisms even prior to the regulatory exhortation. But, based on current evidence, such
voluntary compliance is likely to be limited to a few of the large companies.
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empirically, in terms of quantitative measures (to a limited extent), but
more by way of qualitative assessments of board practices as well as
through case studies. This exercise establishes through available evidence
that the institution of independent directors that was devised in the outsider
economies to resolve the manager-shareholder agency problem may not be
effective in that very form in the insider economies such as India (to which
it was transplanted) in order to resolve the majority-minority agency
problem that is predominant in these economies.
VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN
INDIA
In this Part, I approach the question from a normative standpoint.
What does the future hold for independent directors in India? Is it time to
consider jettisoning the concept altogether in that country? Alternatively,
is there merit in retaining the concept and, if so, what are the changes
required to be introduced to embolden independent directors in India such
that they are able to perform the monitoring role and protect the interests of
minority shareholders, the basic constituency that requires the independent
directors' allegiance? This Part seeks to address these questions.
Here, I confine myself to a discussion of reforms required to some of
the key legal considerations that emerge from the analysis in the previous
Part. For example, it has been found that issues relating to the nomination
and appointment of independent directors and their exact role and
constituencies they are required to protect are matters of grave doubt in the
insider systems such as India. Hence, this Part seeks to provide some
options for future reforms on these fronts. On the other hand, there are also
several practical issues relating to independent directors: their competence
levels, availability of adequate information, ability to commit adequate
time for the job and other matters pertaining to their performance of the
role in practice. Many of these issues are common both in the outsider
systems as well as insider systems like India. Hence, I do not propose to
delve into details regarding some of these practical issues from a normative
standpoint, but only to list them with some basic discussion so as to
constitute an exhaustive guidance of factors to be taken into account by
regulators in India while reforming their independent director norms.
A. REVISITING THE CONCEPT
If the independent director concept in India is mired in conceptual and
practical problems, the obvious question that arises is whether the concept
adds any value at all and hence whether it should be done away with
altogether. Of course, independent directors may add value to companies
from an advisory standpoint, but that can be a matter left to determination
348 Vol. 6:2
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN INDIA
by parties voluntarily. For instance, if companies wish to bring experts on
to their boards, they could do so without the existence of any law that
mandates the same. It is only the monitoring aspect that requires regulatory
oversight or mandate by law, and if that aspect is not being fulfilled by
independent directors, it may be argued that there is no merit in retaining
independent directors as a mandatory requirement by law. At one level, it
may seem outrageous to approach the issue from such an angle, but it
might be worthwhile to ask that question anyway, considering that the
present study seeks to strike at fundamental issues pertaining to the role of
independent directors in India.
At the same time, the analysis in this Article does not support a radical
proposal such as elimination of independent directors altogether in India.
These questions have arisen previously in the outsider systems as well,
where also there has been no empirical evidence of success of the concept,
but scholars have repeatedly avoided the path of calling for extinction of
independent directors. For example, it has been observed that "it is hard to
oppose more independent directors;"34 8 even more, "[t]o oppose the
institution of the independent director almost amounts to heresy;"3 49 and
"[a]ny jurisdiction that does not stipulate the need for independent directors
may find itself unable to attract capital to its securities markets."" The
outcome of the present research is to advocate a similar position.
Merely because the concept has not been fully effective, it is not
prudent to follow the radical approach of doing away with independent
directors."' Independent directors do bring significant value to corporate
governance not only in their advisory role, but also in their monitoring role.
If the requirement of mandating independent directors is done away with,
that would mean a loss of even the currently available (albeit minimal)
monitoring efforts on corporate boards in insider systems. Hence, what is
required is revamping of the structure of the institution and the support
systems available to independent directors to carry on their role more
effectively.
However, it is equally important not to be over-optimistic about
independent directors even within a reinforced set up. For reasons that
have perhaps been belabored at length earlier in this Article, it is not
possible for independent directors to perform any wondrous role that
ensures complete protection to minority shareholders, for example by
348. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 871, 892 (2002).
349. Rodrigues, supra note 85, at 457.
350. Tan Cheng Han, Corporate Governance and Independent Directors, 15 SING. ACAD. L. J. 355,
390-9 I (2003).
351. Commentators have noted that since it is a "universally acclaimed regulation" [sic], it ought to
be retained, and that any other approach would question its introduction in the first place as a misjudged
policy choice in these countries. Prithvi Haldea. The Naked Truth About Independent Directors (2009),
http://www.directorsdatabase.com/IDsMythPH.pdf.
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preventing frauds in companies on whose boards they sit. That simply
cannot be expected. Hence, it is incumbent upon the governments and
regulatory authorities in insider systems, and particularly emerging
economies such as India, to first comprehend the extent of utility of
independent directors and to devise a corporate governance regime with
that in mind, so that any over-optimism bias is eliminated. Similarly, the
regulatory authorities must moderate the expectation of the corporate
players in order to ensure that there is no over-reliance on independent
directors and that they are not seen as a solution to all corporate governance
ills that plague those economies. In other words, it is important that the
perceptional constraints that currently operate in India352 are carefully
addressed so that corporate actors obtain clarity on the role of the
independent directors and the extent to which they can make a difference to
corporate governance.
B. ALTERNATE STRUCTURES FOR APPOINTMENT OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
One of the significant weaknesses in the current structure for
independent directors in India relates to their nomination and appointments
process. Since controlling shareholders (who are to be monitored) have a
strong influence on the nomination and election process, the independent
director institution fails to have any bite to begin with. As we have seen,
independent directors tend to toe the line of the controlling shareholders as
the latter category of persons nominates, appoints, remunerations, renews
the term and can even remove the independent directors. This process
obstructs the efficacy of independent directors in protecting the interests of
minority shareholders. In terms of the way forward, one of the key areas
for reforms relates to the process of nomination and appointment of
independent directors. In this section, I propose to explore several alternate
structures for the appointment of directors (other than straightforward
election by shareholders) that may diminish the influence of controlling
shareholders and thereby instill greater independent in fact in such
directors. The details of each structure and a discussion of their advantages
and disadvantages precede the recommendations for an optimal structure.
I. Nomination Committee
Nomination committees consisting of independent directors are
mandatory in the U.S., as required by the leading stock exchanges, 353 and
352. As one commentator in India has observed: "f[iff almost the entire foundation of corporate
governance rests on the shoulders of the independent directors (/Ds). it is not beyond debate that the
foundation indeed is extremelyfragile." Id. (emphasis in original).
353. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Both the NYSE and the NASDAQ require the
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they have also been called for in the U.K.354 The role of the nomination
committee is to consider various candidates for appointment as independent
directors and to make recommendations to the full board.35" There are
various methods that nomination committees utilize before they make their
choice. These include consideration of candidates identified by external
consultants (e.g., recruitment firms), through recommendations from other
industry players, and quite often through names put forth by the
management itself.3 1 In many cases, nomination committees are required
to follow strict procedures and maintain utmost transparency in their
functioning.5 It has become almost customary for independent directors to
be nominated by nomination committees in outsider systems. However,
the requirement of nomination committees has only been recently
introduced in India, and that too in a non-mandatory form. 5 It is therefore
necessary to consider whether such nomination committees in India, even if
followed by a large number of companies, will adequately deal with the
problem of controlling shareholder influence in the appointment of
independent directors.
As far as outsider systems such as the U.S. and the U.K. are
concerned, nomination committees do serve a purpose. Since it is the
manager-shareholder agency problem that dominates the corporate
governance arena, the nomination committee moves the independent
director nomination process outside the purview of the management. When
nomination committee to be comprised entirely of independent directors.
354. The strands of this approach can be seen in the Cadbury Report. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text. The key recommendations of the Cadbury Report have been adopted in the U.K.'s
Combined Code for Corporate Governance, which requires the majority of nomination committees to
consist of independent directors. Combined Code 2008, supra note 146, f[ A.4.I. There is a similar
requirement in other Commonwealth countries. See e.g., in Australia, as recommended by the Bosch
Committee. FORD, AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 130, at 16.
355. See CHARLES A. ANDERSON & ROBERT N. ANTHONY, THE NEW CORPORATE DIRECTORS 94
(1986).
356. See Helen Bird, The Rise and Fall of the Independent Director, 5 A.J.C.L. 235, 251 (1995).
357. For example, one observer notes elaborate mechanisms to be followed by a nomination
committee:
The [nomination committee requirement] significantly expands the disclosures relating to the
director nomination process. A company is ... also required to: make the nominating
committee's charter publicly available, disclose whether the nominating committee members
meet . . . independence requirements, disclose whether the committee has a policy regarding
considering nominees recommended by shareholders, describe the minimum qualifications
for nominees recommended by the committee, describe the qualities and skills that the
nominating committee believes are necessary or desirable for board members, describe the
nominating committee's process for identifying and evaluating candidates and whether fees
are paid in connection therewith, disclose who recommended the nominee, and disclose the
identity of any candidate nominated by a holder of more than five percent of the voting
common stock, regardless of whether the nominating committee chose to nominate that
candidate.
Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased Shareholder Voice
in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W.L. REv. 361, 382 (2005).
358. See Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 333.
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an independent nomination committee picks candidates for independent
directorship, it presents the candidate to the shareholders for their vote.
Since the shareholders are dispersed in the outsider system and given the
existence of collective actions problems, it is conceivable that they would
vote for the candidate presented by the independent nomination committee,
and they are unlikely to come together to vote against a candidate (unless,
of course, there are some extraordinary circumstances). This process
effectively keeps the management outside the nomination and election
process.359
However, if this system is replicated in an insider system like India,
the outcome is likely to be different by quite a wide margin. Even if an
independent nomination committee were to nominate candidates without
the influence of the controlling shareholders or management, those
candidates would ultimately have to be voted at a shareholders' meeting,
where the controlling shareholders would wield significant influence.
While nomination and election are virtually seamless in the outsider
systems (due to lack of significant shareholder input), they are two
different processes in the insider systems. The nomination committee
tackles the first process, but it does not touch upon the second. Controlling
shareholders will continue to have the ability to sway the shareholder
decision on whether the candidate nominated by the nomination committee
should be appointed on not. Hence, nomination committees are compelled
to function in the shadow of an ultimate shareholder decision (with
controlling shareholder influence). For this reason, nomination committees
are unlikely to pick a candidate who does not have the tacit acceptance of a
controlling shareholder. It would be an embarrassment after all if the
person nominated by the nomination committee fails to muster enough
votes at a shareholders' meeting due to opposition from the controlling
shareholders. Implicitly, therefore, independent nomination committees
are likely to consult controlling shareholders before putting up names for
election.
Such a process is unlikely to effectively deal with the majority-
minority agency problem in India as independent director appointments
continue to be within the defacto control of the controlling shareholders.
Nevertheless, a nomination committee process is superior to the current
system of direct elections (without an independent nomination process). A
rigorous and transparent nomination process3 "o could minimize the
359. It is a different matter that criticisms have been levelled that management continues to play an
important role in the manner in which nomination committees select their candidates. For example,
quite often, nomination committees tend to rely extensively on candidates that have been identified by
management. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 202 (3rd ed., 2004);
ANDERSON & ANTHONY, supra note 355, at 94.
360. For a brief description of such a process.see supra Part VI.BI.
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influence of controlling shareholders. 6 '
The following proposals involve a change in the voting process for
election of independent directors and also in the constituencies that elect
them.
2. Minority Shareholder Participation in Independent Director Elections
Currently, independent directors in India are elected by shareholders
through the "straight voting" system, whereby a majority of the
shareholders present and voting for a resolution can determine whether or
not a candidate for independent directorship is appointed.362 It is the
straight voting system that confers dominance on controlling shareholders
in the appointment of independent directors, as minority shareholders do
not have any say at all. My proposal deals with the enhancement of
minority shareholder involvement in independent director elections. This
would make independent directors accountable to the shareholder body as a
whole (including the minority shareholders) as opposed to the sole
allegiance to controlling shareholders as currently practiced in India.
Minority shareholder participation can be introduced through two
principal methods: (i) cumulative voting by shareholders;3 3  and (ii)
election of independent directors by a "majority of the minority."3' At this
stage, it is imperative to discuss the rationale for minority shareholder
involvement in independent director elections before dealing with the
details of each of the two options.365
Minority shareholder involvement in director elections as a mandatory
matter is almost a rarity. However, historical accounts of cumulative
361. When independent nomination committees select candidates in a manner that is transparent to
all shareholders (and other stakeholders), controlling shareholders may find it difficult to veto the
appointment of such nominee as that would send negative signals about the company and its corporate
governance principles to the market, which could also impact the company's stock performance.
362. Bhagat and Brickley provide a simple description:
In most corporations board members are elected through "straight voting." In straight voting
each shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares held for each director
position. If a group controls 51 percent of the vote, it can elect the entire board of directors
by casting all of its votes for the candidate that it favors for each position.
Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting
Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 339 (1984). Note, however, that in straight voting any shareholding above
50 percent, i.e., one vote more than 50 percent, is sufficient to guarantee appointment of all directors. It
is not necessary to have "SI percent" as the authors suggest above.
363. For an introduction to the concept of cumulative voting, see supra note 188.
364. In this method, controlling shareholders will not be permitted to vote for the election of
independent directors. The independent directors will be elected by a majority of votes that are cast by
all the non-controlling shareholders. Hence the expression "majority of the minority."
365. Note, however, that the literature concerning the role of minority shareholders in director
elections is largely embedded in the context of cumulative voting rather than "majority of the minority,"
and hence any reference to cumulative voting in this rationale discussion will apply equally to the
"majority of the minority" even though no explicit reference is made to the latter.
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voting (including one by Professor Gordon) 66 indicate that it was a
prevalent practice in the early part of the 20th century, and was even a
mandatory provision for director elections in some states in the U.S. This
practice witnessed its demise first in the 1950s and thereafter in the 1980s
due to pressure from the managerialist forces.367 Managers sought to ensure
complete prominence in director elections without shareholder influence,
thereby perpetuating the manager-shareholder agency problem. The nearly
eliminated concept of cumulative voting (as a measure of minority
shareholder involvement in director elections) has found its resurrection
recently the form of a mandatory requirement in Russia.6
Minority shareholder participation in elections of directors in general
and independent directors in particular carries with it significant
advantages. First, minority shareholders obtain representation on the board
of directors,36 ' as they are unable to do so in the straight voting process.
Second, independent directors elected by minority shareholders will obtain
knowledge about various policy decisions that are being discussed on the
board. Knowledge itself is a significant advantage, and it is of special
significance where public disclosure of company information is not
advanced in the relevant jurisdiction.o This bears significance to
jurisdictions like India where the availability of company information is yet
not as wide as it is in the outsider economies.37 ' Third, independent
directors will be truly independent (of management and controlling
shareholders) and hence accountable to the minority shareholders as such
directors have been elected by that constituency. 372 Fourth, the minority
shareholders' voice will be heard on the board through independent
366. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 124 (1994) [hereinafter Gordon, Cumulative Voting].
367. Id. at 144. Professor Gordon further notes:
I have looked at salient historical factors operating during the two periods of rapid movement
away from mandatory cumulative voting, the 1950s and the 1980s. The evidence suggests
that at both times managerialist motives activated the process of legislative change: in the
1950s, managers wanted to reduce the threat of proxy contests which, among other
characteristics, seemed to jeopardize senior management tenure; in the 1980s, they wanted to
reduce the threat of hostile takeovers by eliminating a particular route to board
representation.
Id. at 148.
368. Currently, only the company law that was adopted in Russia over a decade ago contains a
mandatory provision for cumulative voting for director elections. KRAAKMAN, ET AL., supra note 43, at
55. See also Black & Kraakman, supra note 19.
369. Whitney Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. LAW.
3, 13 (1955).
370. Black & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 1947.
371. However, it must be noted that SEBI in India has taken significant steps in recent times to
improve disclosure of financial and other information by companies by prescribing detailed disclosure
norms, both in the primary markets as well as secondary markets.
372. Gordon, Cumulative Voting. supra note 366, at 133.
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directors elected by them."' Fifth, independent directors elected by
minority shareholders will have incentives to monitor the activities of
management and controlling shareholders against transactions that create
conflicts of interest.374 Finally, there is fairly unequivocal empirical
evidence that supports minority shareholder participation in director
elections through cumulative voting.7
On the other hand, minority shareholder representation on corporate
boards brings with it certain disadvantages. First, minority shareholder
representation could impede constructive decision-making on corporate
boards as it is likely to create frictions causing disruption in boardroom
activity. Second, due to the diversity of interests represented on the board,
it is argued that "minority representation schemes expose the firm to an
uncompensated risk of making inconsistent or illogical decisions."7
Third, it may be a device for certain minority shareholders to extract rents
out of management or controlling shareholders-a kind of blackmail, by
which the process can be subjected to abuse." Fourth, it could provide
avenues for competitors to put forth candidates as independent directors so
as to obtain information about the company and derive undue competitive
advantage."
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of minority
shareholder representation on corporate boards, I argue that the benefits of
this method of director election far outweigh its costs. Of course, minority
shareholder representation is likely to denude the collegiality on corporate
boards, but that is a small price to pay for the lack of effective monitoring
that exists on corporate boards currently in India where independent
directors are effectively the nominees of the controlling shareholders.
There may be complexities in the decision-making process, but the benefit
is effective monitoring that protects all shareholders (including the
373. Campbell, supra note 369, at 13. Another commentator observes:
... while criticism [of management and controlling shareholders] may be painful, it often
acts as an oven to refine out impurities or expose weaknesses. A board of directors' meeting
should be a place for hard work and clear thinking. It should not be run like a social club
where a person with unpopular ideas can be "blackballed" by those who don't like him. A
famous statesman is reported to have said: "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the
kitchen."
John G. Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAW. 316, 321-22 (1960).
374. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 366, at 170.
375. Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 362, at 364 (finding that the inclusion of a provision for
cumulative voting rights in charters of companies enhanced share values of such companies); Peter
Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: The Impact of ProxY Contests, II J. FIN. ECON.
401 (1983) (concluding that cumulative voting tends to benefit shareholders). The empirical studies in
this area may be limited, but they are at least consistent.
376. Frank. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. LAW & ECON.
395, 410 (1983).
377. Ralph E. Axley, The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 278, 283. See also
Campbell, supra note 369, at 13; Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 366, at 169.
378. Axley, supra note 377, at 283.
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minority). Objections such as rent-seeking behavior and exposure to
competition can also be carefully addressed. Rent-seeking by minority
shareholders can be avoided through a careful nomination process of
independent directors by an independent nomination committee.
Furthermore, as a matter of law, allegiance of independent directors to
competition could result in breach of duties by independent directors that
could expose them to potential liability under company law. In essence,
the perceived disadvantages of minority shareholder representation cannot
preclude the introduction of an otherwise beneficial method of independent
director election.
On a more theoretical plane, it is interesting to note that the arguments
against minority shareholder representation carry greater acceptability in
the context of outsider systems and that the concept is more attuned
towards an insider system like India. For instance, Professor Gordon notes
that the decline of cumulative voting is associated with the movement
among U.S. corporate structures from concentrated ownership to diffused
ownership.8 o Such a view finds overwhelming support."' In the context of
the theoretical analysis adopted in this Article, this only boils down to one
conclusion. Minority shareholder representation may not be necessary (and
may even be undesirable) where there is diffused shareholding, and hence
it is not seen as a mechanism for addressing the manager-shareholder
379. See infra Part VI.B.2.c.ii.
380. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 366, at 169. He states:
In the large public corporation there was no face-off between majority and minority interests;
rather, management was the party on the other side. Thus the potential role of cumulative
voting changed, from giving a minority a voice in a majority-dominated firm to giving a
minority a voice in a management-dominated firm. This led to a significant problem.
Management's control, because it rested only on the proxy machinery and on the majority's
apathy, seemed at risk in such a confrontation. Because a tenacious minority could do real
damage to management's position, management would face the temptation to accede to
various rent extraction proposals that a minority might present. In short, in the absence of a
majority check on minority power and without adequate monitoring of management by the
majority, the minority's power under a cumulative voting regime made the firm vulnerable to
hold-up.
Id.
381. Herbert F. Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 BUS. LAw. 550, 563
(1961). Sturdy notes:
The preceding case histories and comments deal principally with close corporations which
usually have an unchanging majority. About the only escape for the minority whose interests
are being abused is to be bought out in one way or another. Publicly held corporations are, on
the other hand, quite different in many respects. In the first place there is probably a market
in which the shares of a minority may be sold. Furthermore there is no fixed majority so that
one who is in the majority today may be in the minority tomorrow and vice versa. Because
shares are available to anyone on the market, and because of the fluidity of the majority
position. and because of the necessity of dealing with many proxies, it is in the publicly held
corporation that the results of mandatory cumulative voting can be seen at their worst.
Id. In this context, it is necessary to note that the liquidity in stock markets and the availability of free-
float stock (i.e.. that which is not held by the controlling shareholders) in insider systems is
considerably low making them similar to the kind of close corporation referred to by Sturdy.
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agency problem.38 2 However, where there is concentrated shareholding,
with a long-term controlling shareholder, minority shareholder
participation can make all the difference in being able to protect the
interests of minority shareholders. Contextually, therefore, minority
shareholder participation in director elections (especially of independent
directors) is an important tool in the hands of minority shareholders in
insider systems, and its benefits significantly exceed its costs in these
systems, thereby providing the requisite justification for introduction of
such a voting method in these jurisdictions.
In the backdrop of this discussion, it is now necessary to consider
some proposals for the specific application of minority shareholder
participation in independent director elections in India.
a. Cumulative voting
Cumulative voting will ensure that minority shareholders will have the
ability to elect such number of independent directors as is proportionate to
their shareholding in the company, thereby reducing the dominance of
controlling shareholders in the process. In this structure, each shareholder
gets to exercise such number of votes determined as the product of the
number of shares held by the shareholder and the number of independent
directors to be elected. A shareholder can exercise all votes in favor of a
single candidate or can split the votes among different candidates. In case
all votes are cast in favor of a single candidate, then that candidate may
have a chance of being elected depending on the total number of candidates
that are in the fray.




N number of directors who can be elected
x = number of votes exercised by a shareholder
d number of independent directors to be elected
v = total number of votes exercised in the independent director election
The key variables here are the number of votes available to a shareholder
(relative to the total shareholding of the company) as well as the number of
directors to be elected.384 Any change in either variable can alter the
possibility of minority shareholders effectively being able to influence the
382. This perhaps explains why cumulative voting was eliminated as a mandatory requirement in
the U.S., in addition to manager influence in the policymaking process.
383. Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 362, at 343.
384. Id. (explaining through an illustration that "if a corporation is to elect seven directors and it is
estimated that one thousand shares will be voted, a group controlling 126 shares can expect to elect one
director (if it cumulates its votes and votes for only one director)."
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overall outcome of the election.85 Therefore, the higher the number of
independent directors, the greater the chance that shareholders with smaller
stakes will be able to elect independent directors through cumulative
voting. The reverse holds good equally. Hence, the concept of cumulative
voting works only if the board of the company is large, which therefore
needs a larger body of independent directors that is mandatorily stipulated.
The advantage of cumulative voting is that it allows both controlling
shareholders as well as minority shareholders to elect independent directors
depending on the proportion of their respective shareholding. This creates
a suitable mix of persons who are acceptable to controlling shareholders
(and management) as well as truly independent directors. In that sense, the
interests of all parties (including minority shareholders) are likely to be
well-protected."' Furthermore, the management and controlling
shareholders may also benefit from the guidance and counsel of
independent directors that each of them may nominate. Such an election
process may create three distinct classes of directors: (i) executive or
promoter (non-independent directors), (ii) independent directors elected
through votes of controlling shareholders, and (iii) independent directors
elected by minority shareholders. This process will create a diverse board
representing varying interests, and hence it cannot be claimed that any
shareholder interest is left unprotected."'
385. Id. (making a small variation to their illustration to indicate that "in the example, if only five
directors are to be elected, it requires 168 shares (rather than 126) to elect one director."
386. Apart from cumulative voting, the result of proportional representation of minority
shareholders can be achieved through the system of single transferable vote. This is provided, for
example, as an option for director elections in India. See Indian Companies Act, supra note 189. A
scheme involving a single transferable vote is explained below:
Single transferable [("STV")] vote is a preference voting system for a multi-seat election....
With STV, however, the voters are allowed to indicate more than simply their first choice
among the candidates. Voters may also, if they wish, rank order candidates to reflect their
relative preferences among them. .. . Ranking candidates in order of preference in an STV
election enables votes that would be "wasted" on one candidate to be transferred to another
candidate. A vote is wasted in either of two ways. It could be cast in support of a losing
candidate, or it could be a "surplus" vote cast in support of a candidate who would win
without it. Rather than waste a vote in such situations, STV allows a vote to be transferred to
another candidate, provided the voter has specified a subsequent preference. STV is a voting
system designed to increase the proportion of voters in an election whose vote will ultimately
contribute to the election of a candidate.
Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution,
27 U.S.F. L. REV. 779, 788 (1993). While STV helps achieve the same result for minority shareholders
as cumulative voting, it is somewhat more complex as it requires voters to make multiple choices in
order of preference.
387. The second category of persons, i.e., those independent directors elected by controlling
shareholders may have an important role to perform as well, in terms of mediating the various interests
on the board. On the one hand they are elected by controlling shareholders, but on the other hand they
are independent (at least in form) as they will still be required to satisfy the definition of
"independence" under the relevant corporate governance norms applicable in the insider jurisdiction.
Their role will be akin to the 'mediating director' described by Professor Langevoort:
Such persons may not, for reasons often emphasized in the literature, be the best external
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The interests of minority shareholders will be truly protected in this
scheme only if the total number of independent directors is significant, but
not otherwise.388 In this context, there may be a question as to what is the
minimum number of independent directors for whose election the
cumulative voting method can be employed. Here, the present research
does not propose to identify any magical figure and to impose the same as a
criterion for the applicability of the rule. That would depend on a number
of factors such as broad shareholding patterns in companies in India, usual
board size, the minimum number of independent directors to be appointed
and the like. It would be best left to the discretion of regulatory authorities
based on further empirical analysis to crystallize that minimum number of
independent directors. Similarly, cumulative voting is effective only when
the minority shareholders (at least as a collective) hold a meaningful
number of shares, but even the determination of that number is best left for
determination on a case-by-case basis, without hazarding any guess as to a
magic number.389 Lastly, it is also necessary to provide that all independent
directors will have a concurrent term that runs for a pre-determined
period.39 () In that case, all independent directors will be elected for the same
term39 ' thereby providing a robust number for an election that makes
monitors. But they may well make up for this shortcoming as advisers to the management
and as emissaries to the true outsiders on the board. The same may be true of the so-called
"gray" directors.... But again, whatever their limits as monitors, their knowledge of, and
ties to, the senior managers put them in a good position to earn trust inside. They can then
build on this trust to work with the outsiders to reduce the level of cognitive diversity and
allow the board to function more efficiently. . . We have put forward two sets of less
conventional reasons why firms with "mixed" boards may be more productive than super-
independent ones. The first is that giving insiders a significant political presence on the
board may help both de-bias the outsiders and bolster the perceived quality and stability ...
The second reason is that overloading the board with true monitors may create too stark a
dilemma for the senior managers, forcing them to engage in impression management tactics
at the expenses of seeking needed advice and assistance in strategy formulation and resource
gathering.
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences ofIndependence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 815-16 (2001). This discussion
in the context of the manager-shareholder agency problem has its parallel in the majority-minority
agency problem as well.
388. Whenever there is a small number of independent directors, it is recommended that they be
appointed by the "majority of the minority" voting method discussed below. See infra Part VI.B.2.b.
389. Even here, where shareholding of the minority shareholders is minimal, then the appointment
of some, if not all, independent directors can be determined by a "majority of the minority." This can
be illustrated by certain companies in India, e.g., Wipro, which are listed on stock exchange both in
India and the U.S., but where the controlling shareholder holds in excess of 80 percent with very little
possibility of any minority representation on the board through the election of even a single independent
director.
390. For example, a three-year term would be customary and desirable, although there is no hard
and fast rule in that behalf.
391. In case any independent director's term comes to an end in the interim for any reason (such as
resignation, death, removal or the like), then it can be provided that the term of all independent directors
will come to an end at the ensuing annual general meeting where fresh elections are to be held.
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cumulative voting more meaningful. This is to guard against a situation
where minority shareholders do not have much power in cumulative voting.
For example, in a staggered board, only a small number of independent
directors will come up for elections each year, in which case cumulative
voting will not provide any meaningful role to minority shareholders for
reasons discussed earlier. If minority shareholders do not have a
meaningful role at repeated elections due to the slender number of
independent directors being elected, then the controlling shareholders enjoy
similar powers as they have in the case of straight voting. Hence, it is
important that all independent directors are elected together at the same
time, and not on a staggered basis.
b. Voting by 'majority of the minority'
In this schema, only the minority shareholders are entitled to vote for
the election of independent directors. Each independent director will be
elected so long as the candidate enjoys majority support within the
constituency comprising the minority shareholders. In this approach,
neither the controlling shareholder nor the management can influence the
appointment as they have no role at all. The controlling shareholders will
not be permitted to vote in independent director elections under this
proposal. Furthermore, this is useful where the number of independent
directors to be appointed is small whereby the system of cumulative voting
would render itself ineffective. This will result in true representation of
minority shareholders on corporate boards and instill accountability in the
minds of the independent directors towards minority shareholders.
The principal drawback of this proposal is that it could become subject
to "capture" by the minority shareholders. For example, minority
shareholders who may have an axe to grind with management or
controlling shareholders could put up candidates who may denude
constructive decision-making on the board. Moreover, it could also
provide avenues to competitors to gain entry into corporate boards. The
disadvantages of minority shareholder participation on corporate boards
will be greatly accentuated in the "majority of the minority" scheme than in
the cumulative voting scheme. Despite these drawbacks, this proposal
gives significant rights to minority shareholders so as to ameliorate the
majority-minority agency problem.
c. Evaluation of options for minority shareholder representation
Having considered the two types of minority shareholder participation
in independent director elections,39 2 it would be necessary to evaluate some
392. In addition to these two methods, there is another method sometimes employed to provide
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concrete proposals in the context of the issues identified in this Article.
i. Is there an optimal option?
For the reasons discussed in this section, minority shareholder
participation is the recommended option for election of independent
directors. However, as between the two options of cumulative voting and
"majority of the minority" as methods of such participation, this Article
would stop short of recommending one option over the other. That is
because the optimality of the option would depend on a number of
circumstances, such as the normal board size (including any minimum
number of directors required) and the number of independent directors to
be elected, the broad shareholding pattern of companies, and the like. It
should, therefore, be necessary to analyze these issues further to determine
which of the options suits the Indian corporate governance system in the
best possible way, given the operability of these factors. Nevertheless, as a
thumb rule, it is appropriate to say that cumulative voting would serve the
purpose in the case of large boards while the "majority of the minority"
would do so in the case of small boards.
ii. How to deal with the collective action problem
At this stage, an important question may arise in the reader's mind. If
powers of selection of independent directors are to be conferred on
minority shareholders, can there be an assurance that those powers will be
exercised in fact? Will the minority shareholders not suffer from the
collective action problem, thereby resulting in sub-optimal choices for
independent directors? These are valid questions indeed and need to be
addressed. At the outset, it is to be noted that the collective action problem
is more severe in the straight voting process than voting with minority
shareholder participation. In straight voting, it is almost certain that the
controlling shareholder will be able to influence the outcome of the
election, and hence minority shareholders rarely take part in the elections
as their votes do not affect the final outcome. The collective action
problem among minority shareholders is at its highest intensity because
succor to minority shareholders. This method imposes caps on shareholders' voting rights. See
KRAAKMAN, ET AL., supra note 43, at 55-56. For example, it can be stated that regardless of the
number of shares held by a shareholder, such shareholder can exercise voting rights in respect of only a
defined maximum number of shares (10 percent, just to illustrate). This would mean that a controlling
shareholder can exercise voting rights for 10 percent shares no matter what percentage of shares that
shareholder holds, while a coalition of minority shareholders holding more than 10 percent shares in the
aggregate could command a majority (so long as each of those minority shareholders hold less than 10
percent shares individually). This too would effectively provide controlling powers to the minority
shareholders.
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there is no benefit in forming any coalitions due to their inability to affect
the result. However, where the election process guarantees some level of
influence to minority shareholders (either through cumulative voting or
"majority of the minority"), they are likely to be incentivized to exercise
their ballot. Each vote could make a difference to the outcome. Hence, the
collective action problem among minority shareholders is likely to be far
lesser in voting with minority shareholder participation than in straight
voting.
But, such reasoning may not be adequate on its own. It is also
necessary to inculcate a greater sense of investor activism in India. The
process of activism, which has generated great interest even in the
developed nations only about a decade ago,393 has found its way into India
as well.3 94 The concepts of relational investing"' by institutional investors
such as private equity funds and venture capital funds as well as the
increase of participation by investors such as CalPERS and activist hedge
funds into India will raise levels of investor activism. Regulatory
authorities too can encourage investor activism through establishment of
investor associations that can take up causes on behalf of minority
shareholders, including by encouraging them to exercise their rights in the
corporate democracy."' Such measures would ensure that shareholder
participation is achieved not just as a legal matter, but in practice as well.
iii. How to prevent rent-seeking by minority shareholders
In order to ensure that the disadvantages of minority shareholder
representation are neutralized, it is necessary to adopt a stringent
nomination process that results in the selection of competent, committed
and impartial candidates who are put up for election by minority
shareholders. Such a nomination process can be accomplished by the
mandatory requirement of a nomination committee that carries on its
process with regard for due transparency. This would ensure that minority
shareholders (and other stakeholders) have adequate information about
candidates that stand for the post of independent directors as also their
competence levels and an understanding about the broad constituencies
393. See e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 233.
394. For example, in the Satyam case, it was activism in the form of excessive sale of stocks that
raised crucial questions regarding related party transactions with the Maytas companies. See supra Part
V.B.2.b.
395. In this arrangement, "institutions see themselves as long term investors in the firm-owners-
rather than as short term traders or arbitrageurs." Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 366, at 127.
396. For example, in India, SEBI already encourages and regulates the operation of investors'
associations. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, Investor Association Operatinos,
http://investor.sebi.gov.in/InvAssOperations.html. SEBI has also devised a scheme for funding such
associations that may initiate litigation against errant companies. Anindita Dey, SEB1 Proposes to Fund
Class Action Suits, BUSINESS STANDARD (India), June 1, 2009.
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they are likely to represent. This would act as an effective deterrence
against rent-seeking (including by competitors and alleged blackmailers).
Therefore, it is clear that minority shareholder participation would act as an
effective method of independent director election only if it is accompanied
by an unimpeachable nomination process that is truly independent.
iv. Renewal and removal of independent directors
The procedure for renewal of the term of independent directors ought
to be the same as that for a fresh appointment, i.e., through selection by an
independent nomination committee and election through minority
shareholder participation. As far as removal is concerned, there are some
key issues to be borne in mind. There is no benefit in having a carefully
considered election process for independent director if that can be undone
in one stroke by a straightforward removal process. For example, if
independent directors can be removed by a simple majority of shareholders,
then the controlling shareholders can reverse the effect of appointing
independent directors by removing them through exercise of their
influence.397 In order to obviate such a reversal, along with minority
shareholder participation in independent director elections, it is necessary
to impose stringent removal requirements. Either independent directors
can be removed by shareholders only for "cause" or they can be removed
with a supermajority that requires a higher threshold (of say 3/4 or 2/3
majority of shareholders voting for the resolution). This would ensure that
independent directors are capable of being removed only in extreme
circumstances, and not simply because such directors no longer enjoy the
trust of the controlling shareholders. Such a requirement is essential to
ensure that independent directors remain outside the influence of
controlling shareholders.
To conclude the discussion on selection of independent directors, the
recommended course of action is the nomination of such directors by an
independent nomination committee through a transparent process and the
election of such directors by way of minority shareholder participation
(either through cumulative voting or "majority of the minority").
C. CRYSTALLIZING THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
In addition to the appointment process, this Article identifies the lack
397. This could result in disastrous consequences that exacerbate the majority-minority agency
problem. For instance, one of the shortcomings of the revised company law in Russia is that although it
provided for director elections through mandatory cumulative voting, it continued to retain a straight
forward removal process (albeit with some differences) whereby controlling shareholders can wipe out
the effect of the cumulative voting process. See Yevgeniy V. Nikulin, The New Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Laow: Myth or Reality, 6 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 347, 371 (1997).
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of a clear role for independent directors as a key shortcoming of the
corporate governance norms in India. That leads to the question as to what
the role of the independent director ought to be.
It is recommended that the role consist of two parts: (i) advisory; and
(ii) monitoring. Independent directors need to bring value to the company
in terms of their ability to provide inputs on strategy, business, marketing,
legal, compliance or other relevant aspects and also carry out monitoring
functions (by acting as watchdogs) in order to protect the interests of
shareholders in general and minority shareholders in particular. The
corporate governance norms ought to clearly outline these rules so that
independent directors are not subject to any uncertainty on this front.
Admittedly, it may be too much to require every independent director to
perform both advisory and monitoring functions, and that may not be
practicable to begin with."' However, the board could be comprised of
independent directors with different capabilities so that the board as a
whole may be in a position to performance both these functions effectively.
More specifically, the monitoring aspects can be carried out by
independent directors only if they are conferred specific powers. It is not
sufficient if independent directors merely record any transaction or express
their opinion on the suitability thereof whenever that comes up for
consideration before the board, particularly where such transaction involves
self-dealing or other related party transaction between the company on the
one hand and the management or controlling shareholders on the other.
Currently, the powers conferred on independent directors are insufficient.
For example, in India the audit committee is required only to verify
disclosures pertaining to related party transactions.399 They have no
approval rights whatsoever even though related party transactions may
significantly enrich the controlling shareholders and erode the value of the
minority shareholders.oo Such a situation can be remedied if independent
directors are provided the exclusive right to approve certain types of
transactions involving related parties that reduce the value of the minority
shareholders. In such transactions, it is the minority shareholders who are
entirely under-protected under the current dispensation. It is not proposed
in this Article to list out the items that require the approval of the
independent directors. That would be a matter of detail to be suitably
tailored by the regulators in India, but the guiding principle to defining a
related party transaction is that it should include any transaction that
involves self-dealing with management or controlling shareholders, being
398. This aspect has been emphasized by Nolan, supra note 62, at 438.
399. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
400. Even in the Satyam case, we find that in the discussions pertaining to a significant related
party transaction, independent directors only raised questions, but in the end unanimously approved the
transactions as they were voting along with the non-independent directors, although the directors
representing the related parties themselves abstained. See supra note 277-82.
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any transaction that benefits management or controlling shareholders to the
detriment of the other (minority) shareholders.40 '
As a matter of procedure, it is necessary to ensure that such matters
for approval of independent directors are taken up at a separate meeting of
independent directors without the presence of management or controlling
shareholder representatives (i.e., in executive sessions). This is essential to
ensure that independent directors are able to freely exchange views among
themselves, adopt a proper position and make an impartial judgment. The
presence of management or controlling shareholder will negatively
influence the decision-making by the independent directors. Such an
approach may seem largely procedural, but it has enormous implications.
This procedure will help independent directors overcome several cultural
constraints that inhibit impartial decision-making by independent directors
in countries like India.
Identification of clear roles and functions by regulatory authorities
will not only introduce certainty in the minds of the independent directors
as to their tasks on corporate boards, but it will also manage the
expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders as to the level of
monitoring they can expect from independent directors. Regulators too
will be in a position to structure other corporate governance protections
around the clearly defined role of independent directors.
The next key issue pertains to the constituencies that deserve the
attention of independent directors. At the outset, it must be clarified that
independent directors are required to owe their duties to the company as the
separate legal entity.402 In that sense, all shareholders (whether controlling
or minority) will be the beneficiaries of directors' duties. Any breach of
such duties would be met with consequences that are normally provided
under law.
In addition to duties of directors generally, independent directors must
have a special duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders where
those rights are expected to come in conflict with those of the controlling
shareholder.403 In such circumstances, controlling shareholders do not
require any protection as they virtually dominate the affairs of the company
through their voting power. It is the minority shareholders who deserve
401. Guidance can be obtained from the relevant accounting standards that deal with related party
transactions. For example, clause 32 of the Listing Agreement incorporates concepts from the
Accounting Standards on "Related Party Disclosures" (AS-18) issued by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India. Listing Agreement, supra note 156, cl. 32.
402. Directors' duties are not statutorily enumerated in India, and they are adopted from common
law. Under those principles, duties are owed to the company and not individually to shareholders.
Since the company itself is an abstraction, courts have recognized that its interests equate to that of the
shareholders when the company is a going concern and also that of creditors when a company becomes
insolvent. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAw 391-79
(2003).
403. No such duty exists at all under current Indian law.
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protection through monitoring by independent directors. In case of a
breach of these duties, appropriate remedies need to be devised depending
on the types of shareholder remedies available in India. In that sense,
minority shareholders are a key constituency whose interests are to be
protected by independent directors.
By way of analogy, even where directors owe duties to the company
as a legal entity, the shield of separate legal personality breaks down in
certain circumstances such as where the company falls into insolvency.4
Similarly, it should be made possible to break down the legal personality
when directors decide on specific transactions such as related-party
transactions involving the controlling shareholders, where the specific
consideration by independent directors of minority shareholder interests
ought to educate or inform their decision-making and discharge of their
duties owed to the company.
D. OTHER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
In order to engender a workable institution of independent directors in
India, it is necessary to create an appropriate environment, both in terms of
legal requirements as well as other practical considerations. In this section,
I propose to highlight some of these key considerations. The intention here
is only to set out the broad principles in terms of recommendations without
insisting on specific changes or formulations. It is for regulators in India to
consider these principles and devise specific policies as may be
appropriate.
1. Defining Independence
In India, independence is currently defined with respect to the
existence of pecuniary or business relationships and family relationships.
These are quite narrow, and in India where the cultural backgrounds create
other forms of social relationships between individuals (such as extended
familial relationships and friendships and bonds between business families
that transcend generations), it is necessary for definitions of independence
to capture such relationships as well. The importance of social institutions
cannot be undermined.405 Admittedly, it is an onerous task for legal
definitions to capture such fluid relationships, but guiding principles can
nevertheless be set out without attempting very specific definitions. On
this count, I advocate a principles-based approach rather than a rule-based
approach. The latter is fraught with difficulties because bright lines always
404. Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors' Duties in Failing Firms, I J. Bus. & TECH. L.
529 (2007).
405. This issue has not been entirely resolved even in the outsider systems, although it has received
attention in rare cases. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938-39 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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lead to noncompliance in spirit as parties would tend to arrange their affairs
in such a manner as to stay out of the bite of the regulation with impunity.
Any such principles-based definition ought to capture the objective of
independence and the problems that are sought to be addressed through the
system of independent directors.
2. Competence and Qualifications
Current definitions of independence largely rely on the lack of
relationships between the director and the company, management or
controlling shareholder. It does not matter if the person is otherwise ill-
suited for the job. That leads to the appointments of persons who may not
possess any business acumen or other skills that are required of a director
on corporate boards. It is therefore necessary to introduce positive qualities
that individuals are required to display before they can occupy an
independent director's board seat."" This can be knowledge or experience
in the particularly industry in which the company operates, or even general
business and managerial skills, or other allied skills in areas such as
accounting, marketing, strategy, law and the like that the individual can
bring to bear on corporate boards. Any such skills would also enhance
monitoring on corporate boards. More importantly, at least one director
should have significant expertise in accounting and financial matters
because accounting fraud, manipulation and non-transparent disclosures
has been found to be a key corporate governance failure in insider systems.
Other "soft" factors ought to be kept in mind while appointing
independent directors. For example, there are often complaints that the
average age of independent directors is very high and that it is usually
male-dominated. These issues are to be addressed so that the element of
board diversity is maintained. This would bring persons with varied skills,
experience and backgrounds on to boards as independent directors.
3. Commitment
One universal concern in the insider systems is the lack of availability
of competent individuals suitable to don the mantle of independent
directors. The ones who have the necessary qualification and competence
are required to serve various boards, and hence find it difficult to commit
ample time to each board. One solution would be to specify that an
independent director shall spend a certain number of hours or days each
year for every company on whose board he or she serves. However, that
would be difficult to enforce or even effectively monitor. The other would
406. Some of these positive qualification requirements have been recently introduced in the
Voluntary Guidelines. See Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 333.
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be to specify the maximum number of companies on which independent
directors may serve and to keep that at a low number so that they can
justify their role on each board.407 While that would be a necessary
requirement, it may not command a "one size fits all solution." It would
depend on the competence levels of the directors, time available on their
hands (which would vary on the basis of whether they are gainfully
employed elsewhere) and the amount of work required on each board.
Hence, it is not appropriate to mandate the maximum number of boards on
which independent directors would serve, but to leave it to the independent
directors and the companies themselves to determine the specifics.
However, there ought to be a clear understanding under law that some level
of minimum commitment is essential.
One idea that is extremely attractive in the context of several of the
practical issues discussed in this Article (but one that is yet to find its way
into practice in a common way) relates to the appointment of professional
directors.4 08 Such directors' principal vocation is to serve on a handful of
corporate boards, from which they earn their living. The ability of such
directors to commit their time and attention as independent directors would
be tremendous, as they are not distracted by any other principal vocation or
profession. In practice, it is found that the concept of professional directors
is gradually finding its way into the corporate governance sphere in
India.409 However, this system needs to take on a more sustainable form,
and there is enormous opportunity for such a system of professional
directors to enhance the role of independence on corporate boards.
4. Cadre of Independent Directors
Professionalization can be taken to the next level through additional
steps. The first is training for independent directors. Introducing
mandatory training at the time of induction as well as continual training on
a periodic basis would ensure that independent directors are aware of their
roles and responsibilities. Apart from formal training, informal briefings
and caucuses would work as well. For example, forums where independent
directors get together and share their experiences would help in improving
best practices in the field.4 10 The learning from these trainings and forums
can be put to use by independent directors across all boards that they serve.
In addition, it is necessary for policymakers to explore the possibility
407. While there are caps on the number of boards that directors in India can serve, they are
arguably too high to be meaningful. Even the limit of seven boards introduced by the Voluntary
Guidelines appears excessive.
408. The concept of professional directors has been advocated notably by Professors Gilson and
Kraakman. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 233.
409. Practitioner interviews affirm the gradual emergence of this type of directorship in India.
410. Practitioner interviews indicate the existence of at least one such forum in India.
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of creating a cadre for independent directors through a certification process.
In this proposal, a regulatory authority or peer body would register
individuals as independent directors upon satisfaction of certain conditions,
including qualifications, experience, competence levels, training, and so on.
Such a certification would not only ensure uniform standards in
independent directors, but would also make such directors accountable to
their peers. This is similar to certification of lawyers, chartered
accountants, architects and other professionals. It may be premature at this
stage in the evolution of corporate governance in India to insist on
certification as a mandatory requirement, but it is an aspect which should
be attained eventually and policymaking efforts ought to clearly bear that in
mind.
5. Incentives
Independent directors need to be provided sufficient incentives to
carry out their functions effectively. Of course, compensation of
independent directors in monetary terms is the most measurable of the
incentives. Currently, monetary compensation of independent directors in
India is far from satisfactory, as we have seen in Part V.A.5. Therefore, it
is necessary to appropriately remunerate the independent directors so that
they take their job seriously, in a responsive and accountable manner. At
the same time, there is a risk of over-compensating directors that may cause
them to lose their independence. The monetary compensation should not
be so high that the independent director begins to rely heavily on the board
position, which will impinge on the impartial decision-making faculties of
such directors. It is critical that the line is drawn very carefully. It would
not be appropriate to fix specific limits and caps on independent director
remuneration, as that would be counterproductive. However, it is possible
to lay down some rules of thumb. The guiding factor should not be the
relevance of the remuneration with reference to the financial size of the
company itself. Rather, it should bear relevance to the overall earnings of
the independent director. In other words, any limit should be placed as a
percentage of the director's overall earnings, as that would determine
whether the director will place greater reliance on the board position that is
a necessary means of earning and hence not act entirely dependent. Even
here, a principles-based approach would augur well.
One of the significant forms of independent director compensation is
through stock options.4 ' The advantage of stock options is that it provides
the independent directors with a stake in the fortune of the company and its
business. In that sense, it motivates independent directors to act in a
411. Stock options for independent directors is beginning to take on an important form of
compensation in India.
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manner that preserves shareholder value. However, adequate care is to be
taken to ensure that some of the perverse incentives that operate in stock
options do not flow over to independent directors as well. First, holders of
stock options are motivated to increase the short-term earnings of
companies so that they are able to encash on their options. 4 12 This is often
at the cost of long-term performance of the company. Second, any stake in
a company obtained by independent directors ought not to exceed
predetermined maximum limits. For example, in case independent
directors obtain a controlling position (more likely defacto in nature) in a
company, such director is perhaps likely to act as any controlling
shareholder would do rather than in the interests of the minority
shareholders. That would defeat the very purpose of appointment of
independent directors in insider systems. These perverse incentives of
stock options must always be guarded against.
Finally, there are certain non-monetary incentives that would propel
independent directors to perform well. Reputation of independent directors
is primary among them. A reputable independent director can be assured
of directorships in a greater number of companies. This reputation effect in
turn creates a market for independent directors, thereby enhancing the
importance of that institution. However, it is important to ensure that such
a reputation market for independent director is correlated only to his or her
performance (in the interests of the shareholders, particularly the minority)
and not with reference to allegiance shown towards management or
controlling shareholders. Performance in such a market is to be determined
with reference to identified criteria that is justified in the context of such a
role.4 13
6. Disincentives
One of the significant disincentives that drives competent individuals
away from independent directors is personal liability for non-compliance of
law by the company. This, as we have seen, is a crucial issue in India, 414
due to which individuals are not only reluctant to take up independent
director positions, but even existing independent directors have been
resigning in droves. This issue needs to be addressed.
First, the liability regime ought to take into account the fact that
independent directors are not involved in the day-to-day management of
the company. Hence, they cannot be held liable for matters that are not
412. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer G. Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize
Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83
(2000).
413. For details of such performance evaluation criteria, see infra Part VI.D.8.
414. The case involving the directors of Nagarjuna Finance highlights this issue in the Indian
context. See supra Part V.B.3.
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within their knowledge, or those that they were not capable of identifying
on their own.415 In that sense, all directors (whether independent or
otherwise) will be subject to a basic minimum duty of care. However,
executive directors may be subjected to a higher standard as they not only
possess business expertise but also greater knowledge regarding the affairs
of the company. Independent directors cannot bear such higher burden.
Such a regime must be made clear.
Further, independent directors need to be provided the benefit of
indemnities by the company and also D&O insurance policies. In case
independent directors take actions genuinely that result in potential
liabilities, such as for simple negligence, these protective provisions are to
be attracted. Companies should be required mandatorily to provide such
indemnities and D&O insurance policies. These requirements must be
applied as a matter of practice each time an independent director is
appointed to a company's board.
Legislatures and courts must be educated about the precarious position
with reference to independent directors and their liability. For example,
criminal legislation should not be utilized by the state or the courts to
harass independent directors in a manner that extracts benefits from the
companies.41 Even if such criminal actions may not ultimately succeed, it
causes significant hardships to the independent directors as they are
required to devote time and attention to defend themselves, leading them to
forego their primary professional commitments thereby raising the
opportunity costs. More importantly, it causes severe reputational
hardships to such independent directors. All these problems tend to be
compounded in insider systems such as India where courts are prone to
delays in resolution of disputes. The pendency of such disputes for a
prolonged period of time enhances direct costs and reputational losses
significantly.
7. Other Supporting Factors
Independent directors cannot function effectively without a conducive
environment. At the outset, it is necessary to ensure that independent
directors obtain all relevant information that enables them to make
considered decisions on matters. There needs to be a regular flow of
information from management (and controlling shareholders) to
independent directors. Furthermore, independent directors should have
415. This refers to the concept of "red flags" whereby directors are expected to identify and raise
questions regarding issues that are quite obvious on their face without having to make any in-depth
enquiries. For a more detailed discussion on "red flags,"see In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litig., 346
F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
416. The Nagarjuna Finance case is a classic example of what appears to be the victimisation of the
independent directors.
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direct access to key company officials without going through management
(or controlling shareholders), as it is important to make sure they receive
information that is not filtered at any level.
If independent directors are to decide impartially, they should be
allowed to meet without management in executive sessions. This should be
a requirement of the corporate governance norms. If this is not made
mandatory, independent directors may not convene such separate meetings
for fear of showing mistrust of the controllers. However, when it is made
mandatory, independent directors can do so without any such fears. This is
an important step as boards in India may tend to be more collegial showing
reverence (sometimes misguidedly) to the person in control, all of which
act as an obstacle to the impartial thought process of independent directors.
Executive sessions will permit issues to come to the fore and for issues to
be dealt with threadbare.
Independent directors must also be provided the option to engage
experts and consultants on specific matter. These include forensic auditors
(in case of suspected fraud), chartered valuers (in case of sale or purchase
of business), lawyers (in case of a serious litigation or compliance issue)
and the like, all at the cost of the company. This is so that independent
directors obtain the benefit of expert advice on specific or complex matters.
This is even more important in light of the proposal that independent
directors should separately approve related party transactions.
8. Performance Evaluation
Independent directors will be made more accountable if their
performance is evaluated periodically-at least once a year. Currently,
only very few companies in the insider systems follow such performance
evaluation of independent directors. It is important to determine the factors
and metrics on the basis of which the independent directors are evaluated.
Those should be consistent with the roles and responsibilities of the
independent directors and also to the extent to which the interests of the
relevant constituencies (such as minority shareholders) have been
protected. Of course, this cannot be a purely quantitative exercise, as it
involves subjective factors. However, it is possible for companies to
appoint external consultants (such as human resources management firms)
to carry out such performance evaluation. Ultimately, it is for the chairman
of the company as well as the nomination committee to determine the
performance of independent directors (based on relevant reports) and
decide whether the term of such director should be renewed or not. Such a
process of constant evaluation of independent directors would motivate
them to perform effectively in a manner that fulfills their roles and
functions.
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E. ROLE OF THE LAW AND OTHER FACTORS
While a number of recommendations have been made in this Part, not
all of them require legislation to implement. Certain aspects require a
legislative framework before they can be effective. These include the
definition of independence, voting systems for election of independent
directors, clarity regarding the duties, role and allegiance of independent,
mechanisms for compensating directors and fixation of liability. However,
various other aspects such as commitment in terms of time, procedures for
receipt of information and conduct of board and independent director
meetings are matters for which the legal regime needs to provide for some
basic principles, but the detailed working are to be left to the various
corporate players to devise.4 17 These matters will vary among companies
and hence some level of flexibility is called for. Moreover, these matters
will need to be developed in the form of standard practices, and in that
behalf, various business associations and director forums could play a more
significant role than legislation. Regulators in India therefore need to fine-
tune items of regulation that required the mandate of the law and other
matters that need to be developed as good practices. Both are essential to
engender a workable institution of independent directors in the insider
systems.
Finally, it is necessary to reiterate that the independent director
institution is only one of the mechanisms that would enhance corporate
governance in India. That institution, as we have seen, cannot work by
itself. It requires to support, and be supported by, a whole host of other
attributes such as a stringent accounting and financial disclosure regime,
whistle blowing mechanisms, a code of ethics, and even perhaps an open
market for corporate control, just to name a few. The role of independent
directors should also be supported by other gatekeeper functionaries such
as accountants, investment bankers, corporate and securities lawyers,
securities analysts, rating agencies and even the business press. The
effectiveness of the independent directors also depends on other systemic
factors. For example, it even requires courts in India to be in a position to
rule efficaciously on corporate and securities law aspects, set precedents for
lower courts to follow and create a set of principles that imbue certainty in
the functioning of independent directors as emissaries of enhanced
corporate governance. Lastly, independence is not something that can
entirely be ordained by the law. It is a matter involving ethics and integrity
whereby independent directors have to put before themselves the interests
of those that they are to protect. That is a characteristic that should
permeate into the corporate ecosystem in India if enhanced corporate
417. To that extent, the coverage of some of these aspects in the Voluntary Guidelines is note-
worthy.
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governance is to be achieved. While law does play an important role in
creating the conditions for institutions like independent directors to carry
out their functions, the success of that institution also depends to a large
extent on the individuals that occupy that position and the cultures and
practices that are prevalent in India.
In this Part, I suggested various reforms to strengthen the institution,
specifically given the majority-minority agency problem that is prevalent in
India. I also found that while some of the requirements can be mandated
through law, other matters must be left for the various corporate actors and
peer review bodies to determine on the basis of given circumstances, as a
"one size fits all" approach may fail. It is necessary to mention a word of
caution. The effect of strengthening the position of independent directors
in the insider systems should not mean that such directors adopt a
confrontational attitude towards management and controlling shareholders.
That would result in disastrous consequences. Constant deadlocks in the
boardroom would result in sub-optimal business performance, and in the
end it will be the shareholders (minority included) who are likely to suffer
adversely. The enhanced powers require individuals in the position to act
rationally and perhaps even empathetically to the insiders who are
responsible for running the business of the company. Such individuals
ought to act independently and impartially without opposing every proposal
put forth by the insiders. The availability of extensive powers at hand,
however, is important as they may be required to be exercised, albeit
sparingly, if there are transactions that may likely benefit the insiders at the
expense of the minority shareholders. Unless the legal regime confers
sufficient powers, independent directors will be left immobilized. But,
those powers are required to be exercised in the overall interest of the
company. Ultimately, in the end analysis, all directors (including
independent) have to strive to create value to the shareholders having
regard to the interests of the other stakeholders as well. That basic
objective cannot be compromised.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article examined a key question: what is the effect of
transplanting a corporate governance norm, specifically the independent
director, from the outsider systems (where it has originated) to an insider
system such as India? The theoretical foundations of independent directors
and the rationale for their emergence in outsider systems are inextricably
linked to the manager-shareholder agency problem in those systems. There
has been a selective transplantation of various independent director norms
from those outsider systems to insider systems such as India (where the
majority-minority agency problem is prevalent), which was driven by the
forces of globalization and with possible convergence towards the outsider
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model. A review of the empirical studies and the anecdotal evidence does
not instill confidence in the effectiveness of independent director
functioning in India. What is required therefore is an overhaul of the
corporate governance norms so as to embolden India independent directors.
While this Article dealt with the transplant effect of independent
directors from the outsider systems of the U.S. and the U.K. to the insider
system of India, it also sought to provide general guidance on the types of
issues that may arise in the implementation of the concept in other insider
systems, particularly those that are emerging economies. China, Brazil,
and Russia immediately come to mind,4 8 but there are other countries
similarly situated in the evolution of corporate governance norms within
their systems. Further research will help verify whether the conclusions in
this Article are universal across all insider systems or whether they are due
to factors that specifically at play in India.
418. These countries, along with India, are referred to as the BRICs. Goldman Sachs, Dreaming
With BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003), available at http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf (predicting that, if things go right, in less than 40
years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms; currently they are
worth less than I5 percent).
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